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respeckKnuckles t1_j0apq5l wrote

I asked for an operationalizable, non-circular definition. These are neither.

> the state of knowing that you know something and can analyze it, look at it from different angles, change your mind about it given new information, and so on.

Can it be measured? Can it be detected in a measurable, objective way? How is this not simply circular: truly understanding is defined as truly knowing, and truly knowing is defined as truly understanding?

> Today's AI language models have lots of information contained within themselves, but they can only use this information to complete prompts, to add words to the end of a sequence of words you give them. They have no memory of what they've done, no ability to look at themselves, no viewpoints. There is understanding of the world contained within their model in a sense, but THEY don't understand anything, because there is no them at all, there is no operator there which can do anything but add more words to the end of the word chain.

This is the problem with the "argumentum ad qualia"; qualia is simply asserted as this non-measurable thing that "you just gotta feel, man", and then is supported by these assertions of what AI is not and never can be. And how do they back up those assertions? By saying it all reduces to qualia, of course. And they conveniently hide behind the non-falsifiable shell that their belief in qualia provides. It's exhausting.

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Purplekeyboard t1_j0ar5ea wrote

>Can it be measured? Can it be detected in a measurable, objective way?

Yes, we can measure whether someone (or some AI) knows things, can analyze them, take in new information about them, change their mind, and so on. We can observe them and put them in situations which would result in them doing those things and watch to see if they do them.

An AI language model sits there and does nothing until given some words, and then adds more words to the end of the first words which goes with them. This is very different from what an AGI would do, or what a person would do, and the difference is easily recognizable and measurable.

>This is the problem with the "argumentum ad qualia"; qualia is simply asserted as this non-measurable thing that "you just gotta feel, man", and then is supported by these assertions of what AI is not and never can be. And how do they back up those assertions? By saying it all reduces to qualia, of course. And they conveniently hide behind the non-falsifiable shell that their belief in qualia provides. It's exhausting.

I wasn't talking about qualia at all here. You misunderstand what I was saying. I was talking about the difference between an AGI and an AI language model. An AGI wouldn't need to have any qualia at all.

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Forms_Deep t1_j0b2vw6 wrote

Sorry to butt in, but I took your statement "Having an experience of understanding the world" as a reference to qualia also.

If it isn't, could you explain what you mean by "experience of understanding" and how it can be measured?

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