Was it a good Idea for vercingetorix to take refuge with his army in Alesia in 52bc?

Submitted by thereasonyousuffer t3_10ujzp2 in history

Obviously it was a very well fortified town and would have given him a base level advantage against the romans in combat but I have seen people saying the decision caused the rebellion to fail indirectly and allowed it to be smothered more easily somehow, I don’t really understand it.

Also if caesars estimations of the figures are to be believed, the Gaulish army in the city was far larger than his own and in addition to a quarter of a million reinforcing warriors, it’s hard to believe Caesar could have won a stand up battle, especially one in which the Gaulish cavalry could be on standby to intercept his own Germanic allied cavalry which carried the day historically by charging the rear of the main Gaulish infantry force who were stuck into an assault on the outer siege works. This knowledge about the Germanic cavalry arguably wouldn’t really be available to Vercingetorix at the time though, I say arguably because they defeated his own in a previous battle. (He had far less cavalry then though.

Also the reinforcing Gaulish army took time to muster and arrive, that time arguably could only have been bought by a drawn out siege.

Last point, the armies within Alesia were forced to launch their own attacks on The Roman siege works which probably negated or reversed the effects of being in a defensible position.

I Would love to hear peoples opinions and thoughts on this.

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Gadgetman_1 t1_j7d3w1y wrote

A siege, where the Roman army is on the outside is always a bad situation.

Romans KNEW how to besiege a walled city or fortress. They would very quickly put up their own walls locking the defenders inside, and giving themselves unhindered access to all the resources outside.

And they never stop at just putting up pallisades. There's towers, strong gates, ditches and spikes. Layer upon layer of defenses and obstacles that will slow and funnel any breakout.

Vercingetorix lost the moment the first pallisades were put up.

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toddklindt t1_j7e6dx0 wrote

Dan Carlin did a podcast on this battle. He mentioned (I'm paraphrasing) that Roman soldiers were 50% soldier and 50% construction worker. Like you said, they KNEW how to besiege. Once the legion showed up they got to building.

Edit: Dan's podcast, The Celtic Holocaust

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Gadgetman_1 t1_j7esq8e wrote

Consider them the first professional Combat Engineers.

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ThoDanII t1_j7fuf62 wrote

Oh I think the Sumerians, Babylonian and Persian as well as Alexander would say they had been first

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454C495445 t1_j80dyoa wrote

"You cannot besiege Tyre! We are fortified on an island!"

Alexander: "WE WILL BUILD A BRIDGE TO YOUR ISLAND"

O.O

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warhead71 t1_j7fjp0i wrote

Construction, battle in orderly manners and military infrastructure (supply and retreat) is what Roman’s at this point did best. They were usual not good when things became chaotic - but legions were at this point given a lot of autonomy - and Caesar’s troop had a lot of experience. Caesar wanted a lot of slaves/gold - I would think he best chance to win would be to slaughter as many as his south-Gaelic Allie’s and plunder the Roman’s supplies - while some troop keep Caesar occupied

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Jo_LaRoint t1_j7f0yby wrote

I don't know if I agree with the idea that he lost the moment the first palisades were put up. Accounts I've seen tend to make the battle seem like a close run thing at a few different points.

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Tuga_Lissabon t1_j7fezi7 wrote

Let's say before he still had some good chances, particularly if he could avoid them until the huge relief army appeared, but once he was caged in the odds shifted brutally.

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ThoDanII t1_j7cj2uf wrote

caesars number are IMHO most likely pure propaganda fantasy.

There was no way the gauls could have supplied 250.000 men in one army neither could rome.

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MrBrutok t1_j7ewfzz wrote

There is a neat little trick to get better numbers. Romans liked to include civilians in the number of the enemy to make their victories sound greater.

In a pre-industrial nation you can expect halve the people to be children. Half again for the women, who didn't fight at the time. Take a bit of for the elderly and you land at ~50.000 fighting men. Much more reasonable.

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thereasonyousuffer OP t1_j7exdhf wrote

But is a field army representative of the whole Gaulish population?

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MrBrutok t1_j7f5tjw wrote

Pretty much. Unlike the Romans, Gauls didn't have a standing military so the same calculation applies. When you know how many men of fighting age a population has, you know how many soldiers it could field.

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ThoDanII t1_j7fuoag wrote

Not really the problem is supply and running the farms .

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Tuga_Lissabon t1_j7ff3tx wrote

Not a relief army. There will be quite some hanger's on and camp followers, of course.

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aitorbk t1_j7fc0bl wrote

It is a self promotion book.
It is the first and only book I have fully read in latin, and I highly recommend reading it.. the self promotion is hilarious, it is unintentionally funny.

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Constant_Count_9497 t1_j7cw5ge wrote

While I agree is best to be skeptical about army numbers, given what historians project as the entire population of pre Roman Gaul (being around 5 million people) those numbers are fairly reasonable

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ThoDanII t1_j7d08v5 wrote

In total maybe as one army without starving to death not really

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Constant_Count_9497 t1_j7d14u9 wrote

I think you underestimate the technology and structure of ancient cities

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ThoDanII t1_j7d1yo3 wrote

after a while Vercingetorix forced the noncombatants to leave the city because he run out of food.

AFAIK the died in the no mans land

I meant armies in the field outside of waterways logistic was limited to drawn carts or waggons, the draft animals need to eat

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stsk1290 t1_j7jyzuw wrote

There were over 500,000 soldiers at Leipzig; they also needed food and were relying on carts and wagons.

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ThoDanII t1_j7k5p26 wrote

And they did not march as one army on one road

The different armies itself had been divided into corps

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stsk1290 t1_j7kix6s wrote

Did anybody claim that the Gallic armies were marching on one road?

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ThoDanII t1_j7kwt1e wrote

IIRC nobody claimed different armies

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stsk1290 t1_j7kxwjr wrote

You should reread it then, as the relief army was composed of the armies of some 20 Gallic nations.

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ThoDanII t1_j7kye4p wrote

The point is not out how many nations they came but if they campaigned as one force

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stsk1290 t1_j7kzwkn wrote

They came from all over Gaul, met up at Alesia and fought there.

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bbadi t1_j7dcsad wrote

To answer your question, yes it was.

Vercingetorix tried to replicate the conditions that led to the Roman defeat at Gergovia: a well fortified city, natural defenses that multiply said entrenchments, calling his allies and flipping Caesar's...

He was largely successfull, but the plan had a massive hole, which was Alesia not being prepared to support the army and population at the same time, plus, Caesar managed to stockpile enough shit to survive a siege.

From that point on the plan fails because V can't get the rescue army fast enough to avoid Caesar from building a double wall, and thus, by the time it arrives it was too late, Caesar had turned what was supposed to be a siege that would stretch and break his supply lines to one that did exactly that to his enemies.

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Yezdigerd t1_j7os5rf wrote

Right it also was an attempt to take advantage of the Gallic numbers. The Roman's had repeatedly shown they were the master of the pitched battle due to organization. While the Gallic warriors by themselves were outstanding warriors. By pinning the Roman against a fortified position that had to be fully encircled the Roman forces would have to be spread thin and struggle to maneuver. so it would hopefully turn into into an extended meat grinder. It wasn't too late either. The Roman forces were very close to be overwhelmed during the battle. I think Vercingetorix underestimated the Roman's ability to fortify and stay in his position. In all it was a very ballsy move since Caesar's army was very large too and he was deep into Gallic territory once behind his wall no more supplies would get to him either.

I always wondered why Vercingetorix didn't kick all civilians out of the city early though.

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ExoticButters79 t1_j7ct43i wrote

It was less a failure on V's part and more a testament to Ceaser, the Roman legion, and the everyday foot soldier.

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driantulasgoboing t1_j7f4mhj wrote

And yet one Gaulish village yet remains, holding out against Caesars forces…

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Raphius15 t1_j7emkyg wrote

Vercingetorix wasn't the only leader in the city of Alesia during the siege. All decisions (attacks, retreats, army and food managements and so on... ) had to be decided with a consensus with the other Gaulish leaders... Which add complexity to this situation.

It was a terrible mess between them and probably some calls could have given advantages to the Gaulish and maybe a different outcome to the siege.

You have to get in mind that Vercingetorix and Caesar were long time friends before the siege so they knew each other's strengths and weaknesses. So, Vercingetorix knew what he was doing but sometimes, not listened.

I am blaming the Gaulish leaders for bad managements and Vercingetorix took the fall.

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dmastra97 t1_j7f25a0 wrote

Caesar did get lucky with being able to fight on two fronts. We'd be very close to the Romans losing and us asking whether Caesar was doing the wrong choice staying in enemy territory with another army incoming

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SchmilkBoii t1_j7e9a1n wrote

The decision by Vercingetorix, a Gaulish chieftain, to retreat to Alesia in 52 BC with his army was a strategic one that had both advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, the location of Alesia offered a strong natural defense, as it was surrounded by high walls and rivers, making it difficult for the Roman army to penetrate. This gave Vercingetorix and his army some time to regroup and prepare for a potential siege.
However, by retreating to Alesia, Vercingetorix effectively cut himself off from the rest of Gaul and any possible reinforcements. This made it easier for the Roman army, led by Julius Caesar, to surround and lay siege to Alesia. The Romans built fortifications and roads around Alesia, which made it difficult for Vercingetorix to break out. The Gauls eventually surrendered, and Vercingetorix was taken prisoner and eventually executed.
So, whether it was a good idea or not depends on how one views the situation. If Vercingetorix was looking for a short-term solution to regroup and gather his forces, then the decision to retreat to Alesia may have been the right one. However, if he was looking for a long-term solution to maintain control over Gaul, the decision to retreat to Alesia may have been a mistake.

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