How did Stanley Baldwin survive as Tory Party leader for so long?

Submitted by Radical_GRD t3_xxkbtz in history

Stanley Baldwin is remembered by most as a successful Conservative Prime minister, governing the country on three separate occasions between May 1923 to January 1924, from November 1924 to June 1929, and from June 1935 to May 1937.

But for the early years of his leadership, Baldwin was of questionable talent as a leader. Stanley Baldwin was popular enough to command enormous majorities at the ballot box by the mid-1930s, but he forced a hung parliament in 1923 when an election was arguably unnecessary (allowing for the first Labour Government) and again in 1929. Many political parties have lost their position for far less than this. It seems that he should have lost his mandate in 1923, as most leaders would have. What was it about Baldwin, who had many internal enemies, that allowed him to remain leader despite odds? Was there no clear alternative to succeed him?

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harriofbrittannia t1_isupvb9 wrote

Great question.

I don’t know much enough about Baldwin. Will do some reading and come back

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Scitianwarrior t1_ircymyj wrote

Perhaps the British people would be confused between their immediate needs and the ideal of avoiding a new great world war at the cost. They were the golden years of militant pacifism and Baldwin smelled that contradiction of feelings on the one hand and claims on the other and he promised both things: the return of pre-war prosperity and on the other the reassurance of a permanent peace maintained at a Germany defeated in a situation of destitution while its lobbyists reassured with the promise that the Weimar Republic would fulfill its commitment and pay the indemnities established by the Versailles Treaties of 1918-1919 that Baldwin and the majority of the Conservative Party knew that payment was impossible by a melted and prostrated Germany, forced to be a Republic and Democracy by force... As the saying goes "there is no better wedge than the same stick!" confusion of the masses in a time as difficult as the 20's and 30's in a Great Britain traumatized by the Great War and the subsequent crisis the loss of posts of t labor and the world recession, to obtain political gains for the Torys and block the way for Labor and Radicals Winston Churchill was the only dissonant voice in that evangelical choir of peace, and salvation who was not unaware that the world was on fire in many parts but the important thing was to keep the people uninformed and hopeful in a tomorrow that sings.

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Doctor_Impossible_ t1_ird934l wrote

>on the other the reassurance of a permanent peace maintained at a Germany defeated in a situation of destitution while its lobbyists reassured with the promise that the Weimar Republic would fulfill its commitment and pay the indemnities established by the Versailles Treaties of 1918-1919 that Baldwin and the majority of the Conservative Party knew that payment was impossible by a melted and prostrated Germany,

This isn't true. Germany could have paid reparations, they chose not to. Germany was initially to pay some 132 billion marks. That number was essentially fictional, and they did end up paying some 8 billion marks in the interim period which were largely contributions towards things like occupation costs, which technically speaking were not reparations.

One of the ongoing problems was Germany paying in kind (coal, timber, steel, dyes, etc). While cash payments were rare, payments in kind were more reliable, but were still technically defaults, as Germany refused to supply the amounts it had agreed. 1920-1922 for instance, Germany fell short by some 15,000,000 tons of coal, while it was simultaneously exporting coal to Austria and Switzerland at a good markup. This is especially indicative of bad faith for several reasons; payments in kind were based upon (and revised downwards from) German offers, the shipments were arranged by Germany at a fixed price in paper marks, which Germany had intentionally devalued, allowing them to fund such deliveries at impossibly low prices, and shipments continued to fall short, even as Germany received further funding in loans and bounties for development of industries and deliveries respectively.

In 1921, Germany did actually pay 1 billion marks in full, largely because there were troops occupying custom posts in western Germany, but after that paid 13 million marks in late 1921 and 435 million in 1922. During this time inflation spiralled, largely thanks to enormous amounts of paper marks being printed. The Germans blamed reparations for this, at the same time as they barely paid anything, proving inflation and reparations payments were in fact entirely decoupled, and inflation was a very handy ploy to pay back domestic debt, and state enterprise costs, as well as dodge reform and reparations. All told, Germany paid out approximately 20 billion marks, but during this same period received some 35 billion marks in loans.

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Scitianwarrior t1_irdsiv9 wrote

For your information, I refer you to two admirable English personalities for me and for the World who were the opposite of those who, like you, justified the war indemnities imposed on Germany by the Versailles Treaties. I am referring to Winston Churchill and the 1st chapters of his book "The 2nd World War - (1951) in particular the 1st chapter entitled: The follies of the victors. And the other Englishman was John Maynard Keynnes, former secretary of the Royal Treasury and his book: The Economic Consequences of Peace (1920) They will tell you better than this humble citizen of Uruguay because they had not only the fear but also the conviction that the infamous Treaties would be the cause of another war with Germany and much worse than the 1st.!

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Civil-Secretary-2356 t1_ire02h3 wrote

I can't speak on the subject with any great authority. However, your two sources as questionable. Im an admirer of Churchill, but he is questionable as a historian of the age. There are also criticisms of Keynes, that he was unduly influenced by, I think, one or two of his close sources on the continent. Again, I'm not saying who is right and wrong here, just that it is an ongoing debate.

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Scitianwarrior t1_irefsgq wrote

Equal, I am not a professor or academics in nothing, I am just someone who wants to know the origin of things and I do not pretend any revealed truth if perhaps there is such a thing! If your opinion about Churchill and on Keynnes is a majority in the current UK that amazes me and a lot. Churchill was an amateur historian, it is possible that he had misconceptions and as a minister during the war, he certainly made some mistakes although in the essentials he was wrong. He had the premonition that Stalin was not identical to Hitler. Stalin was a mass killer psychopath with which he could talk and even to negotiating, Hitler was the beast on the dark side with whom he could not even speak! That distinction always caught my attention and at some point he said to someone nearby: "I am an anti-communist since 1917 and after the war is finished, I will continue to be an anti-communist but now I say alive the USSR!" And he was not desmaminated in his intuition that with Stalin and with the USSR could be talked out and agreed. With Keynnes perhaps it was not influence but the shock he received when reading the work of Marx and Engels not in the sense of admiration but quite the opposite he just as Churchill sniffed that something bad existed in the classical liberal economy from Adam Smith until the great recession of 1929 and that it was necessary to investigate and raise a new economic theory. And he did it.

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Doctor_Impossible_ t1_irec57z wrote

> the infamous Treaties would be the cause of another war with Germany and much worse than the 1st.!

But they weren't.

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Scitianwarrior t1_irej378 wrote

I am sure that they were and the responsibility of the revanchist France, the US and its policy of the Big Stick and the English policy of seeking European balance were ONE of the main causes of the 2nd World War. The uncontrollable inflation of the German Weimar Republic, abhorrent to 99.99% of the German people, and the great crisis of 1929 were the other converging causes for the outbreak of the "unnecessary war" as defined by Churchill.

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