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phillipgoodrich t1_j112qaz wrote

From a perspective of 150 years, it would appear that the overarching problem between McClellan and Lincoln was Lincoln's inability to articulate the strategy of the war as perceived by himself, and therefore McClellan's inability to approach the war as a federal official suppressing a traitorous revolt by upstart rebels. As a result, McClellan's dallying and failing to pursue Lee aggressively led to a tacit recognition of the validiity of the CSA military as a legitimate army. It was almost as if McClellan had de facto recognized the CSA as an entity. Which of course enraged Lincoln. And also explains why Lincoln was so deeply relieved when Grant finally took command along with Sherman, and advised Lincoln that they would approach this as an unconditional effort to suppress a revolution. Lincoln's statement that "This man fights!" was no casual comment; he needed a general who would chase the last active rebel to hell and back until every active rebel was hanged. McClellan was never of this mindset, even in the waning days of the war.

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DadTaunWesHere t1_j12hnwk wrote

Idk how much of this was propaganda of the time, but wasn't McClellan also focused on the presidency in '64? I know he eventually ran against Lincoln, banking on the support of his men who largely enjoyed his leadership.

My favorite George B. quote: "The President is no more than a well-meaning baboon. I went to the White House directly after tea, where I found "The Original Gorilla", about as intelligent as ever."

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phillipgoodrich t1_j18advm wrote

Indeed, McClellan had at least implied, if not openly asserted, that were he elected POTUS in 1864, he would pursue an armistice with the CSA (thus recognizing their legitimacy, and the separation of the CSA from the USA!). Lincoln certainly took this seriously, which would explain his encouragement of Sherman's destruction of Georgia. Lincoln felt he needed a rapid improvement in the prosecution of the war, with at least the appearance of inevitable CSA capitulation.

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phillipgoodrich t1_j18b7j6 wrote

Apropos nothing, it is interesting from a general historical standpoint to look at the consequences of "regime change" to the success of any nation's prosecution of a war. Certainly in the U.S., regime change has almost invariably culminated in a death knell for any war effort (FDR doesn't really count, as his VP succeeded to the POTUS, and the US army was within 50 miles of Berlin when FDR suffered his fatal stroke). But, e.g., Johnson to Nixon, and then Bush to Obama, produced a nightmarish drag on war efforts.

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