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happyscrappy t1_izdfckf wrote

Reply to comment by Gareth79 in Apple announces plans to encrypt iCloud data on its servers, including full backups, photos and notes. by [deleted]

> Apple will definitely be concerned about physical server theft, yes. Virtually all modern cloud platforms use encryption at rest to protect against this.

All data is encrypted at rest now. Because whether it is stored on SSD or HDD the data in encrypted by the storage device to whiten it. The question then comes where are the keys? For a drive the whitening keys are on the drive, you steal the drive you get the keys. So that encryption at rest does nothing for you.

So the question is does other additional encryption at rest you put on top do anything for you? It depends. If they steal enough drives they get your keys as well as the data. So the encryption at rest nothing for you.

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Gareth79 t1_izdnln2 wrote

You appear to be talking nonsense.

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happyscrappy t1_izeszqq wrote

No. I'm not.

They whiten data because if you don't, if the data has far more 0s than 1s (or vice versa) then it creates a local imbalance in charge level on the disk (or NAND sector). If the local imbalance is large enough it affects other data nearby (that's how magnetic fields work).

So as I said, all data is encrypted at rest now. So, as is nearly always the case for security the real question comes down to key management, not "whether it's encrypted".

E2E would mean that the keys are generated by the client each time it connects. And then presumably it is not written down (it better not be). So no one can steal drives and end up with the keys.

Is this the case for your idea of putting other encryption at rest on top but without E2E? Is it adding appreciable security?

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