Devinology t1_j8fzixt wrote
Reply to comment by HumbleFlea in “The principle of protecting our own thinking from eavesdroppers is fundamental to autonomy.” – Daniel Dennett debates the sort of free will it’s worth wanting with neuroscientists Patrick Haggard and philosopher Helen Steward by IAI_Admin
I disagree, respectfully. The idea of moving the world in a god-like fashion is a human delusion, and one that causes us a great deal of problems in terms of interpreting the world around us and ourselves. Arguably, many psychological issues are either caused by, or contributed to, by the delusion that we can control things that we can't (by having a false worldview regarding free will). It has literally no importance for human functioning, because it doesn't make any difference to us in any pragmatic way whether we are truly choosing (in that delusional way) or not.
All that matters is that we think we are acting with agency (that it genuinely seems like we are) in some sense. Whether we are or not, on the grandest level, has zero relevance for us outside of philosophical pondering. All that matters is that we think we have agency, and that we conduct and judge ourselves as if we do, since ultimately this is all agency is anyway. We don't need any god-like world influencing power for this to work.
I'll also add that under some possible worlds based metaphysical theories, having choice just means that there is at least one possible world in which you've chosen otherwise than you did in the actual world. This allows for compatibilism because it allows for each possible world to be deterministic while also allowing for a genuine sense of agency since for all we know we could be in any of the possible worlds, and which one we're in isn't determined until it plays out, from our perspective at least.
tough_truth t1_j8g4v0z wrote
I agree that the sense of voluntariness is significant for individuals. My critique of compatibilism is only that compatibilists seem unclear on the limits of their domain. It seems that this pro-free will argument applies to the feelings of an individual or perhaps for the convenience of everyday conversation, but falls apart when we consider communities or societies. The feeling that “Jon could have acted differently” is different than saying “Germany could have acted differently”. The more people that are involved, the more they can be modelled as statistically determined rather than agents.
This is because ultimately, we are beings without libertarian free will, or “delusional” free will as you call it. And the farther away we move from our individual frame of reference, the more clear that becomes. I feel like I can choose whether or not to commit a crime, but I know for certain that some percentage of the population will “choose” to commit crimes today. It would be a mistake to assume a whole society could shift based on collective spontaneous individual choice, it is statistically impossible. This does have implications for the way we ought to correctly talk about nations or about widespread social issues (e.g. why do the poor choose to be lazy?).
I disagree with S. Harris about many things but one thing I’ll agree is incompatiblism forces you to take judicial reform seriously. I feel compatibilists skirt around confronting the full implications of having no libertarian free will.
zossima t1_j8ggw9b wrote
“Voluntariness”… the ethical implications of the assumption free will is nonexistent are devastating to the concept of holding individuals responsible for their actions. If an individual does not have real control/agency over their actions, how are those actions truly their fault? Culpability is out the window. And how can an individual be treated as an end-in-itself if we approach them as nothing but a proverbial wind vane fluttering in the wind of reality? I’m into analogies…
Consider the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. We cannot predict with full accuracy the physical qualities of a particle, like position, from initial conditions. That is, considering all factors at a given time, the “reality” giving context to and influencing a particle, we still can never know what is really going on with the particle until it is directly observed and measured. Sure, we know the shapes of electron shells and other aspects in a broader context, but we can never predict the exact nature of an individual particle until we measure it. I think human agency/free will might be similar in nature. Just like a particle, it is influenced by context, but there is always space there for uncertainty and the spark of spontaneity, a sort of freedom. Particles and minds are different in scale and category, it’s the idea of some undeniable mystery that creates space for very important, ethically foundational concepts to remain relevant. We should work to avoid sophomoric assumptions in any case. And I will point out the idea of free will as outlined above is still very compatible with physical reality in the same way it is for, say, electrons.
DwayneWashington t1_j8gq1br wrote
But the fact that we don't know what's going on with the particle doesn't mean its path isn't determined.
zossima t1_j8hankn wrote
I am not denying any sort of determinism. What I am getting at is, like with a particle, there is no way to fully access and completely explain individual agency. Consider recent discoveries in quantum mechanics. Experiments have proven that quantum particles can exist in multiple exclusive states at once (https://www.science.org/content/article/reality-doesn-t-exist-until-you-measure-it-quantum-parlor-trick-confirms). The particle does not collapse into a definitive state until observed. Consider what if the mind is a quantum computer of sorts, with myriad conceptual states coexisting at once in our brains. Surely the concepts are tied to physical states, however they all exist as potentialities in our brains.
There is a certain freedom there at a fundamental level shrouded in that we do not fully understand all of the aspects of consciousness and volition. As with anything you can manipulate a person (impose your will), treating an other as an object, as in a Buberian I-It relationship. Or context can influence a person. However, in many circumstances we are not being overly influenced by context, be it social media, drugs, the full moon, illness, and so on. In circumstances lacking an overwhelming burden of influence on our volitive capacities, I would argue we do have free will, as fragile and at times fleeting as it may be. It’s why Buber raises up the I-You relationship as a preferable way of encountering other beings. Maybe we would all be more free if we could only just stop trying to impose our own will on others. Here’s to hoping Nietzsche wasn’t right that everything is will to power. And maybe all of the above are possible and it’s our choice at any given moment which is real to us?
DwayneWashington t1_j8hcph3 wrote
I don't think I'm smart enough to comprehend a lot of this... But "there is no way to fully access and completely explain individual agency" sounds like it doesn't exist or maybe we just don't have the mental capacity to understand it yet.
I don't really understand the "if we feel like we have agency, then we have it" idea ...where does that logic end, if I feel like I'm God am I God?
I don't know a lot about this topic so i apologize, I'm sure a lot of my questions have been talked about already.
Bowldoza t1_j8hr9jw wrote
Claiming agency or perspective is not akin to claiming godhood. Be reasonable. Comprehending agency as a concept in light of a deterministic chain of events is about as good as you can get in regards to "free will".
Kinda off topic, but in this context I would believe that someone claiming Godhood in a similar comparison would be doing so from an solipsistic and egotistical perspective precisely because they perceive their own agency but can't or refuses to extend that potential to other people.
DwayneWashington t1_j8hsscx wrote
Ok...so if I feel like I don't have agency then I don't, right? So that means that humans have agency and don't have agency at the same time?
zossima t1_j8iqqpv wrote
I think "it depends" is probably an apt thing to posit here.
zossima t1_j8irtby wrote
I would agree we just don't understand it yet. I think it is a real jump to conclusion with implications that outpace the assumption to assert everything is determined. You might as well become a practicing Calvinist. No need to apologize. The core of what I am getting at is we really do not know enough, or at least that agency is too complex and nuanced a concept with wide-ranging ethical bearing to settle on the stance there is no free will because all is pre-determined. Frankly, I feel the belief is not just pessimistic and ethically problematic, but a bit lazy.
Foxsayy t1_j8grjfb wrote
>Consider the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. We cannot predict with full accuracy the physical qualities of a particle like position from initial conditions. [...] I think human agency and free will might be similar in nature. Just like a particle, it is influenced by context, but there is always space there for uncertainty and the spark of spontaneity and for a sort of freedom.
Currently, we have to assign probabilities for where electrons might be, as far as I understand. So essentially, it's up to chance, randomness. Let's say that they're truly is Randomness in the universe, and could you make the same choice at the same point in time again, you might choose differently.
However, if the only reason that actions are not entirely predictable is because your decisions are being made partially by some Quantum dice roll, how can you call that free will any more than you can choose the outcome of a dice roll at the casino?
zossima t1_j8h1xuo wrote
My point is the randomness might not be so random when it comes to human agency, perhaps there is room there for decision-making, even if flawed, influenced and at times ineffectual.
tough_truth t1_j8h5iv8 wrote
>randomness might not be so random when it comes to human agency
This is where the “delusion” comes in, imo. Ultimately, it seems many believers of free will also disbelieve in the laws of physics. You seem to think humans can defy randomness through sheer willpower.
Foxsayy t1_j8j98yi wrote
>My point is the randomness might not be so random when it comes to human agency
I'm trying to think of a good metaphor for this, unsuccessfully, and I think that might be because there aren't really things that work this way.
Something is either random, or it is not. Although you can bound the domain, they're really isn't an in between. So if you have the set of all things random, and human agency does not fall in that set, then human agency must fall within that set's compliment (the compliment of all random things), which is by definition, things that are not random–that is, systematic, predictable, causal, etc.
Therefore, if human agency and decision making is not entirely random, then it must be nonrandom. So you're either accepting randomness as a given (to some degree) in the universe, in which case it still doesn't allow for free will in the traditional philosophical sense, or you're rejecting that the process is up to randomness, in which case you fall back into determinism. ,
EleanorStroustrup t1_j8hihq2 wrote
> If an individual does not have real control/agency over their actions, how are those actions truly their fault?
Exactly. They’re not. We recognise this in the justice system in many ways already. Many jurisdictions give sentence reductions to people whose childhoods were shaped by traumas, or who have mental health difficulties, for example.
> Culpability is out the window.
Whether the person is culpable for the action (or whether the idea of a person is even physically meaningful), and whether we should apply a judicial consequence for it, are not the same question.
Why are you asking these questions in a way that implies they disprove the idea that we lack free will?
Foxsayy t1_j8gqxzv wrote
>I disagree, respectfully.
Did you explain to me what exactly you were disagreeing with? It didn't seem like you're ideas conflicted with the other comment.
wolfgeist t1_j8h1aqi wrote
>All that matters is that we think we are acting with agency (that it genuinely seems like we are) in some sense
You know, I felt like I had no agency before reading this. After reading this, I'm going to make some changes in my life.
EleanorStroustrup t1_j8hhpu9 wrote
> All that matters is that we think we have agency, and that we conduct and judge ourselves as if we do,
But this is circular. If we don’t have agency, then we don’t conduct ourselves. We are conducted as if we have agency.
Devinology t1_j8qr6ja wrote
No, you're just using a false conception of agency. Agency isn't deciding how to conduct yourself, that's the point. You're reading my description of agency with a preconception that isn't compatible with it.
EleanorStroustrup t1_j8qtaqh wrote
Any other conception of agency is useless to consider.
Devinology t1_j8qwhhw wrote
The whole reason this debate is important is because on the one hand we have the science demonstrating for us that everything that happens is determined in some sense, and on the other we have human intuition, experience, ethics, and practical reason telling us (or necessitating) that we exercise agency of some kind. The challenge is in reconciling the two. This is the starting point of nearly all philosophical problems.
It's not helpful to just repeat ad nauseum "but everything is determined cuz the science so free will is an illusion". This is the starting point of the conversation, not the end. We already know that, Harris hasn't said anything that wasn't said 100 years prior. He's just adding more updated science examples. In fact, he's really not contributing anything to the conversation that wasn't already considered 3000 years ago. He's basically just ignoring thousands of years of philosophical discourse, and going "but causality". He doesn't get it.
EleanorStroustrup t1_j8qxowm wrote
> on the one hand we have the science demonstrating for us that everything that happens is determined in some sense, and on the other we have human intuition, experience, ethics, and practical reason telling us (or necessitating) that we exercise agency of some kind. The challenge is in reconciling the two
But they can’t be reconciled. If reason tells us it’s necessary for us to exercise agency, that’s too bad, because we can’t. We are going to act like we can, but we can’t.
The existence of the field of ethics is one thing among many that both arose out of the past physical state of the universe, and will influence its future state, but not from any external cause - it’s all in the closed system. We’re pulled towards the earth because there is gravity, and someone might “decide” something in a certain way because they are aware of some ethical principle, and that contributed to what the particles in their brain do in the current moment. That doesn’t mean the principal itself has intrinsic value.
Devinology t1_j8qyptd wrote
If they can't be reconciled then there is no point to anything and no such thing as responsibility. Why wouldn't you just kill someone for $5? You aren't responsible anyway.
But you know that you are. How do you reconcile this? You realize that free will is not constituted by going against laws of nature.
EleanorStroustrup t1_j8qzakg wrote
> Why wouldn’t you just kill someone for $5? You aren’t responsible anyway.
Lacking moral responsibility is not the same thing as believing or acting like you lack moral responsibility, nor is it the same thing as lack of practical consequences for things that happen.
> But you know that you are. How do you reconcile this?
I know that I feel like I am responsible for my actions and that we have to act for all intents and purposes like we are. That doesn’t mean that we are.
> You realize that free will is not constituted by going against laws of nature.
Why does feeling like you have free will require you to conclude that there is free will?
Devinology t1_j8r06bs wrote
Because that's all that free will IS. I don't think we're going to get anywhere further here, it's too large of a conversion.
I'm not saying that because I feel like a can genuinely alter the state of affairs of the world that I must therefore have it. I'm saying that I can't do that, and I know I can't do that, but I experiemce free will, so I can conclude that free will isn't altering the state of affairs of the world. It's not that kind of phenomenon.
You're morally responsible because you have agency, not because you can genuinely choose what happens.
EleanorStroustrup t1_j8r37h8 wrote
> I’m not saying that because I feel like a can genuinely alter the state of affairs of the world that I must therefore have it. I’m saying that I can’t do that, and I know I can’t do that, but I experiemce free will, so I can conclude that free will isn’t altering the state of affairs of the world.
It seems like you’re still not really addressing my central point. You don’t experience free will, so you cannot conclude that.
A stereotypical schizophrenia patient doesn’t actually experience voices. They experience the illusion of voices.
“I have a certain perception, and I have named that concept, and therefore the thing I just named is actually equivalent to a different thing with that name” is not logically valid.
> You’re morally responsible because you have agency, not because you can genuinely choose what happens.
We are caused to act for all intents and purposes like people are morally responsible for things, because we have to, practically. But that doesn’t imply actual responsibility.
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