> Dennett agrees with all of that… Dennett brings a far more subtle and important point to the table which he has coined “the freewill worth wanting.”

“I am a hard determinist, but I’m going to take this other thing that isn’t free will and call it free will, and argue that we have that instead (while not always making it clear that I’m not talking about actual “free will” despite using that phrase), as if that’s a meaningful thing to do”.

Going back to basics:

> Some "modern compatibilists", such as Harry Frankfurt and Daniel Dennett, argue free will is simply freely choosing to do what constraints allow one to do. In other words, a coerced agent's choices can still be free if such coercion coincides with the agent's personal intentions and desires.

If everything is determined, the concept of an agent loses all meaning. There is no agent who can make choices. There are just indistinguishable particles. Debating the nuances of what it means to “freely choose to do what constraints allow” is also internally inconsistent if you accept determinism, because we don’t make choices. What we’re left with is “free will is simply having the perception that you are an agent who is capable of choosing to do something that you think is an available choice”, which is just worthless as a position. It means nothing.