ambisinister_gecko t1_j97aqfx wrote
Reply to comment by jamesj in Compatibilism is supported by deep intuitions about responsibility and control. It can also feel "obviously" wrong and absurd. Slavoj Žižek's commentary can help us navigate the intuitive standoff. by matthewharlow
No, I don't want to convince you that libertarian free will is coherent. I think it's not, which is part of what drives the compatibilist intuition to recontextualize what is called the "feeling of having free will" - if the Libertarian approach is not only non existent, but not even coherent, that opens us up to the idea that a different approach from the libertarian one might produce something more coherent, more valuable.
jamesj t1_j97dmsd wrote
Sure, I think I can get behind a statement that we can redefine free will to be the most useful plausible version. That then wouldn't be the kind of free will many people think they have. I'm also not sure how that version of free will supports the kind of moral responsibility that many people think other people have.
ambisinister_gecko t1_j97g44s wrote
>the kind of moral responsibility that many people think other people have.
People intuitively think you have moral responsibility for actions you were in control of. The article centers their conception of free will around control as well. I think that's a really solid place to center it.
jamesj t1_j97xptk wrote
In what way is someone in control of their actions if they are determined by causes they are not in control of?
Ytar0 t1_j989r0b wrote
Have you actually never heard the term “free will is an illusion”? I feel like it perfectly describes compatibilism. You can never escape the subjectivity of your personal perspective, objective truths might exist but they will never be known to you. Determinism might ultimately mean that your fate is inevitable, but that whole discussion is redundant since you can’t see the future. Even if it might be an illusion I do experience, and I am not omniscient so I feel free.
fartmouthbreather t1_j98cf2m wrote
Free will being an illusion is obviously compatible with determinism. That’s the whole point of determinism, that isn’t a free will worth wanting, and that’s OP’s point. The author has redefined it to make it a negligible epiphenomenon.
OldMillenial t1_j98czub wrote
>The author has redefined it to make it a negligible epiphenomenon.
The author has attempted to redefine it, and at the same time attempted to leverage the "common sense" perception of moral responsibility that is most certainly not based on his new definition.
The author is playing a semantic shell game, all while desperately attempting to convince you that he gets to go to dinners with more interesting people, and that those who disagree with him and his cool friends are just "Philosophy 101 students."
Ytar0 t1_j98eili wrote
I honestly feel like so much of "philosophy" is just miscommunication lol.
fartmouthbreather t1_j98lejv wrote
It’s easy when people define their own terms. :(
keelanstuart t1_j9ajkrn wrote
Is watching a movie for the first time, whose story you cannot control, any less enjoyable because of that fact? What is "worth wanting" then? Why does determinism feel oppressive if the illusion of free will is persistent? If we had everything we wanted in life, would we feel put upon by forces we cannot control or would we never question things as we do when we suffer? Shrug. Points to ponder.
fartmouthbreather t1_j9b7902 wrote
I don’t want that. The author claims “people do”.
jamesj t1_j98aavi wrote
Sure, but why is that called compatibilism and not illusionism, which seems like a much more appropriate label? It just feels to me that compatibilists want the claim that free will is compatible with determinism (because they are physicalists who like the idea of moral responsibility) more than they want clarity around the words "free will".
Ytar0 t1_j98c0mi wrote
Well, not all philosophers are very "compatible" themselves lol. But that aside, yes you might call that flavor of compatibilism, illusionism. But for the most part, I think they just have a different definition of free will. I.e. one that isn't:
- If someone acts of their own free will, then they could have done otherwise (A-C).
- If determinism is true, no one can do otherwise than one actually does (D-E).
- Therefore, if determinism is true, no one acts of her own free will (F).
Compatibilism reminds me of Absurdism, in that you're embracing "the absurd" (even though it's a slightly different absurd here lol)
Atilla_The_Honey t1_j99xtdn wrote
I’ve seen something like this argument before and I wonder if you can clarify it for me. In the first premise, what does “could have done otherwise” mean? That if they had decided to do otherwise, they could have?
Surely in a deterministic universe this could still be true, because the deciding to do otherwise would be part of the causal chain leading them to act, so changing that part could change the resulting action.
I don’t really understand the second premise either - surely whether the universe is deterministic or not, once an action has been taken it can’t be changed. Can you clarify how someone could do otherwise than they actually do in any kind of universe?
I think I broadly agree that the article above is arguing from a different conception of free will, in a rather sneaky way.
dirtmother t1_j9acftr wrote
Compatibilism often reads to me as, "I will express my moral intuition, and I never could have done otherwise".
Correct me if I'm wrong lol.
Ytar0 t1_j99z04n wrote
Determinism ultimately means that there only is one possible future. And that all actions will inevitably lead to that future. From an outside perspective we are simply following the laws of casualty.
So “deciding to do otherwise” means creating a different future, one where you has done otherwise than what was predetermined. Idk if that makes more sense.
jamesj t1_j993fmi wrote
That's interesting because absurdism appeals to me quite a lot while compatibilism makes little sense to me at all.
Ytar0 t1_j9bwkg6 wrote
Hmm. Then let me ask you some, since I am not sure how to relate to incompatibilists. Are you at all times aware that whatever you choose to do (and chose to do) is outside of your control?? Because for the life of me I have never felt that I wasn't free in my actions. And while this might be an illusion (I am a determinist after all) I will never and don't believe I ever can be aware of how this changes anything in my life. (since I simply am not given this information)
What do you think about that ^ ?
jamesj t1_j9bzbrb wrote
Yes, there are two important levels where things are outside of my control: first, i didn't choose my place of birth, language, parents, schools, upbringing, and what ideas I was exposed to. Second, I conceive of my self as a subset of my brain and body, and at a deep level I don't believe that part of me is in control. I'm along for the ride, and I experience stories about why things happen, some of those stories involving the idea of choices, but I don't believe all of those stories.
Ytar0 t1_j9cvzbv wrote
Hmm yeah, I guess it’s too hard for me to truly explain my pov. But to put it another way, while the concept of objective truths might exist in this universe, I don’t believe we could ever know them, since we’re always bound by the confines of our brains, and our perspective. Your experience and subjective opinion is just as valid is mine, I just argue that “being along for the ride” is the same as what compatibilists call “free will”. Because this “ride” isn’t one you know or can wholly predict, and it also feels the same as if it weren’t a ride. The difference is unknowable imo.
OldMillenial t1_j98dc3y wrote
>Have you actually never heard the term “free will is an illusion”? I feel like it perfectly describes compatibilism.
Whether this does or does not perfectly define compatibilism, I do not know.
I do know that this description is in fairly direct opposition to the relationship between free will and compatibilism as presented in the article.
deepfield67 t1_j99uo0g wrote
I'm not convinced the very concept of free will isn't meaningless. It doesn't necessarily correspond to any aspect of reality. There is an embedded assumption that there is an objective reality in which that free will is exercised and that's a meaningless concept, too. I can only be point to my own subjective experience, and I don't know if the idea of free will has any significance in that context. It feels purely conceptual, purely semantic.
cloake t1_j9985n7 wrote
It's fairly trivial to contradict libertarian free will. If you can prove to me you don't need to breathe and don't need to crap, I'll entertain a will bound by no limitation.
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