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fibsequ t1_j9hrpuw wrote

Your argument rests on four premises, which are not universally agreed upon as stipulation or truth. In your worldview, and perhaps the worldview of most people (although neither are relevant without being universal), the premises you numbered 1-4 may be accepted as truth.

That does not mean everyone accepts those premises, and believes suffering to be bad or pleasure to be good. Hedonism, epicureanism, and other pleasure-seeking and suffering-avoiding ideologies are exalted by some and condemned by others. With words as nebulous as “good” and “bad” I’m not sure how you can definitively claim “pleasure to be good” and “suffering to be bad,” let alone expect everyone to subscribe to those notions.

Your other two premises also suffer from the vagueness of words such as “good” and “bad,” but even without those deficiencies your argument holds no water. Assuming everyone believes your premises numbered 1-4, or that said premises are somehow a universal truth regardless of the beliefs or individuals is not substantiated by any evidence. Your feelings that “suffering is bad, pleasure is good” may be relevant to your beliefs, but are far from objective truth.

Note: this is not a defense of having children or choosing not to. I think there are legitimate arguments for both sides; I do not think this is an example.

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aecorbie t1_j9huntx wrote

Could you please elaborate on how the argument “holds no water” other than stating that there are some who might disagree with it? I would appreciate it if you addressed the premises it’s build upon rather than broadly rejecting them.

Regarding vagueness of the words “good” and “bad”, you might have a point here, but I’d rather we got to the underlying virtue ethics after addressing more general problems one might have with those premises. As for the argument itself, however, I think even an approach as simplistic as negative utilitarianism (which I myself am not overly fond of, but I digress) would suffice to demonstrate the validity of my dichotomy in relation to the morality of having children.

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