Midrya t1_jcccwc8 wrote on March 15, 2023 at 8:36 PM

Reply to comment by Base_Six in The Folly of Knowledge: why we should favor belief as the focus of our epistemology by Base_Six

Logical sure, but not well-founded. We can absolutely arrive at beliefs which logically follow from more fundamental premises that we hold, but to be well founded we would need to demonstrate that those more fundamental premises are themselves true.

I also don't really think we can offer a solid basis for belief. I can explain to you why I believe what I do, and I could go down all the way to the fundamental premises I hold to be true, but the one thing I cannot do is prove to you that those axiomatic assumptions are "more reasonable" than some other set of axiomatic assumptions, especially if your experiences are not compatible with my axiomatic assumptions.

And the clock thing is more highlighting an issue with the article itself; you claim that a common definition of knowledge is "justified true belief", but there is no evidence provided that such a definition is in fact common. Saying you know it's 2:00 after looking at a clock which says 2:00 but is actually not accurate is only an issue if you require knowledge to be justified and true. Since the entire issue is predicated on the definition of the word knowledge, I feel it would be kind of important to establish that problematic definition is both an accepted and common definition, which a quick polling of dictionary.com, Merriam-Webster, and Cambridge would show that they don't really list a definition that if fully compatible with the one you are using. I normally don't like pulling out dictionary definitions in discussions because it feels pedantic in all the wrong ways, but since the entire issue is contingent on the common definition of the word knowledge we need to reasonably establish that the definition being used is the common definition of the word knowledge.

Base_Six OP t1_jccz75h wrote on March 15, 2023 at 11:02 PM

My central tenet for justified belief is basically this: that the evidence we have (e.g. sensory or memory evidence) is a reasonable basis for belief.

This isn't because I think we can argue that the evidence is true, but because we don't have an alternate basis for logically interacting with the world. Our evidence is singular, and we can either accept it with some degree of doubt or we have no basis whatsoever. If we were to accept a skeptical hypothesis instead, then we would have to logically conclude that we have no evidence of the external world and no means of logically interacting with it. I don't know that my evidence is true or accurate (and in fact have good reason to think that at least some of it is untrue), but it's more reasonable for me to accept it ceteris paribus than it is to reject it.

For definitions of knowledge, I would recommend looking up knowledge in a philosophical source, such as the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. JTB is far from the only definition of knowledge, but it's the core of externalist conceptions of knowledge, which are generally more popular than internalist ones (which have their own issues, such as lack of grounding to reality or the possibility of false knowledge). I stuck with JTB because it's the simplest version and I didn't want to devote 50 pages to different forms of knowledge in this paper.

The clock problem itself comes from Russell's "Human Knowledge" and has been discussed fairly extensively as a proto-Gettier problem, largely as a criticism of JTB.