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FrozenDelta3 t1_jch4jg0 wrote

Allow me an opportunity at a different approach.

The incompleteness theorem states that in any reasonable mathematical system there will always be true statements that cannot be proved. Responses to this theorem have been varied. Some people have proposed that if we demand that the standard of proof in the sciences is mathematical certainty and math is not 100% entirely provable then absolutely nothing is certain. While the incompleteness theorem presents a problem for those that want math to be entirely provable, this theorem only applies when self-referencing in a negative. So, as of now, math is provable except in this specific paradoxical self-referencing scenario yet people still claim that all math is now suspect despite it’s accepted provability.

I would rather judge a situation’s provability first before participating in likelihood of occurring or being real. It’s unprovable whether we are or are not brains in jars and that is my ultimate position, but if I were forced to choose I would lean unlikely. Do I believe it’s unlikely? No, I think it’s unlikely. First and foremost, it’s unprovable either way.

Would you happen to have access to this journal?

https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences/article/abs/knowledge-before-belief/B434EF04A3EA77018384EABEB4973994

While many philosophers may agree that knowledge depends on true belief, I see that not everyone does. It seems to be a semantics game, each side clamoring for their specific words choice to become primary.

  • A philosophy professor of mine once asked me if I knew that George Washington crossed the Delaware.*

My response would be “it’s been mentioned in history books so there may be truth to this story.” If the professor pushes me to choose belief or disbelief in the story I would push back against participating in belief or disbelief. I would much rather report on the origin or state of communicated beliefs rather than participating in choosing to belief or disbelieve.

In your second example you speak as if you may have read about Washington’s crossing being propaganda or intentional misinformation and then how you could believe what you read. Again, I would state what is written or even accepted by others without taking the next step of believing (or disbelieving) it myself.

Edit I can speak about things without participating in believing or disbelieving

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Base_Six OP t1_jchl9sn wrote

I think it's perfectly reasonable to abstain from forming a belief, but I think there's plenty of situations in which it's reasonable to form beliefs even in absence of proof.

This is the case in many ordinary situations. Suppose I meet a couple and they tell me they're married. They wear wedding rings and act like a couple. I can't prove that they're married, but I have a substantial amount of evidence suggesting it's the case and no counter evidence. There are plenty of scenarios I could concoct which could be unprovable, such as that they're foreign spies or visiting aliens with a sham marriage as part of their cover story.

I don't encounter these scenarios and abstain from drawing conclusions on the basis of their unprovability: I construct beliefs on the basis of a preponderance of evidence. Colloquially, I might even say "I know they're married", even if I can't prove true belief.

I think a major difference between math and everyday epistemology is that the vast majority of math I encounter is provable, while the vast majority of everyday "knowledge" is premised on things that are not.

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