Submitted by JohanEGustafsson t3_11sqfqm in philosophy
Comments
mirh t1_jcg3oer wrote
There's absolutely nothing wrong with thought experiments, and even with spherical cows (to the extent that the approximation is still usable).
The problem comes up when you try to focus monolithically on just a single facet of a topic (like this article), forgetting not just the common grounds and results of a discipline.. but even omitting the most basic common sense that even a random joe would have.
MordunnDregath t1_jcg5n6m wrote
But that's the point, isn't it? A dialogue like this hinges on a few assumptions about the characters involved, including the contradictory position that the author expects from the audience: that we will treat these characters as both facsimiles and accurate representations of the philosophies under discussion.
Yet it all falls apart when we go "Why wouldn't the Utilitarian simply respond to the Deontologist with 'I don't believe you?'" There's no point in continuing this conversation past that realization.
IsamuLi t1_jcg0y13 wrote
Yep, but that's what happens when you want your conclusions to hold in every possible world.
dopaminetract t1_jcg4ogh wrote
If a point requires an unrealistic hypothetical, it's important we ask why a realistic one wasn't used, instead. Were there so few practical scenarios to reach for that you were forced to use something impractical?
simcity4000 t1_jcg0auz wrote
>This is what most moral philosophy feels like to me: a detailed examination of a highly complex topic, which begins with "imagine something that doesn't exist."
The thing is that when we try and conceptualise morality we're always attempting to describe something that 'doesent exist' outside our conception of it.
SmorgasConfigurator t1_jcf9ops wrote
I'll try to engage with the text.
Take this part of the exchange:
>BENTHAM. Fair enough. But, even so, I worry that giving you the money would set a bad precedent, encouraging copycats to run similar schemes.
MUGGER. Don't. This transaction will be our little secret. You have my word.
Say we accept the Mugger's claim. Wouldn't the Mugger repeat the threat of self-harm immediately after? The previous 10£ is already lost. What matters to Bentham is the future, so his moral calculus would be the same. That is, on the second iteration of the threat, Bentham must hand over another 10£. And so on...
So we run into an infinite regress. Say Bentham considers this option already at the first threat. He then does a calculus that assigns a non-zero probability to that the threat will continue until Bentham is required to give the Mugger more than what a finger is worth (assume a finger has finite utility). Bentham can then rationally reject the threat on basis that accepting the threat, we end up on a slippery slope that after some finite number of threat iterations of finite time leads to negative global utility.
The Mugger could then commit to that if given 10£, that would be the end of said threats of self-harm, to Bentham or anyone else. Now wouldn't we say that Bentham is right to fork up the cash? I'd say so. 10£ seems like a small price to pay to make the Mugger give up all future threats of self-harm (we assume here the Mugger is truthful). So maybe the Mugger should up the price -- why ask for a measly 10£ if it only can be done once? And now we are in familiar, but arguably unavoidable, "icky" territory of assining cash value to the physical well-being of individual humans. What price should Bentham (or the community) be willing to spend in order to prevent a certain self-harm of a certain individual among us? And we are back in territory where utilitarinism works pretty well.
So.... how well did I do? I think these one-shot moral dilemmas are tricky in that the reason they often conflict with our intuitions is because we think about the next step, the step after that etc. If the Bentham stand-in truly could know, or at least expect (given assigned probabilities) that there is one finite cost to accept for the removal of a negative utility, then our moral intuitions would line up with utilitarianism: there is a cash value we should be ready to depart from when that act removes a quantifiable moral ill.
Ohgodgethelp t1_jcg1biz wrote
>What matters to Bentham is the future, so his moral calculus would be the same. That is, on the second iteration of the threat, Bentham must hand over another 10£. And so on...
I feel like I should point out this is literally how the mafia works. You add a few layers, such as the money was originally given as a loan, and the 10 is an "interest payment," meaning it comes on regular schedules and isn't a surprising or crippling amount.
qj-_-tp t1_jcg8y93 wrote
While those conjectures are fascinating to debate, at some point an ice pick to the temple obviates the need to make any further payments, or have tedious ongoing non-consensual encounters with violent criminals.
I get that’s a different debate. But I think variety in debates leads to better, more optimal outcomes, so we should consider it.
“How many times has it been? Three? Here’s the situation, I don’t have cash handy, but I have something of equivalent value that I can give you instead.” “Well, don’t just stand there, gimme!” And thus the infinite regression is averted and, bonus, after cleaning the ice pick, it can be used again if needed elsewhere.
Ohgodgethelp t1_jcghkf4 wrote
>So maybe the Mugger should up the price -- why ask for a measly 10£ if it only can be done once? And now we are in familiar, but arguably unavoidable, "icky" territory of assining cash value to the physical well-being of individual humans
From the post above mine. This raises another interesting question, where there is a threshold variable. From 0 to x dollars life has a value. At X dollars the cost to self passes the danger to self and the icepick becomes an attractive option. So the mugger does in fact start the process of assigning a value to a life. Then the individual (or more realistically the community that looks away) decides at what point that the danger to self and the value of the muggers life cross. So really it wanders into the territory of the most utilitarian of pursuits, the judicial system.
qj-_-tp t1_jcgjxu0 wrote
Excellent. You picked up the ice pick I casually placed within reach and used it as I had intended. Metaphorically speaking…
AzureDreamer t1_jcf17fv wrote
Well that was a joy to read, If I am ever homeless I can revolutionise the game.
bildramer t1_jcf692h wrote
The objection is simple and banal: Utility contains terms for things like "it's bad to give in to blackmail, as this leads to more expected blackmail in the future*" - consequentialism doesn't have to be short-horizon, blind and dumb. You assess all consequences of an act.
My personal objection (why I'm consequentialist but not utilitarian as usually defined): Caring about others' utilities is not something I have to do because of some Rawlsian argument; it's just something that's already in my utility function because that's how my brain evolved to be. You can do approximations that are equivalent to "weighting people's utilities" based on your thoughts, feelings, whims, their likeability, the uncertainty you have about them, etc. And those weights can be negative, because why not? Spite is also natural. If someone tries to threaten his own bodily integrity, see if I care.
^(*: even accounting for all the not-cut fingers, and for everyone's utilities and not just yours, the "giving in to lots of blackmail" future is worse than one where you don't, which does need to be argued for but isn't hard to argue. As opposed to e.g. "giving in" to win/win trades.)
Tinac4 t1_jcflm52 wrote
>BENTHAM. Fair enough. But, even so, I worry that giving you the money would set a bad precedent, encouraging copycats to run similar schemes.
>MUGGER. Don't. This transaction will be our little secret. You have my word.
Fun thought experiment! I think the easiest way for utilitarians to respond is to zero in on this section.
- In reality, giving into muggings like this will pretty much unavoidably encourage copycats. Naive act utilitarianism, funnily enough, does better in practice than in theory here.
- In a world where Bentham's muggers exist and really do have a strict mugger-victim confidentiality agreement: The utilitarian thing to do would be to precommit to saying no to all muggings, tell a bunch of people about your precommittment, and then encourage all other utilitarians to do the same. If the Bentham's muggers know in advance that you're going to say no, they won't try to mug you in the first place.
The scenario seems like it's inspired by Newcomb's problem. A utilitarian who one-boxes in Newcomb's problem--i.e. who endorses a decision theory that tells them to one-box and to accept point 2 above--won't have any issues with muggers.
Traveevart t1_jcg1dlh wrote
Well-written! However, I have two primary disagreements with the author here.
- Bentham begins as an act utilitarian, requiring that he maximize utility, such that none of the potential alternative actions could be more effective. I would argue that, in the first scenario, the maximally effective course of action for Bentham would be to make his best effort to convince the mugger to abandon deontology--and ideally all his scheming efforts.
- Partially related, I'm not even convinced that giving the mugger the money is the maximally effective action in the first case. I would assume, in most circumstances like this, that if one were to agree to the mugger's demands, he would continue his scheme into the future. The author sort of engages with this point when Bentham asks, "Won't this encourage copycats?" and the man responds, "No, it'll be our secret." However, we aren't concerned with other copycats; we're concerned with that specific mugger continuing his scheme. Reasonably so, since that's exactly what happens when Bentham gives him the money. In reality, both choices Bentham can make eventually end with the mugger cutting at least one finger off. Either he refuses himself, and the mugger cuts it off immediately, or he gives over the money, and the mugger gets multiple cut off later, having been emboldened by his previous success. Therefore, Bentham should not give over the money, as even if the mugger cuts off one finger in the moment, the failure of his scheme could discourage him from ever trying again, which ultimately saves more of his fingers.
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Traveevart t1_jcg9otw wrote
The mugger's failings didn't discourage him, I would argue, because he had previously succeeded with Bentham. If you do something and it works the first time, even if it fails in several subsequent attempts, you'll keep trying because you know it can work. If you try something and it doesn't work the first time, you have no reason to believe it is capable of working at all, and therefore are less likely to continue.
[deleted] t1_jcga0v0 wrote
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[deleted] t1_jcfmmcz wrote
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anon19895 t1_jcgfg41 wrote
Can someone please explain this part, it doesn't make any sense to me:
> I wouldn't take the course. If you gave me the money, I would in fact keep it for myself... I don't see how it would be relevant for a Rule Utilitarian. Your giving me the money would be part of the best possible combination of everyone's acts no matter whether I would take the course. What should matter to you is that I could do so – not whether I would.
Rule Utilitarianism seeks to act in such a way that utility will be maximized if everyone acted in the same way.
"Give $10 to someone if it will make them an effective altruist" makes for a utility-maximizing rule.
"Give $10 to someone even if there is a negligible chance of them becoming an effective altruist" does not make for a utility-maximizing rule.
What rule exactly is the mugger proposing that requires Bentham to give him $10? "Give $10 to anyone who could become an effective altruist, even if they just told you they won't"? That hardly sounds like a utility-maximizing rule.
Wang_Dangler t1_jcgb3lv wrote
Utilitarian: How about I sweeten the deal - I will give you $100 if you cut off your head.
The world is better off without extortionists.
Base_Six t1_jch6mhy wrote
Questions of realism or moral hazard aside, Bentham can donate his $10 to charity and do far more good than he would by preventing some degenerate deontologist from cutting off his finger. If Bentham is a committed utilitarian who believes in taking actions at every turn to maximize utility and has not given that money away already, it's because he ascribes significant moral value to keeping it.
PyrrhoTheSkeptic t1_jcia8r0 wrote
Yes. The whole thing is silly. At the first attempted mugging:
​
>MUGGER. Here's the thing: there is, clearly, more utility in me keeping my finger than in you keeping your measly ten pounds. So there would be more utility in the world if you gave me the money than if you didn't.
A better response than what was given is:
"No, I am giving the money to stop a child from starving, so cut off your finger you stupid bastard."
TearfulDespotism t1_jcfrwkv wrote
My state passed a hands free laws after a cop rendering aid on the side of the road was clipped and killed by a distracted driver on the freeway. The driver said his phone was in his hands, the cop had a new born five weeks old so we passed the law. Then said people get two years before it's enforced to get used to it. It's been 5 and our cell phone issues are worse than ever. No one gets pulled over for distracted driving, and in my state it's just a monetary fine.
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no-kooks t1_jcg2lo5 wrote
I can’t think of Jeremy Bentham without thinking of his clothed, mummified body sitting on display after all these years and how un-utilitarian it is.
PyrrhoTheSkeptic t1_jciksoh wrote
It gives me joy to consider his mummified body in a glass case for people to look at. So, from a utilitarian perspective, of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, we would have to compare and count the feelings of people whose opinions are more like yours, and people whose opinions are more like mine, and also factor in the other consequences of the creation of his mummy and display of it, to determine if it fits or does not fit with utilitarianism. It is far from obvious that a proper analysis of all of that would turn out as you predict.
Vivimord t1_jchqndl wrote
"I will give you the ten pounds. In one hundred years' time, assuming we are both still living." Bentham plugs his ears and walks away.
A thoroughly enjoyable and amusing read, thanks for posting!
mirh t1_jcg2v55 wrote
Damn, there's so much going on I don't even know where to start...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_hazard
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner%27s_dilemma#The_iterated_prisoner's_dilemma
And be that as it may deontology has to be opposed to consequentialism (they aren't really, if you don't conveniently cherry-pick particular frames of reference or time spans) how does that say a iota about lying? You can even be a saint, but if nazis were to knock at your door, you wouldn't reveal the people hidden in the basement.
No shit ethics and morality are completely different from whatever real rational expectations you'd have of them, if you somehow introduce "ontologically indissoluble and unavoidable" pacts/contracts/bindings that can assure you of a certain behavior no matter what.
VersaceEauFraiche t1_jchl89h wrote
Why doesn't Bentham simply shoot the mugger?
PyrrhoTheSkeptic t1_jciahzi wrote
Yes, I think that would fit with act utilitarianism. It seems the best act for the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.
VersaceEauFraiche t1_jcibhfr wrote
bang bang "I'm a philosopher btw"
MordunnDregath t1_jcf0tmf wrote
I am reminded of something I once read, about physicists and spherical cows:
>Milk production at a dairy farm was low, so the farmer wrote to the local university, asking for help from academia. A multidisciplinary team of professors was assembled, headed by a theoretical physicist, and two weeks of intensive on-site investigation took place. The scholars then returned to the university, notebooks crammed with data, where the task of writing the report was left to the team leader. Shortly thereafter the physicist returned to the farm, saying to the farmer, "I have the solution, but it works only in the case of spherical cows in a vacuum."
This is what most moral philosophy feels like to me: a detailed examination of a highly complex topic, which begins with "imagine something that doesn't exist." The practical applications of such an approach are nearly always flawed, on a fundamental level, because we're working from a place of fantasy.