SecretHeat t1_itvb343 wrote
Reply to comment by platoprime in Logical positivism does not dispense with metaphysics, as it aimed to. It merely proposes a different kind of metaphysics, in which natural sciences take the privileged position once occupied by rationalist metaphysics. by IAI_Admin
Philosophy is not a hard science. Actually, you could probably argue that lack of strict, reliable verifiability is exactly where philosophy begins and the sciences end. Not every question can be settled with airtight logic or an experiment; sometimes all you have is a better or worse argument
civil_beast t1_itvdvb1 wrote
Correct. Science requires the use of the scientific method. Which in some fields of study is impossible to achieve - either because there exists no way to isolate multivariate systems (while maintaining social ethical norms) or the experiment is not repeatable. Even social sciences truly do not meet the strictest of criteria, and instead are domains of inferrred causality.
platoprime t1_itvfn6y wrote
You can apply the scientific method to anything you can measure.
>Even social sciences truly do not meet the strictest of criteria, and instead are domains of inferrred causality.
Preposterous. You do not need to demonstrate direct causality to apply the scientific method. The scientific method is a method of investigation that can be applied to anything not a set of direct casual results.
civil_beast t1_itvwgc2 wrote
In theory, yes. But invariably social sciences (and if we are being honest, this is why we even have a taxonomic differentiation) have immense problems when it comes to repeatability. Repeatability is a key requirement. If your hypothesis does not qualify the domain concretely, then when results don’t support the original experiment’s conclusion - they get tossed. Practically, the ability to isolate the differences in the null-case in my experience Make reproduction not viable. Because of this, the social sciences do not have academia in those fields judging experiments by anything other than practical validation of steps taken before publishing. Largely it’s the best we have to garner understanding behaviors, and that is acceptable.
But is it a science? I apologize but no. Without verification, there is no axiomatic leverage that guarantees an outcome.
And don’t get me started with how these sciences abuse the rate of error in order to resolve inconsistent output.
platoprime t1_itvwnen wrote
>But is it a science? I apologize but no.
It's okay. I accept your apology for your ignorance on what the scientific method is.
civil_beast t1_itw0f1x wrote
I believe you are aware of the ongoing debate that has been had for centuries on this very topic. If you would like to comment on why my assertion of repeatability when only problematic propositions (meaning those that rely on statistical domains, and not Boolean) are used.
Seriously, I come here to learn. All in good faith. I respect anyone that uses the term “preposterous” outright… so I want to understand where you’re coming from.
YoungXanto t1_itvklp5 wrote
Even the hard sciences are the domains of inferred causality.
Hume remarks about billiard balls
>if I see one billiard ball rolling toward another, how do I know that the second ball will move when it is struck?
That is, experience is a necessary precursor to knowledge. And our observations are limited to only the confines of the single experiment from which they emerge. Repeated measurements add evidence of a causal outcome, but the state space of our observations is necessarily a subspace of the entire space of observable outcomes and we also assume the state space is time-invariant. We can therfore never be absolutely certain about anything because we can never be absolutely certain about the space we haven't sampled (which is admittedly a bit of a tautology)
platoprime t1_itvffqf wrote
Not every question in the physical sciences can be settled with airtight logic either. I'm not sure how that demonstrates the value of speculation on this.
SecretHeat t1_itvgch9 wrote
What you’re dismissing as ‘speculation’ is just part of the character of philosophy as a discipline
platoprime t1_itvh4ki wrote
Except there is plenty of philosophy that can be applied and tested. It's incorrect to think speculation and unverifiability are inherent to philosophy. Philosophy originally included the investigation of the natural world.
It seems to me the only reason to separate speculative philosophy from the rest and gatekeep it as the only "true philosophy" is to retain the pretense of authority on things like metaphysics compared to physicists who are also capable of engaging in philosophy.
SecretHeat t1_itvj258 wrote
Sure there are philosophical sub fields—probably most notably analytic philosophies of cognition and perception—that are amenable to science, and often the philosophers working in these fields are in dialogue with scientists. But this is pretty far from being representative of the field as a whole.
As far as I’m concerned physicists are as welcome to the party as anyone else but you’re just not going to be settling via the scientific method whether Nietzsche’s account of ressentiment or Schopenhauer’s account of willing are accurate takes on the world anytime soon.
platoprime t1_itvjf19 wrote
So you think the scientific method is the only way to verify truth?
SecretHeat t1_itvl3sy wrote
It depends on what your criteria for ‘truth’ are, which I think is exactly what we’ve been debating here. What degree of uncertainty are you comfortable with? To call a statement ‘true’ does it have to be testable? Repeatable? Is a strong argument good enough?
I think a great deal of philosophy tends to allow for more leeway here than standard scientific practice, and you seem to have stricter criteria than the average philosopher. Personally I think propositions arrived at via the scientific method are probably the ideal form for truth but that for certain questions this isn’t always a possible method of investigation—or not possible at this moment in history. To me, that doesn’t make the ‘speculative’ answers any less interesting or valuable, at least as possibilities, but yeah they could be wrong
platoprime t1_itvn6fb wrote
>stricter criteria than the average philosopher.
Perhaps the opposite. I don't consider subjective contradictions between perspectives to be the same as a paradox or untruth.
YoungXanto t1_itvj0sq wrote
>Not every question can be settled with airtight logic or an experiment; sometimes all you have is a better or worse argument
From the most skeptical point of view, all we ever have is a better or worse argument. That's the basis of statistics, rooted in probability theory (and very Humean).
We can only sample from observable space across time. Our counterfactual probabilities may be vanishingly small, but they can never be zero.
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