HotterRod t1_itvjf2t wrote
Reply to comment by Kyocus in Logical positivism does not dispense with metaphysics, as it aimed to. It merely proposes a different kind of metaphysics, in which natural sciences take the privileged position once occupied by rationalist metaphysics. by IAI_Admin
Principia Mathematica and subsequent set theories don't start from things you can count, they start from the empty set and the non-empty set. It's similar to basing a metaphysics on "I think therefore I am".
Kyocus t1_itvufwv wrote
So, I am no expert in Set Theory by a LOOONG long shot, regardless please hear me out.In Principia Mathematica, Chapter 1, right when it starts with Preliminary Explanations: "The notation adopted in the present work is based upon that of Peano, and the following explanations are to some extent modelled on those which he prefixes to his Formulario Mathematico."
I reference all this to point out that the book is built upon an older work, which is based on Logical Positivism. Russell's work is based on Direct reference theory, which he supported. The ideas in Principia Mathematica arise from, as I stated in my previous comment "the number of things we can physically count" i.e. Direct Reference Theory.
Please read the opening paragraph of the Wiki for Direct reference theory, it leads straight back to Logical Positivism, all of which Bertrand Russell was a proponent of.
Edit: The smallest of empirical tethers can lead to astonishing discoveries.
DarkSkyKnight t1_itvwpse wrote
This is suggestive evidence, but you would have to do better than that to demonstrate your claim.
ridgecoyote t1_itw453p wrote
His claim that Bertrand Russel was a logical positivist? I thought was common knowledge. At least, that’s what I learned in jr. College and I’ve assumed it was true ever since.
DarkSkyKnight t1_itwf17l wrote
His (implied) claim that set theories start from empirical observations.
ridgecoyote t1_itwgkjw wrote
Ahh. Thanks for clarification. I had issues with that as well, but then, I’m a Pragmatist
zhoushmoe t1_itx5s8g wrote
Where else would they start?
DarkSkyKnight t1_itxjy3h wrote
I really don't know if you're genuinely asking, but linking a possible chain of inspirations through wiki pages is not a rigorous demonstration of their claim.
noactuallyitspoptart t1_iu4rmui wrote
Russell was not a logical positivist, he predates the logical positivists and only agrees with some aspects of their project.
ridgecoyote t1_iu59loi wrote
Thanks for the update. Never been a big Russel fan. I prefer Josiah Royce’s metaphysical system and find it more logical
Kyocus t1_itvywsm wrote
Lol that's a fair assessment. I'm not going to use more time on a thread I feel is thoroughly discussed.
noactuallyitspoptart t1_iu4rfr2 wrote
Russell was not a proponent of logical positivism, and made his philosophical contributions before the Vienna Circle, Ayer etc.
Russell is associated with the “Direct Reference Theory” due to his influential paper “On Denoting”, which makes the meaning of a name the reference of its descriptive content. In this sense Russell is a “direct reference” theorist, but only in contrast to Frege, who proposed an intermediary “sense” of a name, between the idea and the object to which it refers. Russell’s work did not, at the time, fall under such a name “Direct Reference Theory” although his work may reasonably be associated with this later theoretical development. Furthermore, Russell’s account of number and of mathematics in the Principia Mathematica is not rooted in Direct Reference Theory in the way you describe: they are separate contribution that are only linked by Russell’s broader work on and advocacy of Frege’s logic. Principia Mathematica, as a project, in fact predates Russell’s work in On Denoting.
RyeZuul t1_itw7qvg wrote
I don't think you can learn/conceive of empty sets and non-empty sets (or that you think therefore you are) without sensation. While examples are thin on the ground*, the most reasonable self-awareness models rely on an ability to identify the self in one's environment and one's ability to move within it. Without sensation, brains, minds, whatever have nothing to define themselves into being.
*I did look into this years ago and found some rare cases of infants born without the ability to sense and obviously they did not develop properly and were effectively vegetables. Suggestive material exists for people with specific senses absent from birth missing certain experiences of self when dreaming and the like, although plasticity, rewiring the brain to use the visual systems with blindness have also been observed. The general point - that sensation precedes language, logic and self, and these things are genetically dependent on sensation in the hierarchy of knowledge - I think is defensible and reasonable to accept.
Kyocus t1_itwp4om wrote
I think that's reasonable, but would add that the tiniest amount of sensation leads to awareness of self and not self, and to location and relation. pinhole nerve clusters, hearing, or sensation of touch is enough for empiricism.
Viewing a single comment thread. View all comments