contractualist OP t1_iuhbhp8 wrote on October 31, 2022 at 10:10 AM

Reply to comment by TrueBeluga in Freedom vs. Utility (the modern Euthyphro dilemma) by contractualist

I argue that there are objective duties and beyond that, there is subjective meaning (post coming, and I'd like your thoughts on it). I'll be making one on freedom as well, where I believe that there are two relevant definitions that need some explaining.

I don't mean to glorify freedom, but to find a proper foundation for ethics. Freedom, I argue, happens to fit the bill. (wait till I write my stuff on reason for glorification of concepts, which has the authority to restrict freedom).

I agree that the is-ought divide cannot be bridged, and I'll try to clarify this view further.

Philosophers have been using words like autonomy, agency, etc. However, I think freedom gets the point across better, despite its baggage.

TrueBeluga t1_iuilse1 wrote on October 31, 2022 at 4:40 PM

By objective duties do you mean actually objective (as in, within the fabric of the universe or reality, something totally independent of the observer) as that is what I find objective to mean. Anything else is subjective. If you don't think the is-ought problem can be bridged, I'm confused how you argue the existence of objective duties (and thus an objective morality, if I understand you correctly).

I do agree freedom is a decent word for the concept your describing, but is there nothing else that can be used (e.g. mental freedom, desire freedom/freedom of desires, moral freedom)? I think these would help distinguish it from the regular use of freedom, because you may get a lot of flack from ordinary language philosophers for this usage. I don't think it makes your actual argument weaker, but I do think it weakens your ability to communicate it effectively.

I agree that there is subjective meaning, if what you mean by that is something like this: purpose, or meaning within the world is an arbitrary/human concept, and thus can be nothing else than subjective.

I apologize for using the term glorification, as I don't think you're glorifying freedom any more than utilitarian's glorify utility or virtue ethicists glorify virtues. Maybe "moralize" is a better word, but the "moralization" of some concept is integral to any normative theory. In any case, it isn't an issue, but I was just trying to show that freedom is no more special than utility or virtue in regards to the creation of an ethical theory.

contractualist OP t1_iuk1ja7 wrote on October 31, 2022 at 10:36 PM

What I mean by objective duties is that there are moral rules that could not be reasonably rejected and would therefore be a part of the social contract (restrictions on murder, slavery, discrimination etc.). This is in some sense metaphysical and some sense dependent on human nature.

The is-ought problem can't be bridged, however the mere pursuit of normativity is enough for reason to bind an agent's freedom and place them under the moral law. And this moral law is objective. Yet this is the whole mission of my substack, so I'll have much more to say about this.