Submitted by Ma3Ke4Li3 t3_ynt30e in philosophy
Is/Ought Divide has entered the chat.
Why, oh why is he still on this? It was terrible when he proposed it years ago and that hasn't changed. What is it about Philosophical Liberalism that gives people the Brain Worms?
Many moral questions are really questions about new situations, not new principles. For example, if you already believe you ought not eat pork, there's no violation of Hume's Guillotine in turning to DNA sequencing to determine whether there's pork in a dish.
I don't know if this is what this guy means, but it's not unreasonable to suggest that we already believe the moral principles that would let us answer most moral questions to our satisfaction, and we're just waiting for a thorough understanding of the facts.
> ...Philosophical Liberalism...
Huh? Shermer and this kind of scientism are hardly representative of liberalism. Where are you getting this generalization from?
Uhhh... Because he is a Philosophical Liberal? Has he suddenly abandoned Kant, Rawls, or more likely, Nozick? Is he somehow against Capitalism, of which Philosophical Liberalism is the defense?
No. He is not. He's a Transactionalist to the core - He's staunchly for these things. To the level of ranting against their opposite. His entire oeuvre is a defense of 'Individualism'.
You've misunderstood me. I'm not asking where you got the idea that Shermer is or calls himself a liberal from. I'm asking where you got the idea that he is representative of liberalism and I'm asking where you got this dismissive generalization of liberalism from. I mean that as a legitimate question; I've never seen anyone treat Shermer as a major liberal philosopher (emphasis here on "major"), so I'm genuinely wondering where someone could get that idea.
Not unrelatedly, none of the major liberal philosophers that I know of are tied to scientism or anything that seems fair to call "the Brain Worms", if anything major liberal philosophers and even libertarian philosophers (most relevantly and evidently, Nozick and Hayek) are opposed to scientism, so I'm also unsure where you got this impression from independently of Shermer and of other cultural commentators/pop philosophers who profess being "classical liberals".
Do his beliefs w/r/t Liberalism differ from the norm in any great respect?
He's a philosopher, and extremely bright, so his explication of those beliefs is definitely more nuanced than say, a layperson's, but the beliefs themselves do not depart from bog-standard Liberalism. His defenses of various subjects all come from an extremely (nay, extremist) brand of individualism, which is endemic to Liberalism as a whole.
Edit: Scientism isn't orthogonal to Liberalism. It's usually used (badly, imo) as a defense of it.
To be honest, I wouldn't even call Shermer a philosopher, other than maybe a "pop philosopher". He doesn't have a degree in philosophy or have any ties to any philosophy department and I've never seen his political views discussed by any philosophers. He's just not a significant political thinker in general, except for a popular audience, and so I wouldn't take anything he says to be indicative of liberalism as a serious area of thought. At minimum, if you're forming a negative opinion of liberalism because of him or other pop philosophers, including because of how they present the history of liberal thought, I'd encourage you to withhold judgement instead.
Now, I have no clue if Shermer's individualism looks anything like what any major liberal philosopher accepts. But one difference from serious liberalism that is relevant to this thread is his commitment to scientism. That's just incidentally part of his broader collection of views and not at all a part of liberalism itself (along with his atheism). In fact, I can't think of any liberal philosophers who defend scientism or defend any connection between liberalism and scientism (notably for such a modern topic as scientism, it would be nonsense to attribute scientism to Hayek, Nozick, or Rawls). This connection seems like an invention of non-philosophical, "pop" discourse about liberalism. Where are you getting the idea that scientism isn't an orthogonal question from liberalism?
Pop philosophers are definitely philosophers
Sure, we can use the word 'philosopher' that way if we like but then pointing out that Shermer is a philosopher doesn't say much about whether he's a good source for understanding liberalism or even whether he has nuanced views on the topic.
In any case, we should question a person's understanding of liberalism if most of their picture of it comes from writers, like Shermer, who had little to no expert guidance in learning about political philosophy (or had that only incidentally - I have no idea if Shermer took an undergrad course in political philosophy here or there while he was getting his psychology and history of science degrees).
Sure. That would also be the case for academic philosophers. If I want to know, for example, whether X is moral or immoral, an academic philosopher could lead me astray more than a pop philosopher or give me an unworkable solution. This is in relation to practical wisdom vs technical sophistication. People like pop philosophers because they are trying to gain practical wisdom that relates to their own lives and this is useful and probably more useful than the technical sophistication of someone within a given school or tradition that will probably clash with the technical sophistication of another academic in an opposite school/tradition.
Truth is a totally different question from representing a particular philosophical position in an accurate or nuanced way. It is indeed the case for academic philosophers that no one should take them as authorities on what is true about moral questions. Philosophical topics aren't the kinds of topic where it makes sense to treat anyone, academic or popular, as an authority on what is true or false. I'm just talking about treating someone as a good source for what a particular philosophical position even is or in this case for a careful, nuanced account of liberalism and its connections to other views (like scientism).
And if you didn't mean truth (or getting, say, moral, practical, and political questions right) but are just talking about appeal or acceptability to readers, then, absolutely, pop philosophers are much better than academic philosophers for that. Pop philosophers are usually better than academics at writing something that leads people who read it to feel like they have a better understanding about what is right and about how they should live. The same goes for pop science writers: someone who knows how to throw around the word 'quantum' in an engaging way that speaks to what readers want to hear are generally better at writing something that appeals to readers than an academic is (though, as with pop philosophy, some of these popular science writers are also experts who know what they're talking about).
I find this odd. Shermer is not being presented in such a way. He is giving his philosophical views about philosophical topics. No one is saying one should ask Shermer to give a doxographic account of liberalism. Rather Shermer is giving a philosophical account of his own views. This may be problematic(in the specific and the general) but the issue is elsewhere. He is not giving a doxographic course of philosophy.
I don't just mean appeal, I also mean correctness. The correctness of a philosophy is not about the history of philosophy or a doxographic account. That is not the discussion, such issues are only of interest for exams or such academic pursuits. The question "should I cheat on my husband?" and "what did Nietzsche mean by eternal return"? are two different kinds of questions. One is philosophical in its content and the other in its form. An academic philosopher will give you a very competent response to one and a very unwise response to the other.
The initial comment was that Shermer represents some kind of brain rot that's common in people who accept liberalism, one tied to also accepting scientism. How would that not imply that his views are a good source for what is involved in liberalism and its acceptance? But even without that, I'm not sure where you're coming from. I didn't say that Shermer doesn't give a doxography of liberalism and that's the problem; I said his views aren't representative of liberalism and aren't a good point from which to generalize about liberalism. Being representative of liberalism only requires giving an account of liberalism that is, like the person I replied to said, nuanced but also reflective of what liberalism actually involves. I don't see why you'd think I meant giving a doxography.
> When talking about humans, it's probably bad practice to generalize from what you think and what you want to everybody else.
That's why I initially said 'truth' (or getting moral matters right); I don't know why you replied as if I hadn't said that. I only added what I would say IF you just meant appeal to readers because even though you seemed to mean truth what you were describing looked a lot more like appeal or acceptability. What readers think "relates to their own lives" and is "useful" is a great sign of the appeal of that writing to the readers but doesn't tend to have much to do with truth/correctness. For example, if I'm dissatisfied with sex with my husband and care more about that satisfaction than his happiness, I'm probably not going to find someone's writings about why I shouldn't cheat on my husband terribly useful, no matter how rightly or wisely that case is made.
How are you ever going to get an ought statement without having is statements to underpin it?
No one really denies that is statements can be relevant or even necessary for moral evaluation, just that they aren’t sufficient.
What else could be used to inform an ought statement other than something which is ultimately a type of fact?
People disagree what/if moral facts are. But it seems pretty hard to argue they are no different from empirical facts (what was being called is statements).
People disagreeing on something doesn't get you to there being no facts about it though. This seems like a non-sequitur to me.
I'm not sure you've really addressed my question. Perhaps you could give an example?
You're not. That's not where the divide exists.
Is are facts.
Ought are decisions, or intentions if you like.
They are not the same thing at all.
Facts, naturally, may inform decisions, but they do not and cannot dictate them.
I'm not sure what an ought is in this context then. I thought an ought statement would be something like "you ought not drink sea water".
Could you give me a better example?
Sure!
Here's a fact:
It is raining.
SO
I ought to wear galoshes.
OR
I ought to take my shoes off and jump in puddles.
OR
Who cares? I'm not changing my routine.
One fact, three entirely opposing decisions. Facts may have bearing on decisions, they do not dictate them. In the first two cases, the fact informs two opposite decisions - keep your feet dry, go jump in puddles. In the third case, the fact exists, but holds no influence and in this way, is the opposite of the first two decisions.
I disagree, because whatever ought you go with is ultimately going to be determined by underlying facts of the matter.
For instance, your first example - if you decide that you ought to take your shoes off and go jumping in puddles, then that decision is going to be predicated on is statements.
I ought to go jumping in puddles because it is the case that I'd get more enjoyment out of that than the other options, and it is the case that I value my enjoyment more highly than anything else right now.
How could you ever get an ‘is’ statement without ‘ought’ statements to dictate what you accept as evidence?
I would use reason to determine what I accept as evidence.
As well you should; but, that just proves my point.
I thought your point was to show that I need an ought to inform the answer?
Yes.
Reason operates by the use of complex series of ‘ought’ statements—standards, biases, criteria, etc.—to discern what is acceptable; the appeal to reason itself rests on the claim that, in our selection of evidence (or just in general), we ought to be reasonable.
Oh that's interesting.
My response to that would be - yes, we ought to be reasonable because it is the case that we (or at least, I) value reason.
Good riposte; but, does that argument not depend on the claim that our actions ought to be consistent with our values?
There’s also a good discussion to be had there exploring the question of why you/we value reason (and whether we ought to do so), just as an aside.
Well, that's the question isn't it?
I don't think so. I think the question is the exact opposite.
Then what is the question?
The question that underpins the ought/is distinction is "how could you ever get an ought from an is?" Or more concretely, "you can't get an ought from an is."
Well, yeah. You said the question was the opposite, so I'm asking what that is.
The one in my previous comment.
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