Submitted by Gmroo t3_zdfsu4 in philosophy
Reply to comment by lpuckeri in The hard problem of metaphysics: figuring out if other phenomena exist in our universe that like consciousness require we bear a specific metaphysical relation to them - i.e. you can't know of consciousness without being conscious. by Gmroo
It seems to a feature of our universe. Which is why Chalmers invokes it in his meta-problem paper as the debunking argument for illusionism. https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=https://philpapers.org/archive/CHATMO-32.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwj9naKTzeP7AhVRAxAIHQxnBTsQFnoECBsQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1dBPho_aISdjlJadD9LpMq
The point is simply that so far we have not been able to find what-its-likeness in the description of the universe. And I fact I think it's not there. Neural correlates - sure. Or course. But just like I would never ever infer that food tastes like something if it were tasteless to me until I actually would acquire the ability to taste..so too we would never infer phenomenal consciousness or subjective experience without actually experiencing it. That seems quite a significant point and I argue on my point why. Neither a language game nor useless.
You can of course argue that you need to have consciousness to know anything at all, but that's definitely not a given nor obvious. There could be a nonsentient entity processing things without any inner experience, and even with an exhaustive description of the universe it would still remain clueless that there is something like subjective experience. That seems rather significant.
It's why Chalmers also invented the p-zombie... to highlight this gap. However I'd prefer not to get into argumentd about that and conceivability as that's another rabbit hole.
The p zombie argument is bogus because the p zombie doesn't know it's a zombie. It believes it's a person just like you do. As an observer you also don't know whether or not the subject you are talking to is a zombie. They act as if they are not, and if you ask them they say they are not.
It's a weird and invalid exercise.
The p-zombie thought experiment isn't about whether a p-zombie could actually be identified in reality, it's about whether the concept is simply coherent; could a human that doesn't experience qualia exist and act functionally identically to a human that does experience qualia? It's just an attempt to clarify what the term 'qualia' refers to and, based on whether one finds the p-zombie idea to be coherent or not, establish whether qualia are an ontologically real, non-physical property of the universe.
To borrow from Wikipedia (Consciousness is being used here in the sense of 'experiencing qualia'):
> 1. According to physicalism, all that exists in our world (including consciousness) is physical. > 2. Thus, if physicalism is true, a metaphysically possible world in which all physical facts are the same as those of the actual world must contain everything that exists in our actual world. In particular, conscious experience must exist in such a possible world. > 3. Chalmers argues that we can conceive being outside of a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness (a zombie world). From this (so Chalmers argues) it follows that such a world is metaphysically possible. > 4. Therefore, physicalism is false. (The conclusion follows from 2. and 3. by modus tollens.)
This article is pondering whether we'd ever be able to 'know' a metaphysical property that we bear no relation to. I'll give some examples to clarify the problem. For physicalists: imagine dark matter didn't have the property of mass and thus had no gravitational effects. We would never know dark matter exists because we'd have no other way to interact with it or recognize its existence; in fact, there very well could be a form of physical 'matter' like this out there already, but we have no way of knowing it. We couldn't even really speculate on the nature of such matter beyond whether it exists.
For idealists: look at a color wheel and memorize all the colors. Imagine that the spectrum of visible light we can see is expanded by 50 nm in one direction. That new light we'll be able to detect will have colors that are not a part of the current color wheel, but are an addition to it. What do those new colors look like? I personally can't envision any colors existing that aren't ROYGBIV or pink. Perhaps such a color is metaphysically impossible?
For dualists: the universe consists entirely of mental and physical properties. Invent a new fantasy property that doesn't exist and explain it to me in a way I can understand. I'd bet this is also impossible, but perhaps I'm just not very creative!
I would personally consider it impossible for anyone to comprehend or effectively discuss an ontological property that we have no way of recognizing or being impacted by. Because a p-zombie does not have the metaphysical capacity to experience qualia it would not be able to comprehend or discuss it; as you said, a p-zombie would not know it's a p-zombie, because it wouldn't know what it was lacking. The other side of this is that, to put it very crudely, if we are able to comprehend and discuss an ontological property then it can reasonably be said to exist, even if its relation to other properties is uncertain. We possess qualia and are able to discuss it, hence why the p-zombie idea and the term 'qualia' exists in the first place. This is probably what OP means when he says "you can't know of consciousness without being conscious." In this case it really does take one to know one.
>As an observer you also don't know whether or not the subject you are talking to is a zombie. They act as if they are not, and if you ask them they say they are not.
I'd say that if I asked a p-zombie if they experience qualia they'd say "what's that?" They would not be able to understand my explanation because they don't have the metaphysical capacity to understand the ontological properties that I experience and talk about. I wouldn't be able to prove it but I'd have a reasonable suspicion that they were philosophical zombies (provided my explanation was any good). Other than discussing qualia itself though, they'd otherwise be indistinguishable from a normal human, provided that qualia aren't strictly necessary for engaging in usual human behaviors.
I hope at least some of this made sense.
The point is the neither the observer or the zombie itself can know whether or not they are a zombie. So this makes the whole thought experiment moot.
You can't tell, the zombie can't tell.
It's just the problem with solipsism restated.
>Chalmers argues that we can conceive being outside of a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness (a zombie world). From this (so Chalmers argues) it follows that such a world is metaphysically possible.
Can we though? This is the whole problem You can't conceive of such a world because that world would be exactly like this one.
>For idealists: look at a color wheel and memorize all the colors. Imagine that the spectrum of visible light we can see is expanded by 50 nm in one direction. That new light we'll be able to detect will have colors that are not a part of the current color wheel, but are an addition to it. What do those new colors look like? I personally can't envision any colors existing that aren't ROYGBIV or pink. Perhaps such a color is metaphysically impossible?
Do you see how you are begging the question. Your question is saying there is a physical eye seeing physical wavelengths of photons and a brain is undergoing physical processes. So if you are perceiving anything it's due to physicalism. There is nothing metaphysical about perceiving colors.
>The other side of this is that, to put it very crudely, if we are able to comprehend and discuss an ontological property then it can reasonably be said to exist, even if its relation to other properties is uncertain.
Again I pointed out that you can't conceive of it but let's presume you can. This argument boils down to "anything anybody can conceive of is real and exists using the words real and exist in the ways we are familiar with".
Surely you can see the flaw in this premise.
>I'd say that if I asked a p-zombie if they experience qualia they'd say "what's that?"
Most likely this is true because the word itself carries no defined meaning and was created purposefully to be vague and malleable so as to prove a point".
>They would not be able to understand my explanation because they don't have the metaphysical capacity to understand the ontological properties that I experience and talk about.
But they would. The experiment says they could talk about it.
>I hope at least some of this made sense.
I understand what you are saying, your arguments don't make sense to me and I don't accept your premises or conclusions.
>The point is the neither the observer or the zombie itself can know whether or not they are a zombie.
Someone who isn't a zombie would know they themselves aren't a zombie though. Someone who possesses qualia would be able to recognize that fact. The point of the thought experiment is for those qualia-having people to imagine the existence of physically-functional humans who have no qualia and to consider the philosophical/metaphysical/epistemological implications. It makes perfect sense to me.
>Can we though? This is the whole problem You can't conceive of such a world because that world would be exactly like this one.
It would be almost entirely physically identical. Qualia are non-physical by definition. They're the result of physical processes, yes, but qualia are not physical themselves. And I can easily conceive of such a world existing. I know that if I were a p-zombie I'd probably talk about qualia a lot less!
>Your question is saying there is a physical eye seeing physical wavelengths of photons and a brain is undergoing physical processes. So if you are perceiving anything it's due to physicalism. There is nothing metaphysical about perceiving colors.
You got me here. I know there are no idealists on reddit so I still made that example for physicalists really, haha. But I still think it works - subjective color experience itself is a quale, and that's what the whole example is about.
>This argument boils down to "anything anybody can conceive of is real and exists using the words real and exist in the ways we are familiar with".
Hence why I put 'crude'. The argument doesn't work for everything that can be conceived of, only fundamental ontological properties. If humans were all blind we wouldn't discuss sight experience, but most of us can see and thus we can discuss sight experience. The discussion of sight experience itself is one thing that tells me that others can see, and when I apply this logic to qualia this is how I overcome solipsism.
On the other hand, we know bats echolocate and we know the physics and the biology behind it, but most of us can't personally echolocate - and thus we don't talk about the quale of echolocation. We don't even know what it's like, so how would we talk about it? I don't have a nice fancy polished argument for this line of thought but I'm sure you can at least see what I'm aiming at here.
>Most likely this is true because the word itself carries no defined meaning and was created purposefully to be vague and malleable so as to prove a point".
I'm not sure about that. Every definition I've seen of qualia strikes at a very particular feature of human existence - subjective conscious experience. It's always seemed like a pretty straightforward concept to me.
>But they would. The experiment says they could talk about it.
Er, can you clarify?
>I understand what you are saying, your arguments don't make sense to me and I don't accept your premises or conclusions.
That's fine. These kinds of metaphysical debates usually don't result in any form of mutual understanding lol. But figured I'd try anyway.
>Someone who isn't a zombie would know they themselves aren't a zombie though.
How?
>Someone who possesses qualia would be able to recognize that fact.
The zombie thinks they have qualia.
> The point of the thought experiment is for those qualia-having people to imagine the existence of physically-functional humans who have no qualia and to consider the philosophical/metaphysical/epistemological implications. It makes perfect sense to me.
Honestly it makes no sense to me.
>It would be almost entirely physically identical. Qualia are non-physical by definition.
But they are physical. Your perceptions are physical. Your feelings about your perceptions are also physical.
> I know that if I were a p-zombie I'd probably talk about qualia a lot less!
No you wouldn't. You'd talk about it just as much because you would think you have qualia.
> subjective color experience itself is a quale, and that's what the whole example is about.
But it's physical. Your subjective experience can be measured in a machine by examining your brain activity.
>The argument doesn't work for everything that can be conceived of, only fundamental ontological properties.
Why? Why is this definition of creation only limited to fundamental ontological properties (whatever that means).
>If humans were all blind we wouldn't discuss sight experience, but most of us can see and thus we can discuss sight experience.
Yes because photons are hitting our physical eyes and creating physical electrical signals which travel on physical nerves and get processed in your physical brain.
>On the other hand, we know bats echolocate and we know the physics and the biology behind it, but most of us can't personally echolocate - and thus we don't talk about the quale of echolocation.
Some people do. Come to think of it it's no different than talking about qualia of hearing.
>We don't even know what it's like, so how would we talk about it?
We can guess. We can theorize. We can simulate. We can mathematically model. We can build machines to mimic it. That's what humans do to understand things beyond our perception.
>Every definition I've seen of qualia strikes at a very particular feature of human existence - subjective conscious experience. It's always seemed like a pretty straightforward concept to me.
No you forgot to add "non physical" or "non material" or "supernatural" into that definition. Subjective experience is physical and there is no need for a special word to talk about it.
> These kinds of metaphysical debates usually don't result in any form of mutual understanding lol. But figured I'd try anyway.
Do you know why? It's because nobody can define the word metaphysical consistently.
>How?
Because a zombie has no qualia and I know I do have qualia because I'm currently and constantly directly experiencing qualia.
>The zombie thinks they have qualia.
>No you wouldn't. You'd talk about it just as much because you would think you have qualia.
According to whom? That's not part of the thought experiment and I see no logical reason to assume that. I've spent this entire discussion establishing exactly why that wouldn't be the case. The zombie would only think it has qualia (assuming it understands the correct definition of qualia and hasn't been lied to) if it actually does have qualia and thus it wouldn't be a zombie.
>Honestly it makes no sense to me.
Then I'm afraid I must conclude you yourself are a p-zombie :)
>But they are physical. Your perceptions are physical. Your feelings about your perceptions are also physical.
>But it's physical. Your subjective experience can be measured in a machine by examining your brain activity.
>Subjective experience is physical and there is no need for a special word to talk about it.
Neural correlates of consciousness are physical and can be measured but consciousness (qualia) itself is not and cannot. But this is a whole argument by itself. I'd recommend reading Chalmer's The Conscious Mind for a better understanding.
>Why? Why is this definition of creation only limited to fundamental ontological properties (whatever that means).
The article in the post we're arguing in the comments section of should answer this question.
>We can guess. We can theorize. We can simulate. We can mathematically model. We can build machines to mimic it. That's what humans do to understand things beyond our perception.
What these things do is convert that information into a form we can access. But we can never experience the quale of bat echolocation, or bird magnetoreception, or shark electroreception, et cetera. At this point we've just arrived at the Mary the color scientist thought experiment.
>Do you know why? It's because nobody can define the word metaphysical consistently.
'Philosophy' has never been properly defined either, but here we are.
>Because a zombie has no qualia and I know I do have qualia because I'm currently and constantly directly experiencing qualia.
The zombie believes he has qualia.
>According to whom?
According to the premise of the experiment.
>? That's not part of the thought experiment and I see no logical reason to assume that.
The logical reason is that there is another universe exactly like this one which means the zombies are exactly like humans but lack qualia. This means they believe they have qualia and say that they have qualia when you ask them.
>Then I'm afraid I must conclude you yourself are a p-zombie :)
Go right ahead. I am sure it fits in your worldview already.
>Neural correlates of consciousness are physical and can be measured but consciousness (qualia) itself is not and cannot.
Of course it can. We can literally record you experiencing the redness of red.
>But this is a whole argument by itself. I'd recommend reading Chalmer's The Conscious Mind for a better understanding.
I have. He makes no sense. Like you he keeps making insane and completely unsubstantiated claims like "qualia can't be detected" when we can clearly detect you experiencing qualia.
>The article in the post we're arguing in the comments section of should answer this question.
It doesn't. An answer isn't just something somebody says. There has to be some sort of evidence.
>What these things do is convert that information into a form we can access.
Exactly.
>But we can never experience the quale of bat echolocation, or bird magnetoreception, or shark electroreception, et cetera.
why are you so sure of that. According to you qualia is unmeasurable, undetectable, completely subjective, and is not material. Given all of that how can you be sure I am not experiencing the qualia of echolocation?
>'Philosophy' has never been properly defined either, but here we are.
Arguing about the definition of words nobody can agree with. That's philosophy in a nutshell.
>The logical reason is that there is another universe exactly like this one which means the zombies are exactly like humans but lack qualia. This means they believe they have qualia and say that they have qualia when you ask them.
I suppose that's fair enough, but personally I'd say there's a tacit assumption in any thought experiment that causality is 'reset' and the hypothetical world plays out according to whatever has been changed in the thought experiment to begin with. In which case these p-zombies wouldn't believe they have qualia.
>Of course it can. We can literally record you experiencing the redness of red.
>I have. He makes no sense. Like you he keeps making insane and completely unsubstantiated claims like "qualia can't be detected" when we can clearly detect you experiencing qualia.
What magical machine is this that records my qualia? You can measure my brain activity all you want but that's not the same thing. Neural correlates of consciousness are not consciousness.
The insanity here is the inability to understand what I'm talking about when I refer to the most fundamental aspect of human existence. My only options are to believe that physicalism has resulted in some sort of collective self-denying delusion (a la Daniel Dennett) or that philosophical zombies actually exist, are among us, and are debating philosophy of mind with us. I can't tell which one I prefer.
>Given all of that how can you be sure I am not experiencing the qualia of echolocation?
Because I'm sure you would've told me by now if you were lmao
>Arguing about the definition of words nobody can agree with. That's philosophy in a nutshell.
Truer words have never been spoken. Anyway it's far past my bedtime, gotta call it a night/morning. Have a good one 🤙
>I suppose that's fair enough, but personally I'd say there's a tacit assumption in any thought experiment that causality is 'reset' and the hypothetical world plays out according to whatever has been changed in the thought experiment to begin with. In which case these p-zombies wouldn't believe they have qualia.
But that makes no sense. That premise begs the question and can't possibly lead to any kind of rational conclusion.
>What magical machine is this that records my qualia?
There are several variety of brain scanning devices. Surely you know this.
> You can measure my brain activity all you want but that's not the same thing.
Why not? They are exactly the same thing. You can even watch it and say to yourself "so that's what me experiencing the redness of red looks like".
> Neural correlates of consciousness are not consciousness.
That seems like an outrageous claim and will need to be backed up by some evidence.
>The insanity here is the inability to understand what I'm talking about when I refer to the most fundamental aspect of human existence.
I suspect this is because you yourself don't really know and can't put it into precise terms. You are holding on to a vague notion so it's no possible for you to explain it to anybody with clarity.
> My only options are to believe that physicalism has resulted in some sort of collective self-denying delusion (a la Daniel Dennett) or that philosophical zombies actually exist, are among us, and are debating philosophy of mind with us. I can't tell which one I prefer.
I think if you tried hard enough you'd be able to come up other options.
>Because I'm sure you would've told me by now if you were lmao
What makes you so sure of that?
There are variations on the zombie that are a bit more clever. The point is that it's unclear why the processes in our bodies have to feel like anything since descriptively they perform their function.
Cojoined twins exist. See Krista and Tatiana Hogan. So not knowing is an interfacing issue.
>The point is that it's unclear why the processes in our bodies have to feel like anything since descriptively they perform their function.
Why is that a point worthy of consideration?
I also don't see what the conjoined twins has anything to do with this.
My post and a whole body of work covers why it's worthy of consideration. Because consiousness is a crucial phenomenon and apparently you can't know of it unless you get to experience it. That's pretty interesting. I suggest you read the meta-problem by Chalmers. If it doesn't interest you, then I guess it doesn't.
You said as an observer you don't know... so I mentioned cojoined twins as an example that in principle we can know.
>Because consiousness is a crucial phenomenon and apparently you can't know of it unless you get to experience it.
Why did you put the word "apparently" in there. Is this really apparent? It's not apparent to me at all.
>I suggest you read the meta-problem by Chalmers. If it doesn't interest you, then I guess it doesn'
Chalmers bores me to tears. His arguments are all just attempts to justify his already held beliefs no different than any christian who is making arguments for god.
>You said as an observer you don't know... so I mentioned cojoined twins as an example that in principle we can know.
I don't get it. How is this applicable?
Chalmers's arguments are systematic and explorative. Sorry, can't help you further since he bores you and your convinxed of some caricarure of him.
And if it's not apparent to you, then make an argument how subjective experience can be inferred without having it. I don't think there is one. That would be beyond Nobel-level stuff.
>Chalmers's arguments are systematic and explorative
I disagree. They are contrived and designed carefully to try and provide some sort of a backing for his already held conclusions.
>And if it's not apparent to you, then make an argument how subjective experience can be inferred without having it.
I have multiple times.
Your experiences are merely electrochemical activity taking place in your body. They can be measured and then mechanically stimulated to make you feel things.
>That would be beyond Nobel-level stuff.
It's banal and has been done thousands of times. You can literally make people believe in god and then disbelieve by stimulating their brains.
Mentioning elechtrochemical activity and the God helmet has nothint to do with the point. You are projecting magical views onto people and tilting at windmills. So we're talking past each other.
>Mentioning elechtrochemical activity and the God helmet has nothint to do with the point.
It has everything to do with the point. It proves that experience is the result of electrochemical activity in the brain and causing electrochemical activity in the brain causes experience.
It doesn't prove anything and again hss no bearing on my point. You seem to think this is about some ghost in the machine. It's not.
>It doesn't prove anything and again hss no bearing on my point.
You can't be serious. We can cause specific experiences by providing specific input.
You're talking about correlates of consciousness and associated physical processes. I don't disagree any of tbat, but the processes don't "prove" anything in themselves.
And your calculator also takes input. It doesn't automatically have experience.
>And your calculator also takes input. It doesn't automatically have experience.
Are you sure? Why do you think it doesn't? Clearly it reacts to input. Your brain also reacts to input.
I can't be a 100% sure, but we have our own experience and evidence from convergence in evolution in our cases, verbak reports and the whole rest. In the case of simple calculators that did not evoove to think and feel like us, we don't. And it's a rather specious suggestion. The positive feedback loops in the CNS, receptors and signalling, etc., are a whooe different machine than simple electronic devices or even any Von Neumann architecture. Our brain is an analog piece wetware.
>n the case of simple calculators that did not evoove to think and feel like us, we don't.
I said nothing about thinking or evolving. I am merely talking about experience.
>Our brain is an analog piece wetware.
Irrelevant to the discussion.
How something is built and what sort of input it receives, how it's processed is of course relevant to the discussion. Making random claims that anything that receives input has subj. experience is silly.
>How something is built and what sort of input it receives, how it's processed is of course relevant to the discussion
No it's not. The mere fact that processing happens is the only thing that matters.
>Making random claims that anything that receives input has subj. experience is silly.
Why is it silly?
Handwaving with a word like processing is meaningless. I personally am looking to engineer not just AI but synthetic minds. Properties of the materials and the physics matter.
It's silly because it assumes subjective experience as some sort of magic that happens regardless of the design.
>Handwaving with a word like processing is meaningless.
Is it though? How is it worse than handwaving with a word like consciousness or experience or qualia?
>I personally am looking to engineer not just AI but synthetic minds.
Good luck with that. Let me know when you know what a mind is and how you would recognize one.
>It's silly because it assumes subjective experience as some sort of magic that happens regardless of the design.
It's not magic at all. It's just chemical reactions.
You can levy any argument against knowing without consciousness against knowing consciousness without consciousness.
Yes you can't experience the taste of food without the ability to taste food. Yes you can't experience consciousness without the ability to experience consciousness... but can you know it? Well it all comes down to how you define knowing... your argument is about knowing consciousness.
To define knowing in a way that you do to combat my more parsimonious statement requires you giving up ur argument. Example if you say: a non sentient thing processing can know things. Well than a non sentient thing processing can know consciousness and ur argument fails. You must argue knowing requires inner experience and awareness, for both your and my more parsimonious statement to stand.
As i said it would boil down to, all there is to debate is whether ur definition of knowing requires experience and/or awareness. If you say no, ur right my argument fails... but so does urs. We both must say yes, and in the end all were really saying is saying you can't experience things without the ability to experience that thing.
Which we both agree with, but just seems an obvious tautology to me.
Again, I would invoke Chalmers' argumentation here:
One can also make a debunking argument about beliefs about phenomenal consciousness in general, perhaps with some variety of non-reductionism operating as a background assumption. There are various ways to lay out such an argument, but perhaps the most straight forward is as follows: 1.There is a correct explanation of our beliefs about conscious-ness that is independent of consciousness 2. If there is a correct explanation of our beliefs about conscious- ness that is independent of consciousness, those beliefs are not justified 3. Our beliefs about consciousness are not justified.
Basically, I am claiming 1 and in my post list 2 as a partial knockdown argument. I personally find this a brain-breaking and fascinating idea wrt to the properties of our universe.
So we can bicker about knowing or belief, but in the end I don't see how the basic idea that whatever consciousness is bears a particular relation to us so that we can even bicker about it as an explicandum, is not compelling basis to ponder the search for other phenomena that might not be easily or at all detectable without a particular relation we'd have to bear to them.
> here is a correct explanation of our beliefs about conscious-ness that is independent of consciousness
How can that possibly be? How can you have a belief without consciousness?
Explanation about our beliefs about consciousness rhat is independent if it...that's something else.
And it's conceivable an entity has intelligence but no subjective experience. So you can explain what strawberry tastes like till you're blue in the face. It doesn't grasp the concept of taste.
>The point is that it's unclear why the processes in our bodies have to feel like anything since descriptively they perform their function.
Again, what does this even mean?
>And it's conceivable an entity has intelligence but no subjective experience.
I am not sure if that's possible. I don't think you can gain or enhance intelligence without input of any sort and input is experience.
>So you can explain what strawberry tastes like till you're blue in the face. It doesn't grasp the concept of taste.
I think it could. Blind people have concepts of seeing, deaf people have concepts of hearing.
People born deaf have some compensatory mechanisms like better detection of vibrations... but you're stretching at this point.
Yes, the relation between intelligence and consciousness is an open problem. Input sure. Input is not experience. That is nonsense. I can build a simple raspberry Pi robot with accentuators and its simple processing doesn't mean it necessarily has subjective experience unless you subscrive to some form of panpsychism. I don't that flies.
>People born deaf have some compensatory mechanisms like better detection of vibrations... but you're stretching at this point.
They have input into their brains. They can understand input they don't have using input they do have.
>Input is not experience.
Of course it is. There can be no experience without input.
>I can build a simple raspberry Pi robot with accentuators and its simple processing doesn't mean it necessarily has subjective experience unless you subscrive to some form of panpsychism.
It has input and that input is in fact experience for the processor. It detects the electricity which then results in other electrochemical reactions.
This is no different than your brain.
It's is of course arcbitecturally completely different than my brain.....
From "input isn ot experience" it doesn't follow that there can't be any experience without input. I am simply saying not all forms of input result in subjective experience.
>It's is of course arcbitecturally completely different than my brain.....
It's really not that different though.
>From "input isn ot experience" it doesn't follow that there can't be any experience without input.
Sure it does. Experience is the result of electrochemical activity in the brain. That doesn't happen without input.
>I am simply saying not all forms of input result in subjective experience.
And I am saying they do.
Okay, wow. Bold claim. Evolution seemed to work hsrd to develop a CNS and such if all "input" is subjective experience.
>Okay, wow. Bold claim. Evolution seemed to work hsrd to develop a CNS and such if all "input" is subjective experience.
CNS can't work without input. It requires a steady stream of oxygenated blood and hydrocarbons all of which require input.
>It's is of course arcbitecturally completely different than my brain.....
An old circular CRT TV is architecturally completely different than a modern smart TV. Yet there's a commonality of function (convert input to two-dimensional visual display) that makes comparison not only possible, but obvious.
Hmm maybe I will read more into Chalmer. See if that changes my thinking
Thanks for the info and responses.
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