Submitted by contractualist t3_ziw9nv in philosophy
Nameless1995 t1_izv1iph wrote
Reply to comment by contractualist in Why You Should Be Moral (answering Prichard's dilemma) by contractualist
> If someone were to say that a valued sentimental value, they wouldn’t be acting according to that value if they ripped up that painting. The painting has sentimental value, regardless of who imposes that value onto it.
Can you elaborate what you mean? If someone were to say that they have a sentimental value towards a painting; then yes, given no good overriding reasons, they wouldn't rip the painting because that would go against them valuing the painting.
But that example only demonstrates that the paining has sentimental value for the particular subject who values them.
That doesn't say anything, however, whether the value exists for others as /u/timbgray was concerned about. It may but it doesn't seem like it need to.
In fact, the example makes more sense if we think of the "valuing" as a relational-functional orientation of the subject towards an object that induces certain behaviorial dispositions which allows folk-psychological predictions (like the subject will be resistent to ripping the painting apart, the subject will be upset if the painting is ripped etc.).
Instead you seemed to be making the "value" intrinsic to the painting itself as if values can be "imposed" to objects by subjects, and the values remain imposed even after the death of all subjects. A skeptic can easily resist this move. The same move is also made in the article where value of freedom valuable by some objective standard, thus self-freedom is made as valuable as other-freedom.
contractualist OP t1_izv4yle wrote
What the painting has is sentimental value, so if the person said that they valued sentimental value, they would have to value the sentimental value of the painting.
Although no one would normally say that they valued sentimental value itself since its agent-relative. Yet freedom, on the other hand, is agency itself. It can be thought of instead as a possession. It doesn't depend on an agent's perspective because that's what freedom is, an agent's perspective. Our freedom is identical to one another as an asset. There is no basis on which it can be differentiated like utility can be (since its also agent-relative).
Thanks for the engagement, let me know if this addresses your concern.
Nameless1995 t1_izv9hw3 wrote
> What the painting has is sentimental value
To the person.
> Yet freedom, on the other hand, is agency itself. It can be thought of instead as a possession. It doesn't depend on an agent's perspective because that's what freedom is, an agent's perspective.
This seems a bit spurious. An agent can quite coherently take freedom to a form of capacity, and they can value their capacity. Moreover, I don't see what relevance here is for reflexivity. A self-conscious being valuing their self-conscious is valuing, in a sense, that which they are reflexively, but that doesn't make the valuing ~agent-relative. Even if we accept the freedom is an agent's perspective itself (which is a very weird phrasing), there is no clear incoherency in an agent reflexively valuing their own perspective/or their own agency -- in relation to their own agent-perspective itself.
If we say that kind of valuing is "illegal", it's not clear to me what kind of "value" any freedom is even left with.
Moreover, there is a trivial sense, in which freedom can be differentiated. For example, one agent can be free to act in different ways, and another agent can be barred (perhaps imprisoned; shackeled). Freedom in concrete instantiation, is then tied to particular agents.
Although, you could make a case if the skeptic valued freedom as such (in that case, the skeptic to be consistent may need to value freedom for all if we assume everyone shares the relevant kind of potential for freedom), but the skeptic may start with valuing "own-freedom" (the specific freedom that exists in the specific relation to oneself) rather than "freedom as such". The reason to move towards valuing freedom as such opposed to the particular capacity of freedom existing in the specific relation to oneself seems to be still missing.
contractualist OP t1_izwjlao wrote
But it’s because the skeptic values reason as well, that they would have to have a justification to value their own freedom. They would have to have a non-arbitrary difference between their freedom and others’ freedom for them to justify valuing only their own. And because freedom is equal, in that a difference is not possible, then the skeptic would have to value freedom generally.
This is intuitive as well. We understand that free beings have value compared to non-free beings (inanimate objects). We wouldn’t have a reasonable justification to prioritize only our own freedom is freedom is equal.
Nameless1995 t1_izwvjd4 wrote
> justification to value their own freedom.
Skeptic is interested in being consistent. They can't say "I value x but I don't value x", and they can't say "I value freedom as such but I don't value x's freedom" and so on. But as long as they are consistent, they don't see the need to provide justifications for why they value what they value. The skeptic can say they value "their own freedom, but not others'", it seems completely consistent to me. The "difference" is merely that their own freedom is the capacity that they have, and they can exercise; and the skeptic values things that are related to themselves in an empowring manner.
You can say that's an "arbitrary" difference. But I am not sure what criteria for "non-arbtirariness" is here. Any "random" difference should go to allow the skeptic being consistent. You may say that the skeptic has to justify why the skeptic cares about the "arbitrary difference". But, it seems odd to ask justification for "values", because they usually turn into explanation in terms of other "values". It's not the kind of thing that can be derived from laws of logic. The skeptic may be Humean; allowing reason to be slave to passions, and allow some values to be just brute psychological force (like hunger). The skeptic values 75% dark chocolate rather than chocolate in general, because he just does. Similarly the skeptic values things that increases the power of self (like the particular capacity of freedom (not freedom in general) that they possess) because the skeptic simply does.
> We understand that free beings have value compared to non-free beings (inanimate objects). We wouldn’t have a reasonable justification to prioritize only our own freedom is freedom is equal.
I don't "understand" that free beings "have" value. I simply brutely find myself respecting the freedom of others as my my own given no overriding reasons.
contractualist OP t1_izxtsw1 wrote
You’re saying “related to itself” but what do you mean by that? If it’s something physical like the body, then any difference is still arbitrary. For instance, if the cup on my desk has a certain value, it has that value regardless of what desk it happens to be on. It wouldn’t make sense for it to change value if its physically on another desk (or if it did, that would require an additional premise that I’m not assuming). And any equivalent cup would have the same value.
But if you mean “related to itself” as in someone’s personal agency, then what I’m talking about doesn’t relate to itself. It’s just agency and doesn’t depend on someone’s personal agency. The thing doesn’t have value from relating to itself. It’s just a thing with value.
Nameless1995 t1_izxxy5k wrote
> If it’s something physical like the body
It could be the physical body, the organism, it could be some non-physical soul; we can be agnostic to the metaphysics. But yes, we can go along with the particular physical body.
> difference is still arbitrary
But what makes a difference "arbitrary"? And what's wrong with the Skeptic valuing some "arbitrary" difference?
> For instance, if the cup on my desk has a certain value, it has that value regardless of what desk it happens to be on.
Let's go with this example. Perhaps there is a skeptic who finds the cup valuable only if it is arranged in the desk in a certain way but not otherwise. He doesn't find the cup in itself valuable. So what is the problem with that? The fundamental values can be just brute physcological impulses; why should the skeptic need to provide any reason and justification for that? Similarly the skeptic may not find freedom by itself valuable, simply freedom as possessed by himself - the physical organism (or whatever).
> It wouldn’t make sense for it to change value if its physically on another desk (or if it did, that would require an additional premise that I’m not assuming)
What additional premise? The point I am making is that people are not compelled to value some high-level universals. They can value particulars with specific relations to their own physical embodied system and history. You can't just say it's all "arbtirary" differences.
> And any equivalent cup would have the same value.
Not necessarily. A skeptic (or even any normal person), may value a certain cup more because of the specific history they share with the cup. An otherwise materially equivalent cup may not just have the same value for the skeptic (of course, we can fool the skeptic by replacing the valued cup with a replica and misrepresent the value, but that's irrelevant).
contractualist OP t1_izzxovv wrote
>the skeptic values reason. An arbitrary difference would violate that value.
> if its arranged in a certain way, then just replace my example with the cup and the desk together. The example can be anything with inherent value.
> the assumption that the value is dependent on something else. The premise is that X has value, not that X's value depends on Y. What I argue is that freedom has inherent value. Again, its not agent dependent since freedom is agency.
> If the cup is valued due to sentimental value, then its not inherent value. Its value is agent-relative.
Nameless1995 t1_j0067m8 wrote
So the argument is only aimed at skeptics who accepts the notion of "inherent value"? Not at a more radical skeptic who is skeptical of the very notion of the possibility of values being "inherent" in object in a stance-independent sense?
contractualist OP t1_j01ecxe wrote
You can’t have morality without values, specifically freedom and reason
Nameless1995 t1_j02eqdx wrote
I am not talking skeptics who denies values per se, but inherent stance-independent values. So the radical skeptic may brutely stance-dependently value reason, his-own-freedom and such but not believe that reason has inherent agent-independent value, or that freedom-as-such or even his-own-freedom has inherent value beyond the psychological contigencies of people relating to them in a "valuing" manner. Thus the radical skeptic is not sure if value is a thing or a property rather than being a process-in-act -- a "value-ing" associating with how the agent relates to a thing, concept, or a capacity.
And moreover, the skeptic may be a skeptical towards moral realism (beyond there being game-theoretically stable principles for agents to modulate their "powers" by considering trade-offs involving different valuing of different agents)
Thedeaththatlives t1_j00pn7a wrote
Wouldn't valuing reason also be arbitrary?
contractualist OP t1_j01fn48 wrote
You need values to have morals and what the skeptic values is a given
Thedeaththatlives t1_j01nsww wrote
Then what's the problem with also arbitrarily valuing the freedom you have and not the freedom someone else has? Since clearly there is no inherent problem with arbitrarily valuing things.
contractualist OP t1_j04l3vi wrote
Because reason is valued.
Thedeaththatlives t1_j04p002 wrote
Then valuing freedom on it's own should also go against valuing reason, right? Because it's arbitrary, and thus irrational.
Basically, both "I value freedom" and "I value my own freedom" are by your own admission arbitrary values. If the latter goes against valuing reason because it's arbitrary, why doesn't the former? If the former is acceptable because you need values to have morals, why isn't the latter?
contractualist OP t1_j052bg3 wrote
The skeptic already values freedom, hence why he's asking. You can value both freedom and reason. However, freedom isn't agent-relative. Valuing freedom in one requires valuing it universally.
Thedeaththatlives t1_j060uyb wrote
"But it’s because the skeptic values reason as well, that they would have to have a justification to value their own freedom. They would have to have a non-arbitrary difference between their freedom and others’ freedom for them to justify valuing only their own."
By your own admission, it's not that it's impossible to value ones own freedom (which wouldn't even make sense because people clearly do that all the time), but that it would be arbitrary and thus irrational to do so, which brings us back to my question.
I think the thing here is that you believe extrinsic properties are irrational to value, but intrinsic ones are not, and I don't see a meaningful difference. Is this accurate?
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