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LukeFromPhilly t1_izwlo0f wrote

Reply to comment by contractualist in Why You Should Be Moral (answering Prichard's dilemma) by contractualist

>If we both have possession X, and I value my X for itself, then I can’t say that your exact possession X isn’t valuable because I am me. It’s not a reason that can’t be reasonably rejected.

Since the question is whether I should value you you having freedom as much as I value me having freedom the proper analogy would be the question of whether I should value you you possessing X as much as I value me possessing X. In that case, again, the obvious reasonable reason for someone to prefer themselves having X more than someone else having X is because they are themselves and other people are other people. What's unreasonable about this?

>Children meanwhile are valued through an agent-relative relationship, unique between child and parent. But agency isn’t agent-relative but it’s agency itself. It’s a possession which everyone has in equal capacity and no justifiable difference exists (you can’t say that one is more free than others).

I'll give you that freedom is not an entity whose value is agent-relative so in that sense my example falls down here. However, as I've said above, the question is not whether my freedom is more valuable than someone else's it's whether there is any reasonable justification for me to value myself having freedom more than I value someone else having freedom and there the obvious reason is that I am me and they are them. In this sense all values are agent-relative. I don't value things from a third-person perspective.

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contractualist OP t1_izwnmg2 wrote

Not valuing the same, but valuing at all. Only in the former question can you can get into issues of degrees. But the latter is binary.

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LukeFromPhilly t1_izwo9gr wrote

Ah ok. I think my argument still works if you substitute valuing the same for valuing at all but at least I understand you better now.

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contractualist OP t1_izwoj1b wrote

Then I still wouldn’t say there is a justification for valuing’s someone freedom at 0, given the status of freedom as an agency creating asset, rather than dependent on personal agency. So any claim that “X is valuable because it’s mine” isn’t justifiable since X’s value doesn’t rely on that persons personal agency.

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LukeFromPhilly t1_izwq091 wrote

I think saying X's value here is confusing. If I say that I value my neighbors Tesla then the implication is that I want it for myself. If I say that I value my neighbors freedom the implication is that I want my neighbor to have freedom which is actually contrary to the first example.

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contractualist OP t1_izwscg1 wrote

Well your neighbor in that case already has freedom. Now it’s just about recognition and valuing of freedom. But I wouldn’t argue that people would necessarily want others to have freedom (say non-conscious animals). All I argue is that freedom is equal in one dimension and because it’s not agent relative, must have a universal value in itself.

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LukeFromPhilly t1_izxfaz7 wrote

Well in that case my critique of what you're saying is entirely based on me misunderstanding you.

However, if all you're saying is that we acknowledge that freedom as value regardless of whose freedom it is, how does that belief lead to any constraints on our own behavior? If we're acknowledging that I may have a reasonable reason not to want other people to have freedom then it would seem my actions aren't necessarily constrained in any way and therefore I don't have to be moral.

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contractualist OP t1_izxsfa0 wrote

Yep, that’s the next step. Once the value of people’s freedom is recognized, they’ll act according to that value by obeying the term of the social contract, the expression of individuals’ freedom.

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LukeFromPhilly t1_izxweg4 wrote

But that would seem to imply that I want other people to have freedom which I thought we agreed doesn't follow.

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