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Nameless1995 t1_izwvjd4 wrote

Reply to comment by contractualist in Why You Should Be Moral (answering Prichard's dilemma) by contractualist

> justification to value their own freedom.

Skeptic is interested in being consistent. They can't say "I value x but I don't value x", and they can't say "I value freedom as such but I don't value x's freedom" and so on. But as long as they are consistent, they don't see the need to provide justifications for why they value what they value. The skeptic can say they value "their own freedom, but not others'", it seems completely consistent to me. The "difference" is merely that their own freedom is the capacity that they have, and they can exercise; and the skeptic values things that are related to themselves in an empowring manner.

You can say that's an "arbitrary" difference. But I am not sure what criteria for "non-arbtirariness" is here. Any "random" difference should go to allow the skeptic being consistent. You may say that the skeptic has to justify why the skeptic cares about the "arbitrary difference". But, it seems odd to ask justification for "values", because they usually turn into explanation in terms of other "values". It's not the kind of thing that can be derived from laws of logic. The skeptic may be Humean; allowing reason to be slave to passions, and allow some values to be just brute psychological force (like hunger). The skeptic values 75% dark chocolate rather than chocolate in general, because he just does. Similarly the skeptic values things that increases the power of self (like the particular capacity of freedom (not freedom in general) that they possess) because the skeptic simply does.

> We understand that free beings have value compared to non-free beings (inanimate objects). We wouldn’t have a reasonable justification to prioritize only our own freedom is freedom is equal.

I don't "understand" that free beings "have" value. I simply brutely find myself respecting the freedom of others as my my own given no overriding reasons.

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contractualist OP t1_izxtsw1 wrote

You’re saying “related to itself” but what do you mean by that? If it’s something physical like the body, then any difference is still arbitrary. For instance, if the cup on my desk has a certain value, it has that value regardless of what desk it happens to be on. It wouldn’t make sense for it to change value if its physically on another desk (or if it did, that would require an additional premise that I’m not assuming). And any equivalent cup would have the same value.

But if you mean “related to itself” as in someone’s personal agency, then what I’m talking about doesn’t relate to itself. It’s just agency and doesn’t depend on someone’s personal agency. The thing doesn’t have value from relating to itself. It’s just a thing with value.

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Nameless1995 t1_izxxy5k wrote

> If it’s something physical like the body

It could be the physical body, the organism, it could be some non-physical soul; we can be agnostic to the metaphysics. But yes, we can go along with the particular physical body.

> difference is still arbitrary

But what makes a difference "arbitrary"? And what's wrong with the Skeptic valuing some "arbitrary" difference?

> For instance, if the cup on my desk has a certain value, it has that value regardless of what desk it happens to be on.

Let's go with this example. Perhaps there is a skeptic who finds the cup valuable only if it is arranged in the desk in a certain way but not otherwise. He doesn't find the cup in itself valuable. So what is the problem with that? The fundamental values can be just brute physcological impulses; why should the skeptic need to provide any reason and justification for that? Similarly the skeptic may not find freedom by itself valuable, simply freedom as possessed by himself - the physical organism (or whatever).

> It wouldn’t make sense for it to change value if its physically on another desk (or if it did, that would require an additional premise that I’m not assuming)

What additional premise? The point I am making is that people are not compelled to value some high-level universals. They can value particulars with specific relations to their own physical embodied system and history. You can't just say it's all "arbtirary" differences.

> And any equivalent cup would have the same value.

Not necessarily. A skeptic (or even any normal person), may value a certain cup more because of the specific history they share with the cup. An otherwise materially equivalent cup may not just have the same value for the skeptic (of course, we can fool the skeptic by replacing the valued cup with a replica and misrepresent the value, but that's irrelevant).

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contractualist OP t1_izzxovv wrote

>the skeptic values reason. An arbitrary difference would violate that value.

> if its arranged in a certain way, then just replace my example with the cup and the desk together. The example can be anything with inherent value.

> the assumption that the value is dependent on something else. The premise is that X has value, not that X's value depends on Y. What I argue is that freedom has inherent value. Again, its not agent dependent since freedom is agency.

> If the cup is valued due to sentimental value, then its not inherent value. Its value is agent-relative.

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Nameless1995 t1_j0067m8 wrote

So the argument is only aimed at skeptics who accepts the notion of "inherent value"? Not at a more radical skeptic who is skeptical of the very notion of the possibility of values being "inherent" in object in a stance-independent sense?

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contractualist OP t1_j01ecxe wrote

You can’t have morality without values, specifically freedom and reason

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Nameless1995 t1_j02eqdx wrote

I am not talking skeptics who denies values per se, but inherent stance-independent values. So the radical skeptic may brutely stance-dependently value reason, his-own-freedom and such but not believe that reason has inherent agent-independent value, or that freedom-as-such or even his-own-freedom has inherent value beyond the psychological contigencies of people relating to them in a "valuing" manner. Thus the radical skeptic is not sure if value is a thing or a property rather than being a process-in-act -- a "value-ing" associating with how the agent relates to a thing, concept, or a capacity.

And moreover, the skeptic may be a skeptical towards moral realism (beyond there being game-theoretically stable principles for agents to modulate their "powers" by considering trade-offs involving different valuing of different agents)

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