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Flymsi t1_j1fqxc8 wrote

Thanks for the replies so far. =)

>I think that the cognitive/perceptual basis of empathy doesn't need propositional content

I would say this depends on the emotions involved. For emotions that dont need content, i agree. Or at least i can't imagine Fear without any object of fear, else it would be anxiety ("I fear" alone feels more like "I fear, ..."). And if i understood correctly the question arises if the basis of empathy lets me feel anxiety and fear differently or if it lets me feel both as anxiety , but in one case i later give one the attribute of a certain fear.

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notabraininavat t1_j1g9cqf wrote

Absolutely. My point is that sometimes levels of analysis are confused. If we talk about non-linguistic creatures, ecological psychology allows explanations of these phenomena without appeal to propositional content. Anscombe and Ryle develop good non-factualist accounts of intention or action in which patterns of behavior can be explained intentionally (for example, as a behavior caused by fear), but understanding the intentional idiom as a discursive ticket that permits a better scale of explanation, rather than assuming there's an entity-like fact under some category (emotions for example).

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Flymsi t1_j1h9dlg wrote

What is your stance on unconscious processes?

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notabraininavat t1_j1jmd3s wrote

Haven't figured yet, but my tendency is to think about it as the normative structures that implicitly regulate our behavior. In the vein of Lacan's dictum, 'the unconscious is structured like a language', but from a Brandomian perspective.

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