Submitted by CryptoTrader1024 t3_zwqxxb in philosophy
Comments
CryptoTrader1024 OP t1_j1x3mhx wrote
indeed, and this is mentioned in the article at the end. The compatibilists would argue that free will merely means freedom from compulsion. I used to hold this compatibilist view too. But upon further inspection, this view seems pretty hollow, and meaningless.
the_grungydan t1_j1xghol wrote
Compatiblism always just smacks me of "but that (determinism) makes me uncomfortable so I'm going to contort my mind into a pretzel so I feel better again.
AConcernedCoder t1_j1y4o6i wrote
As someone trained in machine learning and compelled for years to really dive into the subject to try to figure out how it could even work at all, I find compatibilism to be the most reasonable position to agree with. While I still find myself having deterministic leanings, the opposition on that side usually seems much more motivated by other factors, enough that the interesting conversations must be taken elsewhere.
[deleted] t1_j1y9d8o wrote
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CryptoTrader1024 OP t1_j1yezsu wrote
in that case, you might like some of the other articles on that blog, since I also have an ML background and it has very interesting philosophical implications that pop up here and there.
the_grungydan t1_j1zjb5t wrote
Unrelated, but here's my favorite ML joke.
Scientist: If all of your friends jumped off a bridge would you do it too?
Machine Learning algorithm: Yes.
Nameless1995 t1_j1yoxv3 wrote
> The compatibilists would argue that free will merely means freedom from compulsion.
They don't though.
CryptoTrader1024 OP t1_j1ypg8j wrote
Please enlighten us, instead of just saying "nope".
Nameless1995 t1_j1yqoxb wrote
You can just check SEP:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/supplement.html
They have different specific accounts for compatibilism -- example higher-order theories of freedom (from Frankfurt and others), Reason-responsiveness views, and there are also compatibilist variants of "ability to do otherwise".
Also compatibilists are trying to make many different points:
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Some may argue that what we actually want to "track" by freedom and what we care about are compatible with determinism. This can involve some thought experiments and arguments as to how incompatibilist "ability to do otherwise" doesn't really offer anything much.
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They may argue that "ability to do otherwise" itself is compatible with determinism if ability is understood in a unloaded/unbloated sense.
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They often want to argue not only that we have compatibilist free will, it's also moral responsibility inducing. Which is a substantive point and not just "shrugging".
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They may attack incompatibilist intuitions for example -- they may provide cases where it feels intuitive to assign praise even when the person says they are compelled by their nature to do some good, or they may argue lack of meta-wants or meta-meta-wills to control oneself and such are unnecessary demands and not clear why necessary for moral responsibility. And so on.
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They may also provide x-phi support that ordinary humans have elements of compatibilists intuitions.
> This sort of solution essentially splits freedom into two concepts: the type of freedom we recognize in everyday life, and freedom from the laws of causality. Since the latter is impossible, it makes no sense to draw any kind of moral consequence from it, and one must therefore focus on the former. This is rather unsatisfying because it feels like the philosophical version of a shoulder shrug.
But that sounds more favorable to compatibilism than against. If the compatibilist's version of freedom is the very freedom we recognize and talk about in everyday life, what's the practical value and meaning of this "freedom from laws of causality" (which you yourself recognize to be ultimately seemingly incoherent, because to be free from causation is make actions free from the actor which would again be no freedom at all)? So why should anyone bat an eye or lament or celebrate the non-existence of some concept that cannot be even legibly conceived of? It's also not clear if moral responsibility is necessarily threatened by lack of such "freedom from causality". Backward-looking punishment can also be independently argued against. So we don't have to worry about that.
Personally, I am not a compatibilist. I am just trying to give credit where it's due.
VitriolicViolet t1_j21wr6m wrote
>But upon further inspection, this view seems pretty hollow, and meaningless.
why?
'you' are just neurons, genes, memories, environment, culture etc therefore by definition you make all your own choices.
what magical 'you' is there that could make choices outside yourself? and how does the universe being deterministic mean that you do not make choices? (as i already stated genes and neurons and culture and memories are you, so you cannot tell me that choices cant happen due to determinism, it makes no rational sense at all)
Aka-Pulc0 t1_j1yskma wrote
Replying to myself as a true beginner haha. I've just watched two well-made videos on the subject from Monsieur Phi (It's in French, but the English dubs are decent Link 1 & Link 2). I agree with the content but I am just paraphrasing here.
There is a philosophical confusion about freedom and free will. Freedom can be defined as (1) being able to make different choices in the same situation and (2) making that decision without being influenced by any external factors. Therefore, being free means being able to determine yourself in a deterministic world, and that sounds like a godly power. This definition seems to be the classical, enlightenment, view of freedom, not mine. But that definition is a philosophical definition of Freedom and not how it is perceived intuitively by common folks (including philosophers) and it s not the definition of Free will.
Free will is simpler than Freedom. Free will is based on (1) I can exert some control over my decision (2) I can deliberate and choose between different options (and not be forced to pick one ie: at gunpoint).
These 2 definitions seem close but the devil is in the details.
Scenario 1 : I wake up extremely sick on Monday and can't go to work. Not going to work is a decision that was determined by external causes, with no control nor different options to choose from. There was no freedom nor free will in this scenario.
Scenario 2 : I wake up on Monday feeling fine, debate whether or not I should go to work, and decide to stay. I had several real options to choose from, deliberated, and freely choose not to go. We can debate on the Freedom part but there was free will here.
Scenario 3 : I wake up, and debate wether or not I should go, remembered that my boss warned me that I ll get fired if I don't show up again. I had several real options and deliberate but the decision was forced on me. Hence no free will.
Scenario 4 : I wake up, debate whether I should go or not, and decide to stay, but, unknown to me, my car is actually broken and I would not have been able to go even if I wanted to. I had no freedom to choose because either way, I would have had to stay, but still used my free will to decide to stay. This is a Franckfurt case where you believe you can choose even if you really cant.
All 4 scenarios illustrate the grey area between Freedom and free will. In a deterministic universe, true Freedom (in the metaphysical definition as stated above) seems impossible, yet Free will is possible. There is a compatibility between the two (hence, compatibilism). Because there is a place for Free will, there is a use for our moral system and justice overall. We are responsible for our own actions as long as we had some control over them and as long as we deliberate and we can choose between them.
I am no expert on the subject, feel free (lol) to poke holes in my block of text =)
CryptoTrader1024 OP t1_j1z87om wrote
yes, you are referring to a colloquial definition of free will, or perhaps a compatibilist one. That is, you think that free will is compatible with a deterministic universe. This is a totally valid position to hold. The question is whether we think that this "freedom" is indeed "enough". And that's where I would say that it just isn't. Yes, it serves it's purpose in every-day life, and in normal conversation we all talk about choices, etc.
But if we think about what is fundamentally true in the world, I think this compatibilist version of free will is just weaksauce. No "choices" really exist, except in our imagination. If possessing a mental image of imagined options is "free will" then free will means very little I think. And, furthermore, the imagined list of choices in your mind's eye would also have been determined by prior causes, such that you can only imagine those choices that you are determined to imagine.
I think neuroscience throws another wrench into your common sense reasoning. Namely, the entity that you call "yourself", the "you" is much less of a concrete thing than it appears subjectively. So when you talk about "you" making a choice, this fact further complicates it. Really, there exists a brain that has various inputs and outputs, and it acts perfectly deterministically in connection to the unique evolution of the universe and it's initial conditions, and that's it. The "you" and "choices" are all abstract concepts that we "recognize" but which are not fixed ontological objects or real things.
XiphosAletheria t1_j1zpvyd wrote
> No "choices" really exist, except in our imagination. If possessing a mental image of imagined options is "free will" then free will means very little I think.
What makes you think they don't really exist? I mean, the universe as a whole is an non-living system, yet some objects in it have the emergent property of being alive. The universe as a whole is a non-conscious system, yet some objects in it have the emergent property of being conscious. The universe as a whole is a deterministic (non-choosing) system, yet some objects in it have the emergent property of being free-willed (making choices). And that is, after all, how we experience ourselves, as living, conscious, free-willed beings. Mostly the arguments in favor of determinism seem to be arguments from ignorance - I can't explain how free will could exist, so it must not be real! But I think this is just the prejudice of a society that overvalues science, which has little interest in the subjective experiences of people because they are not something science is well-equipped to handle.
CryptoTrader1024 OP t1_j1zscfc wrote
I'm not sure you quite understand the argument, or you're arguing for a kind of dualism where the mind is not part of the world. Or you're arguing for magic, such that the laws of causation that govern everything else in the universe, somehow don't govern the electro-chemical reactions in your head? Which one is it?
You seem fine with the idea that the universe is deterministic. But then you say that some parts of the universe (humans, for example) are non-deterministic. How can you claim this, without invoking magic?
XiphosAletheria t1_j1ztqek wrote
>You seem fine with the idea that the universe is deterministic. But then you say that some parts of the universe (humans, for example) are non-deterministic. How can you claim this, without invoking magic?
The same way I am fine both with the idea that the universe is non-living and that some parts of it are living. Or that it is non-conscious yet some parts of it are conscious. That you (or I) cannot currently explain a given phenomenon doesn't mean that the answer has to be magic, or that the phenomenon somehow isn't real. That's just an argument from ignorance.
CryptoTrader1024 OP t1_j209z8a wrote
I've described a mechanism that suggests that everything follows a deterministic path, including our choices. This mechanism seems to conform to everything we know about how the world works (let's just assume this is so).
You are making a claim about how the universe works that differs from mine, yet you do not support this in any way. You don't propose a mechanism or principle, or reason for why it works the way you say. The only thing you present is a sort of allegory about how parts of something must not share the same qualities as the whole. But how does this preserve free will, or indeterminacy?
XiphosAletheria t1_j20jizx wrote
No, I am saying that the universe is deterministic. Its basic particles don't have choices. A ball bearing pushed rolling down a forking path at a particular angle must go left. A person starting on the same path will see that it forks, will recognize that there is a choice, and may shift right instead. You argue that the "choice" is an illusion, because you can't explain how a non-choosing system gave rise to choosing beings. That's fine. I've seen people say the same of consciousness, and even (more rarely) of life. But the truth is that that in all cases amounts to no more than an argument from ignorance, a sort of fit of pique because science not only doesn't explain any of these things very well but probably can't.
CryptoTrader1024 OP t1_j20ps5e wrote
again, you seem to fundamentally not understand the problem. What are your choices? They are comprised of some set of neurons firing in one way or the other. Why do those neurons fire the way they do? well, their reactions are electrochemical, based on the strength of the stimulus in and out, and the relative amplification, or damping of the signal within the neuron. This all follows physical laws.
Now tell me... where, in this web of firing neurons is the "choice" exactly? everything just reacts to a prior cause, including all the parts of your brain. Unless, as I've stated before, you are willing to argue that the brain is magic, and is not beholden to these laws.
This is the opposite of an argument from ignorance. I'm not saying "I have no idea how free will could work", I'm saying that based on everything we know about how the brain works, and how physics works, the illusion of choice does not translate to actual choice.
XiphosAletheria t1_j20x5uk wrote
>Now tell me... where, in this web of firing neurons is the "choice" exactly?
No idea! Nevertheless I am aware of having choices. I still don't see why your inability to explain why should cause me to doubt the reality of my experience.
>This is the opposite of an argument from ignorance. I'm not saying "I have no idea how free will could work", I'm saying that based on everything we know about how the brain works, and how physics works, the illusion of choice does not translate to actual choice.
Yes, physics can't explain it, any more than it can explain life or consciousness, because those things are all emergent properties of complex systems, not direct consequences of simple actions.
CryptoTrader1024 OP t1_j20yfz2 wrote
ok, you're going with magic then. that's fine.
Aka-Pulc0 t1_j1zvqki wrote
agree. the difference is between freedom and free will. we can have free will as long as we have the illusion of choice because we cant perceived that there was no other choice possible (deterministic) Or, perhaps more correct, we perceived choices that were never possible.
In the videos I mentioned, they are using a series of thought experiment, including one about repeating the same day over and over again or even the same universe over and over again. And I trully believe that, if everything starts the same, then they should end the same and all choices, all decisions, everything will turned out exactly as it already has been. But still, as we perceived our choices as our own, we can believe in free will, even if it could perfectly be some coping mechanism.
On the last note, about me, myself and I. I also agree on the several "me" inside of me. I believe in an non conscious part of my brain making or influecing way more than I wish to admit (I dont think about breathing or I dont "think" most of the decision I make in a day). I think there is a more conscious me and also that when I say "I think" there is a thinking me and the "I" that observe the one thinking. Well it s complicated
VitriolicViolet t1_j21w3qt wrote
>No "choices" really exist, except in our imagination. If possessing a mental image of imagined options is "free will" then free will means very little I think
why?
why do you dismiss yourself? i have literally no idea how it can possibly make sense to think that due our choices are constrained by ourselves we have no choice?
that is what you are saying, that due to the fact 'you' are made up of genes, neurons, culture, memories, environment, preferences, trauma and due to these parts of 'you' limiting choice that somehow magically 'you' make no choices at all.
its an entirely nonsensical position to hold in the first place (if we deleted your memories, culture, preferences and trauma then 'you' would not be able to even hold the opinion you do, those things are the very foundation of the person who is claiming to not have free will).
emergent behavior and properties may not be fun or special but they sure as shit make more sense then Determinism trying to pretend it doesnt require souls (or the free will believers thinking we do)
pokoponcho t1_j21fpvv wrote
Thanks for the comment. I learned new things.
Your examples are presented as events separated from the past. If we isolate the situation from all prior events, then free will exists because you can consciously choose between a few options. Hence, compatibilism seems logical.
But if you try to track and connect all prior events, you'll see that you have been led to that situation and your decision.
In this thread, you can check my comment about inescapability from a trio of genetics, life experiences, and external circumstances.
tkuiper t1_j1z0vph wrote
This comes down to the semantics of what "free-will" means.
I think it can be agreed that there's a subjective 'free-will'. We know there's something going on. However, this 'thing' is challenging to describe in a way that doesn't evaporate under scrutiny.
It's a challenge of description, rather than a test of existence.
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j1z456g wrote
Yep, you can summarise it with the statement libertarian free will doesn't exist but that doesn't matter since most people really mean compatibilist free will that does exist.
IMakeTheEggs t1_j1xiued wrote
Yes please.
IMakeTheEggs t1_j1xivc1 wrote
Yes please.
GrymanOne t1_j1wo8k6 wrote
>In light of such a doom, it is perhaps tempting to suggest that nothing matters. But this is incorrect for the same reasons it would be in a non-determined world. All our choices and actions still matter and still change our lives and our world exactly as before. The only difference is the realization that we could not have done otherwise.
I'm not sure I agree. If the universe is indeed determined, and all actions are necessary, then as you state, no one could have done otherwise. If so, would one not be more than a pre-programmed robot following a pre-determined path? What meaning would life have other than that of the voyeur? Furthermore, if all actions are necessary, then all events happen as they must. If I choose to not work, that was pre-determined. If I choose to work, that was pre-determined. That's not a choice, it's just what was to happen, and therefore, why should it matter at all what my perceived choice was?
Jingle-man t1_j1wu50i wrote
>What meaning would life have other than that of the voyeur?
The word "voyeur" implies the spectating of something of which you are not a part. But we all are part of the cosmic drama. Our roles (and the roles of every atom) may be already written, but it's still our story.
GrymanOne t1_j1xvuh4 wrote
Aye, perhaps the wrong word, but I do believe you understand what I was proposing. How does this differ from a puppet in a play? The marionette controls the puppet, the puppet cannot do otherwise, but surely it's the puppet's story to tell, is it not?
Jingle-man t1_j1yf288 wrote
It doesn't differ really. We are puppets. Is that so bad?
YuGiOhippie t1_j1yx3ab wrote
If you’re whole life philosophy can be simplified to “we are puppets is that so bad?”
I pity your view of the world. What a huge nihilist waste of time this universe is.
The holocaust? We are puppets, that’s not so bad.
A child tell it’s mother he lovers her. We are puppets, who cares?
This very argument we are having - why have it - shouldn’t we all kill ourselves and end it? we are puppets what’s so bad?
Basically you don’t have a philosophy of life. You have a non-philosophy of non-life.
Jingle-man t1_j1zh9g2 wrote
But if nothing matters, then everything matters!
>What a huge nihilist waste of time this universe is.
That's precisely what makes the universe so beautiful: the fact that it is unnecessary.
If you can't find fulfilment in the cosmic game, if you insist that only useful things have value, and things aren't worth caring about unless they mean something – then I pity your view of the world; it seems like a very exhausting way to think.
YuGiOhippie t1_j1zke87 wrote
The unnecessary-ness of the universe means that all it’s elements are contingent :
Contingent is that which could’ve been something else ; that’s the beauty of it : it was unnecessary : not determined to be as such.
Your position is self-defeating.
Jingle-man t1_j20m3p2 wrote
No: the elements of the universe follow necessarily from each other, can not be anything other than they are. But the very fact that anything is at all is unnecessary in that there might as well be nothing. The drama follows a necessary path, but the drama itself is an unnecessary phenomenon. There doesn't need to be a universe. But there is. And that's beautiful.
Polychrist t1_j22f7br wrote
So you believe that the existence of the universe itself is a non-determined random occurrence? Because that’s what it sounds like…
And if it’s possible for that occurrence to be non-determined and unnecessary, then how can you be so sure that there are no other non-determined and unnecessary events?
Jingle-man t1_j23amaw wrote
>So you believe that the existence of the universe itself is a non-determined random occurrence? Because that’s what it sounds like…
Language fails. These words don't really mean much when we're talking about an object of which there is no outside. The universe cannot be said to follow from anything else, because there is nothing before it. Nor can it be said to serve any other purpose than itself, because there is nothing beyond it. The universe is not an occurrence; it is occurrence itself, the entire web of causality.
Things that occur occur necessarily – but does occurrence have to occur? It makes no sense for something to necessarily cause causality itself. Thus I do not believe the universe can be called a necessary phenomenon, even though all that is a part of it necessarily follows.
Polychrist t1_j23s9ip wrote
How can you know that there is nothing outside of our universe, or nothing beyond it?
And assuming that you’re correct, and there’s nothing else— is it actually possible that the universe would not have been? How could a particular state of affairs ever emerge from a non-state of affairs, except by random occurrence or necessity?
Jingle-man t1_j23x5o5 wrote
>How can you know that there is nothing outside of our universe, or nothing beyond it?
Because the word "universe" literally means all that exists. If there's something beyond what we call universe, then what we call universe isn't universe at all.
>is it actually possible that the universe would not have been?
Is it possible that Possibility could not have been? ... is what you mean to ask. As I say, language fails.
>How could a particular state of affairs ever emerge from a non-state of affairs, except by random occurrence or necessity?
That is quite literally the Great Question, that no one is qualified to answer. But how could Occurrence itself be a random occurrence? "Randomness" refers to the interaction of possibilities; so how can randomness exist prior to existence and possibility itself?
Polychrist t1_j244foz wrote
Well, that’s just the thing— if it’s nonsense to talk about occurrences not occurring, or possibilities not being possible, then it seems the universe must exist out of necessity. To say that it is possible that possibilities wouldn’t exist, is nonsense— therefore it is a contradiction to say that the universe could’ve not been.
Perhaps the universe only exists because it would’ve been a logical contradiction for it not to have.
Or perhaps the universe (not just the observable universe post big-bang, but the potential multiverse structure beneath it which you would also deem part of the “universe,” or “all that exists,”) has always existed, and is persistent unchanging in some sense, and therefore could not have not been either.
I’m just not sure that it made sense when you said that it’s possible that there would’ve been nothing, and that makes it beautiful that there’s something. I would argue that it’s either not possible that there was nothing, I.e. the existence of the universe itself is necessary, I.e. it’s non-existence would be a contradiction, or else other non-necessary entities may exist.
Jingle-man t1_j249jeo wrote
>I’m just not sure that it made sense when you said that it’s possible that there would’ve been nothing, and that makes it beautiful
It didn't make sense at all, because language can't really capture this kind of thing well. But to be fair, I said "the universe might as well not have been" which isn't wrong. There's no reason for the universe to exist, but neither is there any reason for it not to exist. The universe is "unnecessary" in that its existence itself is not a matter of necessity. The universe truly "doesn't need to exist" because "need" implies necessity. But as I've said again and again, Necessity is not necessary. It is (that is, the universe is) unnecessary.
Polychrist t1_j249q4x wrote
And I disagree. I think the existence of the universe is necessary.
YuGiOhippie t1_j20rwfa wrote
You cannot prove that the elements follow necessarily.
They follow contingently.
That’s my point.
Jingle-man t1_j20towl wrote
No one can ever prove that (A) could have led to (C) rather than (B); nor can one, as it stands, prove that it could only lead to (B); because the only reality we have access to is the one in which (A) indeed did lead to (B). In the absence of cold hard proof, I am left with only intuition and faith.
I do not believe that, if we could rewind time and let it proceed again, anything different would occur. That's the long and short of it. That idea doesn't fill me with existential dread, because it quite literally changes nothing about how I inhabit the world – except that it gives me a poetic sense of contentment and soothes some fears.
YuGiOhippie t1_j20v2dz wrote
You’re free to have faith in your own lack of freedom sure, if that makes you feel better.
Ironic considering your determinist position.
Jingle-man t1_j20vx0j wrote
You have a very narrow idea of fate and belief if you think there's any irony to what I've said. Don't take things so seriously!
VitriolicViolet t1_j21xlpj wrote
whats wrong with it?
we are puppets, puppets who pull their own strings. what he stated is not nihilism, nihilism would go on to claim that due to being puppets we should not pull our own strings (big difference between ''theres no meaning'' and ''theres no point in making your own meaning'')
YuGiOhippie t1_j22aoz9 wrote
A puppet who’s strings are being pulled cannot “make meaning”
smariroach t1_j243fou wrote
This seems like an argument motivated by bitterness. The statement was that it's not so bad to be puppets, not that we shouldn't care about any particular things that take place. And how can the universe be a waste of time? Time can only be wasted from the perspectives of those that find value in time, and therefore it can only be wasted if you assign it some value. It has value to humans, so given that we don't exist independently from the universe we must appreciate the universe if we find value in anything at all.
YuGiOhippie t1_j25dkaw wrote
Puppets cannot care. That’s the point.
Their care, their meaning, is a fake if it’s pre-determined. It is not authentic. It doesn’t arise from choice only necessity if we are puppets.
smariroach t1_j25ldfo wrote
Puppets cannot care, but we're not literal puppets. We can care, and have meaning.
Saying that caring is fake if it's pre-determined is not self evident.
All it means is that whether we care is dependent on what it is we care (or don't care) about and who we are. We could not be other than we are, and the things we form opinions about could not be other than they are, and therefore we will care (or not).
Why is the care only authentic if we can break the laws of causality? What does your use of "authentic" and "fake" mean in this context?
YuGiOhippie t1_j25mm7g wrote
If you cannot choose to care or not you are not really caring or not caring.
A puppet can act as if it cares but it’s a meaningless act.
A puppet forced to care by the laws of causality doesn’t really care. It’s not authentic because it’s forced.
Do you love me if i tell you with a gun to your head that you must love me? Of course not. Even if you swear YOU LOVE ME : if i forced you to say it : it is not authentic.
smariroach t1_j263x1j wrote
> If you cannot choose to care or not you are not really caring or not caring.
Why not? what is it that you think it means to "care" about something?
I would like it if you stop mentioning puppets because I have a hard time knowing if you're being metaphorical or if I'm expected to explain in what way a literal puppet is not like a human, it would help me understand more clearly what you mean.
>It’s not authentic because it’s forced. I'm still not sure I understand why the unavoidable nature of the feeling makes it inauthentic.
>Do you love me if i tell you with a gun to your head that you must love me? Of course not. Even if you swear YOU LOVE ME : if i forced you to say it : it is not authentic.
That's not a good analogy, because loving and saying you love are two completely different things. A better question would be: if we discovered a drug that would cause a person who takes it to fall in love with the first person they see (a classic love potion), would that person be in love if they took it, and they felt the effects? In this example, the feeling, emotion, everything, is in every way like love that the subject would have felt had they fallen in love without the drug. Are they "really" in love now or not? If not, why? how do you define "love" in a way that excludes what this person is feeling?
And what if we take it the other direction. What if you work out, becoming attractive and behave in such an impressive, kind and likable way that it makes me fall in love with you. Is if inauthentic since it's caused by what you did, therefore you having "forced" me to love you since I would not have had you not done those things?
YuGiOhippie t1_j26maaf wrote
Cool now love doesn’t exist because it can’t be defined outside of your presupposed deterministic world view.
Nihilism as I said.
smariroach t1_j280kp4 wrote
You don't seem to be trying to to provide your own definitions, reasons, or elaborations, and you ignore all my questions. I'm not sure why you are here if you don't want to explore philosophy.
YuGiOhippie t1_j28hhfd wrote
You know what is great? This fruitless conversation is not determined to go on endlessly: you are free to disengage at anytime
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j1yl4c5 wrote
> The marionette controls the puppet, the puppet cannot do otherwise, but surely it's the puppet's story to tell, is it not?
Because the strings controlling us isn't something separate or different to us.
One could say that everything we do is fully determined by our DNA and environment/upbringings/experiences. But someone's DNA and experiences aren't something separate and external to a person.
A person is their DNA and experiences.
VitriolicViolet t1_j21xxkx wrote
this, both sides really, really try hard to deny what makes up 'you'.
i make all my own choices by definition as 'i' am the sum of my memories, neurons, genes, culture etc the free willers think we have souls and the determinists believe the body and mind are separate.
Aka-Pulc0 t1_j1wqqaw wrote
I dunno how deep you are in deterministic philosophy (I am myself still in shallow water) but a short answer may be that you can still make a choice even if the choice you made was pre-determined. And that choice matter because you made it.
GrymanOne t1_j1wrzu6 wrote
I too am still in shallow waters, which is why I'm engaging. It's hard to have these conversations at the bar, as most cannot follow the logic or reasoning.
The thesis for determinism is that all events are necessary. If it was necessary because that event was predetermined, then what choice was there in the matter? My "choice" may matter, simply because it HAS to matter, but it's still a hard pill to swallow to say that my actions are not my own.
Aka-Pulc0 t1_j1wtjuh wrote
It s 1 am here =) i ll follow up tomorrow with a better explanation of my point. I m new here and glab to have these conversations!
mcr1974 t1_j1x6oby wrote
Why would the fact that they are pre-determined not make them your own though?
GrymanOne t1_j1xvnbr wrote
Well, I did them, but did I have a choice? Again, if all actions are necessary, then I could have done no other than what I have done. What choice in the matter did I have? If not my own choice, was it my own action?
This is not to say that all actions are not caused. I think one could argue that indeed all actions are caused. But caused actions do not mean predetermined. Caused actions are not necessary, are they? But again, if all events are necessary, and all events are actions, and all actions are caused...
Jingle-man t1_j20q1t9 wrote
>If not my own choice, was it my own action?
Of course! Why wouldn't it be?
YuGiOhippie t1_j1yxc99 wrote
All events are contingent.
Not necessary.
This is the shallows waters in which most people drown in determinism.
GrymanOne t1_j209ogw wrote
And yet I just had my Intro to Philosophy professor tell me that the very thesis of Determinism is: All events are necessary.
YuGiOhippie t1_j20rn7b wrote
Yup it’s a thesis.
But you should ask your professor the difference between necessary and contingent facts.
GrymanOne t1_j20s2a7 wrote
We did cover this.
>Observe that saying that event E is contingent is the same thing as saying that event E is “not necessary,” and saying that event E is necessary is the same thing as saying that event E is “not contingent.”
>
>So “necessary” and “contingent” are inter-definable. Be aware of that.
In his words, another way to write the thesis would be: No events are contingent.
gradual_alzheimers t1_j1yffkf wrote
I find it so strange that if the world is indeed deterministic why on earth would it spend so much time debating deterministically about its own free will. What would compel a process to have meta reflection? The fact that we engage in discussion and consider other points of views on this subject at all just seems strange regardless if determinism is true or not -- and to be honest I don't know the answer but this point has always been odd.
Olympiano t1_j1z2vms wrote
I think what drives it is that discovery and striving to understand things feels good, or is rewarding in some manner. I guess it’s a result of evolution reinforcing this as well as our intelligence and the ability to reason abstractly, and when they come together, we wander into strange territory and begin to examine ourselves as well as the world.
I have heard a theory that our self-awareness is not even necessary for what we have achieved as a species though, and that it’s simply an incidental byproduct of the development of our intelligence. Some things just evolve incidentally without necessarily conferring a benefit in itself. So maybe the level of abstraction we’ve reached where we are self-aware is just… an accident of evolution. Maybe it’s possible for humanity to have done just as much but not possess this extra ability.
BleakBeaches t1_j1wrhup wrote
Guys shut up, I’m trying to watch my movie here.
flynnwebdev t1_j1yj9pg wrote
Meaning arises from a mind experiencing something. Even if what happens is deterministic, your mind will still assign various levels of meaning to it. You still experience meaning, regardless of whether you had a choice or not.
[deleted] t1_j1xn9nj wrote
[deleted]
brian_heriot t1_j1xnd60 wrote
Yeah, but any moral value or shall we say "value judgment" placed on determinism (i.e. "By golly, no free will is bad---it shouldn't exist!") is not a sensible and valid stance, as belief that no free will is "wrong" is just a measure of how much someone doesn't like there not being free will. Hard determinism, if it exists is neither a bad nor good thing:, it's just how things are.
VitriolicViolet t1_j21x8u1 wrote
>If so, would one not be more than a pre-programmed robot following a pre-determined path?
its still 'you' making those choices, whether or not 'you' could choose differently is irrelevant.
even if no one could have possibly chosen differently they still chose.
to me it seems like determinists believe in souls by necessity ('you' are your genes and neurons so even if 'you' cant actively control them they are still 'you')
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j1yoiop wrote
The article stumbles upon the correct approach of compatibilism, but just finds it unsatisfying without explaining why. It's like someone saying they find 2+2=4 unsatisfying and discounting it.
​
>Compatibilists will argue that freedom merely consists of the absence of compulsion. In other words, if an agent can do whatever they please, they are free and therefore the appropriate target of praise or blame, even if determinism is true. This sort of solution essentially splits freedom into two concepts: the type of freedom we recognize in everyday life, and freedom from the laws of causality. Since the latter is impossible, it makes no sense to draw any kind of moral consequence from it, and one must therefore focus on the former. This is rather unsatisfying because it feels like the philosophical version of a shoulder shrug.
VitriolicViolet t1_j21v8gh wrote
thats the entire free will v determinism debate in a nutshell.
both sides just hand wave compatibilism away when it not only makes sense but works. both sides of the debate have a deepseated need for humans to be special, one side thinks we have a soul and thus libertarian free will and the other believes we are mere passengers along for a ride. both require dismissing reality to believe (the focus on magic free will is pointless in the extreme, may as well debate the afterlife for all the practical effect either side would ultimately have).
42fy t1_j1zwkok wrote
The concept of AGENCY seemed to clear up a lot of confusion on this topic in my initial education about the free will/determinism debate (which affected me profoundly, to the point that I would compose an entire rock opera about it 35 years later!).
A leaf falling from a tree follows a trajectory entirely determined by physics—I think we can all agree.
A skydiver falling from an airplane also follows a trajectory completely determined by physics. The difference is the skydiver has eyes and ears that take in information, and memories and training, and a brain that can make calculations based on these factors, plus muscles that can move things in the world. The pulling of the rip cord at time “t” and not “t+x” is a product of the skydiver’s agency—her ability to take an action (among a seemingly wide range of actions or particular timings thereof).
Here’s the rub: although she is not falling “helplessly” in the sense that the leaf is, her trajectory—including the exact time of pulling the rip cord—is following the laws of physics just as ineluctably as the leaf’s. It’s just that the causal stream is much more complex because the exact timing of the rip cord pull is a result of the actions of an agent—that is, a thing that can process information, have memories and do things.
From the vantage point of the agent, it very often seems as though there are indeed many options to choose from whilst deliberating. That internal sense, though, is just that—a feeling from within a deliberating organism. And I think that is what many consider to so “obviously” be free will. And they are insulted/put off by the idea that they don’t have “free will” (when they are really thinking about agency), which they wrongly conclude suggests they are merely like the falling leaf. This ability to deliberate and act on those deliberations is agency, but not free will, in my view.
The question of whether we have free will to me comes down to an entirely different question: Whether we actually could have decided otherwise if placed in exactly the same circumstances with the exact same environment and exact same brain states, etc.
We most definitely have agency (“I” decided to choose option A instead of option B). But agency does not magically allow us to escape determinism, because agency itself is a completely determined—if complex and sometimes conscious—process.
Our having agency does not justify compatibilism, in my view. But a lack of incorporation of this distinction seems to explain how people can believe such a weird idea.
pokoponcho t1_j20qcba wrote
Thank you for the excellent comment.
In my view, a human as a whole - body, thoughts, actions, etc. - at each moment is a dynamic product of genetics, life experiences, and external circumstances (or, more precisely, external influences). The last two elements are ever-changing and interact between themselves and our genetic structure.
We think that we have free will because we have more choices compared to, let's say, a stone. But our free will is an illusion because a human's reactions are as pre-defined as stone's.
chrismacphee t1_j1wwp72 wrote
I’ve heard that at least with religious determinism, one cannot deviate from gods plan thus you have no true free will
tokmer t1_j1yrf5b wrote
See but religious people like the idea of free will (that way rewards and punishments can make sense) so they say hod said we have free will so we do.
token-black-dude t1_j1yt9ur wrote
Classical Islamic theology is pretty clear on the position that everything has already been determined by Allah. Obviously that means that he's unfair by human standards, but they seem chill about that.
YuGiOhippie t1_j1ywl83 wrote
They don’t seem that chill about it actually.
God driven determinism is the perfect recipe for justifying all kind of atrocities
iiioiia t1_j204786 wrote
Science seems better at some though, like climate change - I challenge you to describe a plausible scenario where religion could pull that one off on its own.
YuGiOhippie t1_j208ueu wrote
Pull what of?
iiioiia t1_j20amcs wrote
Destroy the ecosystem of the planet.
YuGiOhippie t1_j20rpxy wrote
I don’t get what you are trying to prove
iiioiia t1_j20y4o6 wrote
I'm saying I don't believe the output of religion could destroy the ecosystem of Planet Earth with the same efficiency that the output of science is now doing.
Do you believe that religion is capable of it, and if so could you explain how?
YuGiOhippie t1_j214jes wrote
I’d argue this is more the result of capitalism Not science
Capitalism is a kind of religion too
iiioiia t1_j215hbh wrote
> I’d argue this is more the result of capitalism Not science
I can agree with that, can you agree that:
-
science is a pre-requisite to make it happen?
-
the scientific community is not well known for saying (because they do not say it) that their work is producing harm because much of their work is conducted under capitalism?
YuGiOhippie t1_j215xv5 wrote
Science is not a pre-requisite to capitalism.
All work is in the capitalist system right now science included, but that’s not a fault of science.
Science is as often stifled by capitalism as it is financed
iiioiia t1_j21hxta wrote
>>> I’d argue this is more the result of capitalism Not science
>> I can agree with that, can you agree that: science is a pre-requisite to make it happen?
> Science is not a pre-requisite to capitalism.
Oh my.
> All work is in the capitalist system right now science included, but that’s not a fault of science.
Are harmful things that science contributed to the fault of science?
If capitalism can be guilty of things, why can science not be guilty of things?
> Science is as often stifled by capitalism as it is financed
Perhaps (you're welcome to show your work), but this is orthogonal to whether science causes harm.
YuGiOhippie t1_j21lkb5 wrote
Science is a method.
Capitalism is a system.
Any method used within a system is tinted by it.
CryptoTrader1024 OP t1_j1z6wsm wrote
I think some Calvinists also believe that everything is already determined by God. That is, who goes to heaven or hell is already set.
foxrun89 t1_j1zquvi wrote
Doesn’t the Bible say something about the book of life and death? I think they’ve already been written. Therefore, your path has been chosen for you.
CryptoTrader1024 OP t1_j1zrdn8 wrote
well, I think most christians do not believe this. most of christianity leans pretty heavily on free will.
foxrun89 t1_j1zri1j wrote
I’ll have to look it up when I get home.
No-Independence570 t1_j20z5f2 wrote
This is not accurate
iiioiia t1_j203z7c wrote
All pro-determinism theories are similarly opinion/meme-based imho.
Globularist t1_j207f76 wrote
I don't see the usefulness in discussing a theory based on a being that can't be proven to exist.
chrismacphee t1_j209jso wrote
To you perhaps, wisdom can be found in all things or forms even from what you might consider un-wise, to philosophize is to embrace or too pursue without capture, don’t be hubris in presumption or you might loose what you otherwise would have gained
quantumdeterminism t1_j1wmc4c wrote
Every system is a quantum system. There is no defining line that has to be crossed when quantum switches to classical physics. If the universe is deterministic, it is quantum deterministic.
CryptoTrader1024 OP t1_j1yg0h7 wrote
agreed. The only problem is that the common interpretation of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen, truly makes an indeterminacy claim about the universe at a fundamental level. However, I think most physicists would say that Copenhagen cannot be the final answer to how quantum mechanics works.
Studstill t1_j1yb8uf wrote
Ok, like, I didn't know allegedly serious people were making these arguments, so uhh, just to bullet point it out:
-
What was "incoherent" about "Free Will" exactly?
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Are particles like little tiny people, or rather, where was the justification for applying quantum dynamic statements to conscious living things? (This might be what u/Aka-Pulc0 meant by it being a stretch that we are "part of the world"?)
-
This reminds me of Xeno, and how movement is impossible, its just a false on its face anti-truism paradox fueled exclusively by "look that coin was heads it was always going to be heads good luck proving this wrong idiot you don't have free will, now let's bang like we were always going to", no?
4.Compatibilism sounds swanky, anyone in particular to check out?
CryptoTrader1024 OP t1_j1yft4n wrote
As discussed in the free will section of the article, the concept of free will makes very little sense, even if the universe is non-deterministic (God save us if it isn't...). This is for the following reason: if free will means you can do what you want, then we must ask why you want the things you want. Well, some prior causes presumably made you want those choices. Is it really free will if all your choices are caused by wants resulting from prior states of affairs? And what would free will even mean then?
I have absolutely no idea why you think particles not being tiny people would make a difference. You'll have to elaborate here. Yes, particles are not conscious living things, but they are basic to what makes reality. Since we already know that determinism is pretty much the case in classical mechanics, a popular criticism of determinism comes from the murky and fuzzy world of quantum mechanics.
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j1yoabt wrote
>As discussed in the free will section of the article, the concept of free will makes very little sense
It is only the incoherent libertarian free will that makes little sense, but that doesn't matter since compatibilist free will is what people really mean and what is relevant when it comes to morality.
>This is rather unsatisfying because it feels like the philosophical version of a shoulder shrug.
I don't see why. It's like someone telling you that 2+2 =4, but you just fine it an unsatisfying answer.
tokmer t1_j1ysb40 wrote
The reason the compatibalist position is unsatisfying is because compatibalists will typically recognize the determinist nature of everything up until humans come in then they stop.
Like what makes us so fundamentally different from everything else in the universe
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j1ytgg3 wrote
>The reason the compatibalist position is unsatisfying is because compatibalists will typically recognize the determinist nature of everything up until humans come in then they stop.
They recognise the deterministic nature of everything including humans.
>Like what makes us so fundamentally different from everything else in the universe
Nothing, that's the point. Humans are fundamentally just like everything else.
tokmer t1_j1yuxcq wrote
If humans are subject to their environment the same as everything else then there cannot be free will
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j1yyhid wrote
>If humans are subject to their environment the same as everything else then there cannot be free will
No because compatibilist free will is "compatible" with a deterministic world.
Or to put it better put, free will has nothing to do with determinism.
Think of free will as like being "happy", the world being deterministic says nothing about whether you can be "happy" or not, similarly the world being deterministic says nothing about compatibilist free will. They are completely different compatible concepts.
tokmer t1_j1yzoso wrote
Under compatibalist “free will” your choices are still fully determined, all that is saying is that you arent physically restricted from the choice youre making (like you arent in prison so you are free to choose to travel) this is a different concept than what determinists and free will believers are talking about.
Compatibalists believe in determinism but dont like the idea of fate so they redefine free will and call it a day
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j1z3cua wrote
> this is a different concept than what determinists and free will believers are talking about.
I argue that you have it backwards. What you are talking about doesn't exist and is just an incoherent idea. But what people really mean is the coherent compatibilist free will.
People have incoherent views around free will, but if you properly probe you'll see that people have compatibilist intuitions.
​
>In the past decade, a number of empirical researchers have suggested that laypeople have compatibilist intuitions… In one of the first studies, Nahmias et al. (2006) asked participants to imagine that, in the next century, humans build a supercomputer able to accurately predict future human behavior on the basis of the current state of the world. Participants were then asked to imagine that, in this future, an agent has robbed a bank, as the supercomputer had predicted before he was even born. In this case, 76% of participants answered that this agent acted of his own free will, and 83% answered that he was morally blameworthy. These results suggest that most participants have compatibilist intuitions, since most answered that this agent could act freely and be morally responsible, despite living in a deterministic universe.
>
>https://philpapers.org/archive/ANDWCI-3.pdf
>Our results highlight some inconsistencies of lay beliefs in the general public, by showing explicit agreement with libertarian concepts of free will (especially in the US) and simultaneously showing behavior that is more consistent with compatibilist theories. If participants behaved in a way that was consistent with their libertarian beliefs, we would have expected a negative relation between free will and determinism, but instead we saw a positive relation that is hard to reconcile with libertarian views
>
>https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0221617
Then when it comes to philosophy professors most are outright compatibilists.
[https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/all)
There is a saying that that philosophers are mostly compatibilists, most laypeople have compatibilist intuitions, but amateur philosophers don't think free will exists.
So it's amateur philosophers like you that are talking about something completely different to what people really mean.
tokmer t1_j1z61av wrote
Id have a hard time calling myself any kind of philosopher,
But i think we are making the same point determinists and people who believe in free will are talking about a different thing than what compatibalists are talking about when they say free will.
When a determinist is talking about free will they are talking about the ability to make independent choices.
When someone who believes in free will is talking about it they are talking about the same.
When a compatibalist talks about it they are talking about something different. (Just learned that today)
Why this has happened im not sure and i cant speak on why professionals are more inclined to compatibalism than others.
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j1z7jy5 wrote
>But i think we are making the same point determinists and people who believe in free will are talking about a different thing than what compatibalists are talking about when they say free will.
>
>When a determinist is talking about free will they are talking about the ability to make independent choices.
I'm not really familiar with your terminology. I would say a determinist simply states the world is deterministic, rather than making any comment of free will.
When you say "independent choices" independent from what? If it's independent from some external coercive influence, then yeh, that's what I think most people are talking about. If you are saying "independent" from the laws of physics, then no, I don't think that's what most people mean.
>When someone who believes in free will is talking about it they are talking about the same.
I would say people talking about free will are talking about making decisions in line with their desires free from external coercion/influence.
Which is what a compatibilist is saying.
tokmer t1_j1z81he wrote
Free will to most people would be you come to two doors you have a choice to use either door or none.
A determinist would say you do not you are destined to choose whatever you end up choosing based on your preceding life.
A compatibalist would say you are destined to choose what you choose but it feels free enough as you arent being coerced to choose.
This is my current understanding of the differences
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j1zanx1 wrote
>Free will to most people would be you come to two doors you have a choice to use either door or none.
So how do you define choice.
Let's use a simplistic system of a thermostat. That system will make the choice to turn off the heating once it gets to a certain temperature.
Choice is just about a deterministic system being what causes an action.
>A determinist would say you do not you are destined to choose whatever you end up choosing based on your preceding life.
That's what a compatibilist will say also.
>A compatibalist would say you are destined to choose what you choose but it feels free enough as you arent being coerced to choose.
It's got nothing to do with how they feel. It's about whether in fact you are being coerced or not.
Is someone holding a gun making you do an action or did you do it because you wanted to. There is a matter of fact here, it's nothing to do with how they feel.
tokmer t1_j1zb9cy wrote
But you are being coerced, by the chemicals in your head and all youve grown up to become.
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j1zbplx wrote
>But you are being coerced, by the chemicals in your head and all youve grown up to become.
That's dualistic thinking. Your brain isn't something separate to you. You are a body, which has a brain that has conscious activity.
Those chemical are you, they aren't something separate coercing you.
tokmer t1_j1zc6yt wrote
You can be coerced by chemicals in your head, imbalances exist and can be adjusted to change things. You are coerced constantly by these chemicals you are not them
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j1zee8x wrote
>You can be coerced by chemicals in your head, imbalances exist and can be adjusted to change things. You are coerced constantly by these chemicals you are not them
This makes zero sense to me. You are basically saying, "you" are being coerced by your brain. That you are not your brain.
What do you mean by "you" how are your defining it? How is any definition of "you" coherent if it doesn't include your brain the chemicals in it. How is any definition of "you" coherent if it treats the brain and chemicals as some external coercive influence.
tokmer t1_j1zgt52 wrote
No you are your brain. you are not your endocrine system, you are not psychedelics you consume, you are not an addiction you have. All of these thing effect your brain but they do not become it
OmarsDamnSpoon t1_j1zbpup wrote
The application of QM to the discussion of free will or determinism is a failure for the applicant to recognize that random =/= choice.
VitriolicViolet t1_j21ynfh wrote
>if free will means you can do what you want, then we must ask why you want the things you want. Well, some prior causes presumably made you want those choices. Is it really free will if all your choices are caused by wants resulting from prior states of affairs? And what would free will even mean then?
yes that is free will.
those things are 'you', the prior causes being memories, culture, experience and/or neurons, genes and chemistry.
why do you all try so hard to divorce yourselves from yourselves?
jordantask t1_j1ymjb9 wrote
Of course there is free will. As a product of my prior history, my “prior causes” as you put it make me often want to do things that I shouldn’t do, but I don’t do them as a conscious decision on my part.
If I acted on my impulses I’d have been in prison for a very long time.
The proof of free will lies not in doing what you want to do, but in the choice not to.
CryptoTrader1024 OP t1_j1ypr7l wrote
this mistakes the idea of determinism with low impulse control, which is nonsense. The whole point is that your 'conscious decision' itself is determined by prior causes. You merely have an illusion of choices and an illusion of choosing.
Studstill t1_j1yh1tu wrote
I think most of my beef is that "prior causes" don't seem to exist? Like, whos done the experiment to show why the the word APPLE just appeared in all caps? Sounds like it would fractal out to nonsense in almost all relevant contexts. I'd reckon more people are uncomfortable with how much of their lives seemingly is/was out of their will/control rather than by this nonsense of predestination masquerading as physics.
Thats what being conscious is, literally having access to free (thoughts) will. We clearly are conscious, and I know a beagle that seems so too, and thats about as far as I can get before this seems to have serious problems. Particles, even quantum ones, don't have such abilities. A chunk of Uranium doesn't decide to decay, the narrative/anthropomorphizing/thought experiment consists of applying metrics for qualities that do not exist . Those questions of "was I always going to live where I live" etc are pointless because they have no further justification than much verbose (as in the article) handwaving about how our understanding of particle/macro physics can allegedly scale or transition to living entities.
I fundamentally do not understand the argument for applying physical models to whatever consciousness/free will is.
tokmer t1_j1ysvv2 wrote
Because you are a physical being you were destined to end up this way, based on how you were raised where you were raised what you experienced. (Your environment)
This is determinism, your environment was decided by very measurable phenomenon and you are a product of your environment.
If put in the exact same situation an infinite amount of times you would make the exact same devisions. (Exact same situation also means same memories and everything if you remember trying something 50 times you are in a different situation)
Studstill t1_j20nmbi wrote
How are you measuring how much I like apples?
How are you stating I would do "the same thing everytime"?
tokmer t1_j20oeoh wrote
If you right now appeared in front of a set of doors and had to choose one to go through, you would choose a certain door.
If we then wiped your memory and reset the door simulation you would choose to go through the same door every time you were forced to go through the simulation.
Nobody is trying to measure how much you like apples
Studstill t1_j20r3mk wrote
I understand the situation you keep stating.
I'm not seeing how you are stating it as such.
Why would I go through the same door everytime?
What if one of the doors had an apple on it?
How are the atmospheric conditions always identical? (oh, because this is a simulation*, you said, my bad)
How does determinism apply to non-particle interactions, specifically how is this being stated?
Edit: Maybe I see, so this is simulation theory masquerading as "determinism".
tokmer t1_j20ripp wrote
The question is why would you ever choose something different
Studstill t1_j20tvkm wrote
Because choices are seemingly made from a near infinite pool of inputs, and due to local or hyperlocal conditions those inputs are not consistent.
Which means, without simulation fantasy, that we have two major problems:
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There is no way to differentiate whether I picked the door I was always going to or did I pick the other one.
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There is no way to determine how the door was chosen, so even if we could solve #1, it would still be an infinite trial and error.
Maybe I'm missing something, but it seems the argument is "well what if people were just like protons".
tokmer t1_j20uyvi wrote
Do you think the idea of determinism is meant to be predictive of future behaviour?
Studstill t1_j20vew8 wrote
Not exactly, but the thought experiment extrapolation (anti-free will/predestination) seems to be based on such.
tokmer t1_j20vw3z wrote
I mean yes it could theoretically be predicted given infinite knowledge and understanding but the point is more about morals.
Like how can we morally punish someone for doing something they could never choose not to do?
Studstill t1_j20w99n wrote
Idk, and at least that (morals) line of thought has real roots and real applications (diminished capacity, et al).
What irks me is still this "if physics is determinable, then ofc everything is predestined and free will is an illusion #ironclad".....
tokmer t1_j22vkgj wrote
Well how a rock moves is deterministic what makes us any different?
Studstill t1_j22xubf wrote
Ok, I've read a bunch more in this thread, thanks for bearing with me, but yeah, I think I'd say:
The rock is a uniform solid, just simple predictable matter. I don't think a snake, or hamster, or human operates that way. I don't think that, because I can either choose or be unerringly illusioned to choose X or Y.
It seems just as silly to argue we are the same as a rock, than to say things would always happen one singular way, even if we could run it again.
I thought determinism wasn't this silly, so maybe I'm wrong, I thought it meant that there was an XYZ% of given events, that a coin will 49.999% of the time land on heads, not that the coin will always be heads on a given flip. My understanding of QM seems to back this up, as well.
tokmer t1_j22zxbr wrote
Firstly qm is on a quantum level not a macro level, yes things can get weird when we look at things at an atomic level and we may not know how all that works but on macro levels we do know.
The coin flip is a great example actually though because when you flip a coin all the physics for that coin is already involved and calculable you can KNOW how that coin is going to land and how many flips its going to do and how far its going to move in any given direction and how many bounces its going to have.
The math is very complex but its there and no amount of quantum mechanics are going to change that.
This isnt a 50% chance this is 100% knowledge.
With the decisions a person makes are much the same albeit much more complex but complexity doesnt change the nature of something.
Studstill t1_j230esa wrote
Sure, hard agree on complexity/nature of things, and great point about the coin, if its all classical mechanics than I totally follow you, but QM's "chances" are almost exactly how I feel about me controlling my muscles to flip a coin, or a pool shot. I think that's part of what is getting me so bad here, I do shoot a lot of pool, and the idea that a game (or worse all shots) are predestined because we understand the physics at hand is like, idk just inconceivable to the million experiments that I've run personally. To me, once the physical fundamentals of the game are learned, whether a shot goes in or not is almost entirely up to your mental state, and I'm not saying it is too complex to nail down, but that its akin to QM's inability to say things with 100% accuracy such as your vacuum sealed machine controlled coin flip.
Fun note: Someone did some coin experiments and I think said its about 1/10000 that it will land on its side, lmao, this the 49.999 instead of 50.
tokmer t1_j2324a7 wrote
But quantum mechanics doesnt effect things on a macro level like qm randomness is never going to make a change to the outcome of a coin flip or a pool shot.
But for the pool shot your mental state is also something thats predetermined, the chemicals that flow through your brain the structure of your brain itself all of that is something thats built for each individual moment of your life.
Studstill t1_j23329a wrote
>But quantum mechanics doesnt effect things on a macro level like qm randomness is never going to make a change to the outcome of a coin flip or a pool shot.
Is this absolutely true?
>mental state is also something thats predetermined, the chemicals that flow through your brain the structure of your brain itself all of that is something thats built for each individual moment of your life.
Again, just to be clear, its not the complexity of it that stops me, its that I don't see the science governing those interactions, I see it being extrapolated but the underlying science is, as of now (and maybe I'm ignorant), not certain on all interactions, particularly fluid flows in adaptable pipes, i.e. the brain.
tokmer t1_j234nbw wrote
I have no idea if its absolutely true its my understanding that its the consensus of physicists but i am not a physicist and have not done enough research to say any of that for certain.
I would imagine though if qm made such a huge difference on the macro scale our traditional models wouldnt work right? Like we dont see random things happening on a macro level we see very predictable things.
Again im not an authority on this though and i have no citations very very good chance i have some fundamental misunderstanding here.
The parts governing brain though are knowable, we know certain drugs have effects on the brain, we know certain structures have certain purposes, just because we dont have 100% knowledge of it how it all works right now doesnt mean we cant know it right?
Studstill t1_j2370p8 wrote
Sure, I'm a layperson here too re: QM, perhaps I'll make it back with a refreshed opinion. Thanks!
>Like we dont see random things happening on a macro level we see very predictable things.
Right.
>because we dont have 100% knowledge of it how it all works right now doesnt mean we cant know it right?
Hard agree, but nonetheless I think it could be unknowable, these could be purely philosophical questions with this origin in determinism making it seem scientific.
Being able to smoke pot or know where a hippocampus is has no bearing on it, regardless of the "complexity" or our current "X%" knowledge, we might never be able to play back a memory or fully control functions. I assume deterministic thinking disagrees with this?
tokmer t1_j239wdt wrote
I only see the memes about fucking up snails on reddit tbh but it seems like there are scientists trying to implant memories and shit right now.
Again though thats entirely from memes so huge grain of salt but yeah according to a determinist it would be possible to put memories into someone or implant desires or whatever
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j1yll3j wrote
Dennett is one of the more well known people who argue for compatibilism. I don't like everything he says, in particular the idea about it being a pragmatic approach. I think what people really mean and have always really meant was compatibilist free will.
Here are a couple of papers that I think are nice intros into free will and compatatibilism.
>In the past decade, a number of empirical researchers have suggested that laypeople have compatibilist intuitions… In one of the first studies, Nahmias et al. (2006) asked participants to imagine that, in the next century, humans build a supercomputer able to accurately predict future human behavior on the basis of the current state of the world. Participants were then asked to imagine that, in this future, an agent has robbed a bank, as the supercomputer had predicted before he was even born. In this case, 76% of participants answered that this agent acted of his own free will, and 83% answered that he was morally blameworthy. These results suggest that most participants have compatibilist intuitions, since most answered that this agent could act freely and be morally responsible, despite living in a deterministic universe.
>
>https://philpapers.org/archive/ANDWCI-3.pdf
>Our results highlight some inconsistencies of lay beliefs in the general public, by showing explicit agreement with libertarian concepts of free will (especially in the US) and simultaneously showing behavior that is more consistent with compatibilist theories. If participants behaved in a way that was consistent with their libertarian beliefs, we would have expected a negative relation between free will and determinism, but instead we saw a positive relation that is hard to reconcile with libertarian views
>
>https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0221617
VitriolicViolet t1_j21xyv9 wrote
the free willers think we have souls and the determinists believe the body and mind are separate.
this entire debate is pointless when both sides require what is effectively magic in order for their beliefs to function.
the most rational position is that the universe is deterministic and we make our own choices.
Studstill t1_j22wu13 wrote
So why is there a debate at all when this seems so obviously and demonstrably correct?
Is it just a theists vs anti-theists thing that immediately goes to the irrational place?
NickDixon37 t1_j206hao wrote
Imho, this is all an exercise in a privileged ego-driven community - or the ravings of misfits.
When I was about 12 years old I had my own existential crisis, over the concept of reality. As I mentally explored the possibility that the world was just a figment of my own imagination I got rather confused about what was really real. And after floundering a bit I had a bit of an epiphany, when I realized that embracing a lack of reality would totally mess up my life.
Our current understanding of the way we physically see the world by constructing a model of reality in one's brain (which is constantly updated by new visual data) may have been relevant. But it doesn't change our need to accept the assumption that there's a "real" reality as we go about our daily lives.
In a similar way, we have evolved believing in free will, where we are driven to accumulate resources in order to survive. And while I'm sure everyone here is familiar with the old matrix with 4 options, where,
- Believe in free-will - and you're right - then it's a win!
- Believe in free-will - and you're wrong - then it doesn't matter.
- Believe free-will is false - and you're right - then it doesn't matter.
- Believe free-will is false - and you're wrong - then it's a big loss.
Of course it's more nuanced than this as there's also the duality option, where we can believe in two seemingly contradictory things at the same time. In this case understanding that there are some things we can't control, allows us to both work hard to meet our goals, AND to accept the fact that we're still okay, and we can still move on and recover when the shit hits the fan.
So, if you're fortunate enough to have the time and bandwidth - and the ability to treat all this as an intellectual exercise, then that's perfectly fine. But taking the results too far, and trying to apply them to one's daily life can end up being disastrous.
pokoponcho t1_j20ryrt wrote
While I like your comment and appreciate your perspective, I disagree that thinking about the existence of free will is an impractical exercise with disastrous consequences. At least in my case, an idea about hard determinism gives me peace of mind and feel of harmony in our seemingly chaotic world.
NickDixon37 t1_j28wpod wrote
Thank you for taking my post seriously - as it's way more pedestrian than what usually counts as philosophy.
I tend to eschew most dogma, and almost all religions and formal philosophies in favor of pragmatism, as my intellectual and scientific skills are limited by my own humanity. But I also have a tendency to see right though religious and philosophical bullshit. So I don't believe in god, but I do believe in love, and beauty - and magic. And balance. Where the Serenity Prayer is a great oversimplification of the answer to the determinism debate:
>God, grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, courage to change the things I can, and wisdom to know the difference.
It's an oversimplification - because it's impossible for us to know absolutely what we can change - and what we can't. But there's still great value in trying to discern what's possible, without worrying too much about always getting it right.
pokoponcho t1_j1ytssu wrote
Here is a simple question about free will. At what exact moment of human life does it begin? We don’t choose race, family, time/place of birth, or other factors when we are born.
Naturally, children don’t have free will when they are born. They have a will because they manifest themselves by crying, etc., but their choices are unconscious.
So, let’s say that the first act of “free will” occurs when a toddler chooses a banana instead of an apple. That happens at 10:00:00 PST on March 12, 2022. So, at 9:59:59 PST on March 12, 2022, the toddler didn’t have free will and one second later, he magically did.
But what happened in that one second? Nothing magical. ALL events in his life + a myriad of other factors mechanically made him make that “choice.” One second later, he makes another “choice” and so on, before he kicks the bucket.
So at what point his choice became free from everything prior and everything present?
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j1z51a0 wrote
>Here is a simple question about free will. At what exact moment of human life does it begin?
Not sure if that makes sense. It's like asking At what exact moment of human life does "happiness" begin?
​
>We don’t choose race, family, time/place of birth, or other factors when we are born.
You are your genetics and upbringing, they aren't something separate to yourself.
We aren't talking about being God, so you don't need absolute control over your own genetics and physical being.
​
>So, let’s say that the first act of “free will” occurs when a toddler chooses a banana instead of an apple. That happens at 10:00:00 PST on March 12, 2022. So, at 9:59:59 PST on March 12, 2022, the toddler didn’t have free will and one second later, he magically did.
Free will is about actions. Think of it as being able to walk. One moment the toddler couldn't walk and then one moment it could. Nothing magical about that.
>So at what point his choice became free from everything prior and everything present?
Most people have compatibilist intuitions, where you don't need to be free from everything prior and present.
Seems like you are talking about libertarian free will that doesn't exist, but that doesn't matter since most people are really talking about compatibilist free will which does exist.
pokoponcho t1_j20j8bu wrote
Let me elaborate.
Each human as a whole - body, thoughts, actions, etc. - is a dynamic product of genetics, life experiences, and external circumstances (or, more precisely, external influences). The last two elements are ever-changing and interact between themselves and our genetic structure.
So, back to our example: the toddler chooses a banana over an apple. Why?
There can be many obvious and not obvious reasons for that choice.
Maybe it's color or taste or neuro association in the child's brain or whatever.
What matters is t-1 moment before the first *choice*, the combo of genetics, life experiences, and external circumstances was out of the toddler's control. And that combo made the toddler choose a banana over an apple.
So, why do we call it free will if the toddler had no control over choosing a banana or apple?
A human's existence from conception to death is a sequence of moments -- seconds, milliseconds, and so on. Do we agree that up until some moment, a human cannot exercise a free choice? What free choice a newborn baby has?
Can we also agree that up to the moment of the first manifestation of what we view as a free choice, the prior moment has a combo of genetics, life experiences, and external circumstances that are out of the child's control?
Each process and action has a beginning and end within a human's lifetime. So, what moment can we define as the beginning of free will?
In other words, can we define a moment when a person separates himself from a combo of genetics, life experiences, and external circumstances?
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j22vegn wrote
>What matters is t-1 moment before the first *choice*, the combo of genetics, life experiences, and external circumstances was out of the toddler's control. And that combo made the toddler choose a banana over an apple.
No, that doesn't matter at all.
>So, why do we call it free will if the toddler had no control over choosing a banana or apple?
Because it's "them" acting in line with their desires, rather than them being forced or coerced into doing them. That's a big meaningful distinction people and society uses.
So let's use the example of whether a toddler decides to hit someone.
If in one example the toddler decides due to DNA and past experiences "outside their control" that they want to hit someone and then hits someone.
Vs. If a toddler due to DNA and past experiences "outside their control" decide that they don't want to hit someone, but someone promises them a chocolate if they hit someone and that they will get beaten up if they don't.
You would treat the toddler different depending on which. (The example probably works better using adults, but you get the point)
Basically the whole of morality and justice are based on this concept of compatibilist free will. Even if you deny that free will exists, you still would use the concept.
>A human's existence from conception to death is a sequence of moments -- seconds, milliseconds, and so on. Do we agree that up until some moment, a human cannot exercise a free choice? What free choice a newborn baby has?
>
>Can we also agree that up to the moment of the first manifestation of what we view as a free choice, the prior moment has a combo of genetics, life experiences, and external circumstances that are out of the child's control?
>
>Each process and action has a beginning and end within a human's lifetime. So, what moment can we define as the beginning of free will?
There is no beginning. This whole analysis just makes no sense, since you aren't talking about what anyone really means by the term. You are talking about being God, not free will.
>In other words, can we define a moment when a person separates himself from a combo of genetics, life experiences, and external circumstances?
They aren't different. You could say free will is just a property used when analysing deterministic systems of genetics and environments.
Again you are talking about libertarian free will, which is just incoherent and makes no sense. Libertarian free will DOESN'T EXIST. It makes no sense to talk about it or use such a definition.
pokoponcho t1_j23pesx wrote
A piece of advice. If you want to be taken seriously on this sub and in life:
- Try to comprehend what the other person is saying, even if your view is different.
- Use sound arguments.
Good luck!
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j23pza8 wrote
You've given such a basic take, it's not hard to understand.
But yes, your advice is really good, maybe you should meditate on it.
Here are some basic starting points
pokoponcho t1_j23ypyw wrote
I agree. Cause->effect and starting point of something are basic things. Philosophy combines basic things into logical concepts to help us understand this world. You reject the classic doctrine of philosophy - hard determinism - by nothing but "it doesn't make sense" arguments.
You percept free will as a capacity to make a conscious choice. My point is that our capacity is pre-determined by consecutive interactions between our genes, life experiences, and external influences.
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j242jdl wrote
Again.
Libertarian free will DOESN'T EXIST, but that doesn't matter since most people really mean compatibilist free will which is compatible with a deterministic universe.
Arguments about why libertarian free will doesn't exist don't apply to compatibilist free will. They are completely different things.
Compatibilist free will could be said to be based on the doctrine of determinism.
Hence it makes no sense to use any determinism based arguments against it.
pokoponcho t1_j24fnrl wrote
Please, help me to understand your position. Can you explain the difference between libertarian free will and what you understand under a free will?
Britannica seems to use a libertarian approach to define free will in general: "free will, in philosophy and science, the supposed power or capacity of humans to make decisions or perform actions independently of any prior event or state of the universe."
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j2517if wrote
I'm sure there are other definitions, but I use something like free will is about "the ability to make voluntary actions in line with your desires free from external coercion/influence".
Free will is key in morality and justice, so I like to understand how the courts define and use it. Lets use a real life example of how the Supreme Court considers free will.
​
>It is a principle of fundamental justice that only voluntary conduct – behaviour that is the product of a free will and controlled body, unhindered by external constraints – should attract the penalty and stigma of criminal liability.
>
>https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1861/index.do
In the case of R. v. Ruzic
>The accused had been coerced by an individual in Colombia to smuggle cocaine into the United States. He was told that if he did not comply, his wife and child in Colombia would be harmed.
The Supreme Court found that he didn't smuggle the cocaine of his own free will. He didn't do it in line with his desires free from external coercion. Hence he was found innocent.
​
Compare that to the average case of smuggling where someone wants to make some money and isn't coerced into doing it. If they smuggle drugs then they did it of their own "free will" and would likely be found guilty.
You can also see how the courts aren't using the libertarian definition in Powell v Texas, where they tried a defence that it wasn't of their own free will since they were an alcoholic. While this argument shows they didn't have libertarian freewill, they did have compatibilist free will, hence they were found guilty.
So even if you are a hard determinist, you would need to use this idea around coercion(that the courts call free will). Even if you don't use free will by name you would have to use the concept.
pokoponcho t1_j25kqrv wrote
Thank you for the detailed answer.
Not only do we use different definitions of free will but also different approaches to the subject.
You are talking about the usefulness and practicality of the concept of free will for society. My original comment had nothing to do with that.
In any case, thanks for your time. I learned new things.
42fy t1_j200ypq wrote
Here again is an example where distinguishing agency from free will is helpful. There is a point where the baby becomes a conscious agent, taking actions based on deliberative processes. But these processes are still wholly physically determined. I wrote more about this concept of agency in a comment above.
breadandbuttercreek t1_j1wx8nc wrote
"how all actions or events are determined by prior actions or events"
The problem is that there are an infinite number of prior events determining any event, (even in the seconds just before an event) and most of these are chaotic atomic/molecular scale events. You can't seperate events based on scale, they are all events and they all affect the future.
Then you have the problem of the big bang. In a determinist universe everything expands in a uniform manner, there is no time and no complexity. It is only by introducing quantum uncertainty that we get a universe at all.
[deleted] t1_j1y8j6f wrote
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breadandbuttercreek t1_j1yg6q1 wrote
With all the determinists on r/philosophy I would be disappointed if I wasn't downvoted. I would expect more, they must be determined to ignore me.
xyllria t1_j1y9ip9 wrote
That sounds like the concept of a quantum computer made analogous to our human brain! Sorta cool! And Ive always liked to consider that different regions of space move independently from others, it's hard to perceive because it is in nature nothing, and I do try to acknowledge along a certain line what's outside of our biological perception, and I wonder if perhaps the universe on a larger scale tends to expand, then eventually contracts back over time to a singularity point/blackhole with allll da mass in the cosmos and den explodes again! Is it just me or is there a very identifiable balance made analogous over so many different scales? I don't think there's much actual consideration for me as to the world being solely deterministic, really because of the size of the universe it doesn't make sense that of all the things to happen, that they'd all happen the same. I've spent a LOT of time grasping scale of size, not only in distance but in time. It's all too true that when considering that "big bang" event, we are being silly to assume that there was a definitive "before", or that we're even in an "after" rather one of many, and at a higher scale too, there's not likely "boundaries" to space at reaches or an edge I don't think. I think the kind of cycle we exist in exists in space, just people should expand what they define space as.
Aka-Pulc0 t1_j1wsyj0 wrote
Dr. Sabine Hossenfelder's video about free will (mentioned in the article) was called out by a French youtube channel for the same pitfalls that the article fell into. In short, the article's argument is as follow: 1 The world is Deterministic 2 I am part of the world 3 Deterministic = No free will 4 Hence, I have no free will.
Point 1 and 2 are basics for the deterministic view of the world but 3 is actually far stretch and therefore, 4 is a fallacy. There is a whole branch of philosophy (compatibilism) that argue quite well that you can have free will even in a deterministic world. I ll try to explain it tomorrow if some need the argument (too late for Tonight)