>as an engineer I wanted to know what philosophers thought of AI ethics, but every time I tried to look for it, I only found people talking about superintelligence or Artificial general intelligence (AGI) will kill us all.

I'm afraid, in that case you are either not looking hard enough or are looking at the wrong places.

I would recommend you begin by looking into the domain of "technology/computer and ethics". So, for example, you will find a plethora of works collected under various titles such as Value Sensitive Design, Machine Ethics etc.

That being said, it may also be helpful to clarify some elements of your article, which are a bit disturbing.

First, you invoke the Shoah and then focus on Arendt's work in that regard. But, with specific reference to your own situation, the more relevant reference would have been to Aktion T4 of the Nazis (This is an article that lays out how and where the program began). As is well known, the rationale underlying that mass murder system (and it was a "system") was grounded, specifically, on eugenics, and, more abstractly, on the notion of an "idealized human". The Shoah, on the other hand, was grounded on a racial principle according to which any race considered to be "non-Aryan" was a valid target of a racial cleaning program, which resulted in the Shoah. It is important to be conceptually clear about these two distinct operative concepts: The T4 program was one of mass murder; the Shoah was an act of genocide. One may not immediately appreciate the difference, but let me assure you, the difference matters both in legal and in ethico-political terms. This is a controversial perspective in what is considered "Holocaust Studies", but it is, in my opinion, a distinction to be aware of.

Second, the notion of "evil" that you impute to AI is rather imprecise. It is so because it is likely based on an imaginary and speculative notion of AI. Perhaps a more productive way to approach this problem would be to look through the lens of what Gernot Böhme refers to as "invasive technification". There is a lot of work that is being done on the ethical issues surrounding this notion of progressive technification given some of the problems that are arising as a consequence of this emergent and evolving process. The Robodebt problem is a classic example. As Prof. van den Hengen (quoted in the article) points out

>Automation of some administrative social security functions is a very good idea, and inevitable. The problem with Robodebt was the policy, not the technology. The technology did what it was asked very effectively. The problem is that it was asked to do something daft.

This is, generally speaking, also true about most other computerized systems including the "AI systems" that are driving military and combat systems.

Thus, I'd argue that the ethico-moral concern needs to be targeted towards the designers of the systems, the users of the system and only secondarily to the technologies involved. Some, of course, disagree with this. They contend that we should be looking to (and here they slip into a kind of speculative and futuristic mode) design "artificial moral machines", that is to say, machines that are intrinsically capable of engaging in moral behaviour. This is a longer and more detailed treatment of the subject of "moral machines". I have serious reservations about this, but that is irrelevant in this context.

In conclusion, I would like to say that while I am empathetic to your personal situation, but the article that you have shared, while appreciated, is not really on the mark. This kind of a discussion requires a more nuanced and carefully thought out approach, and an awareness of the work that has been done and which is being done in the field currently.

If the goal is to morals gate ANI, then the process is limited to the rule construction methodology of instruction writers. This would be the banality of evil within such a system, culpability. It's furthered by the apathy of iteration where a narrowed optimization ai obfuscates instruction sets to greyscale through black box, thereby enabling a loss of complete understanding while denying culpability as 'wasn't me' while pointing at a blackish box they built themselves.

In the case of facebook, the obviousness of the effect has no bearing. It has virtually no consequence without a culpability the current justice system is capable of attending to. Whether due to a lack of applicable laws, or the adver$arial nature of the system, or the expectation of 'free market' corrections by 'rational people', the end product is highly representative of the banality that has no impetus to change.