Submitted by owlthatissuperb t3_102cui4 in philosophy
jliat t1_j310za2 wrote
Reply to comment by Dissident_is_here in Free Will, Willpower, and Randomness by owlthatissuperb
I'm arguing about the idea of free will, and a materialism based on cause and effect. Thus the idea that such is the case. Imagine such a universe, how different would t be to a factory that manufactures automobiles? Now it would be surprising if these acted differently?
Not trolling. Here is another argument, though not my own which demonstrates the determinists problem.
Physical determinism can't invalidate our experience as free agents.
From John D. Barrow – using an argument from Donald MacKay.
Consider a totally deterministic world, without QM etc. Laplace's vision realised. We know the complete state of the universe including the subjects brain. A person is about to choose soup or salad for lunch. Can the scientist given complete knowledge infallibly predict the choice. NO. The person can, if the scientist says soup, choose salad.
The scientist must keep his prediction secret from the person. As such the person enjoys a freedom of choice.
The fact that telling the person in advance will cause a change, if they are obstinate, means the person's choice is conditioned on their knowledge. Now if it is conditioned on their knowledge – their knowledge gives them free will.
I've simplified this, and Barrow goes into more detail, but the crux is that the subjects knowledge determines the choice, so choosing on the basis of what one knows is free choice.
And we can make this simpler, the scientist can apply it to their own choice. They are free to ignore what is predicted.
“From this, we can conclude that either the logic we employ in our understanding of determinism is inadequate to describe the world in (at least) the case of self-conscious agents, or the world is itself limited in ways that we recognize through the logical indeterminacies in our understanding of it. In neither case can we conclude that our understanding of physical determinism invalidates our experience as free agents.”
Dissident_is_here t1_j31v0dv wrote
So much wrong here. Where to start?
First of all, my original post did not even imply materialism. Nowhere did I state that all mental states have a physical basis, merely that some do. If you are going to deny that, then please explain to me how it is that reading this is producing thoughts in your head? Or seeing pigments on a piece of cloth produces the sensation of color? Even the most hardcore dualist has to acknowledge the connection between mind and brain.
Second, you seem to be stuck on this point that a deterministic world is like a factory that produces the same things over and over. The world is so, so far away from this that I'm unclear how you came to that conclusion. Let's remove life from the question. Is the world of minerals, rocks, chemicals, etc. deterministic? If it is, voila, a deterministic world that produces nothing identical. Science is unsurprised. There is of course quantum indeterminacy, but this is not well understood and even then, would just be randomness. I certainly hope this is not what you are looking to in order to avoid determinism. If this world is not deterministic, please give me the mechanism outside of cause and effect that influences it.
Finally, even though my post wasn't an argument about whether or not we have free will, but rather my opinion on what type of free will argumentation is best from a deterministic point of view, I'll respond to the free will argument you posted. It is quite poor in my opinion. The scientist, or Laplace's demon, or whoever is in the position to know all deterministic factors possible, would also know the effect their telling would have upon the person making the choice. This is simply another deterministic factor. The knowledge that a person has about what is being predicted, or what is being deliberated in their own mind, is itself a causal factor. This is the fly in the ointment for libertarians. All factors they can mention when talking about choices must be causal, or not. If they are causal - whether we are talking about microbes, neurons, knowledge, outside interaction, or pure contemplation - then we are speaking about cause and effect: a process with a conclusion defined by its beginning. If not causal, then we must introduce randomness - this too is of course problematic, because randomness, even more than causality, removes the agent's freedom. So which class does "their knowledge" (that of the choice-maker) fall into? Is it causal? Then the choice is not free. Is it random? Then also, not free.
jliat t1_j323oi2 wrote
> So much wrong here. Where to start?
Tip: When reading something you think wrong, don't jump to assumptions, ask questions to get where the other guy is coming from.
> First of all, my original post did not even imply materialism. Nowhere did I state that all mental states have a physical basis, merely that some do.
I need to go back and find it.
“You don't need any conception of physics to arrive logically at the conclusion that the common conception of "free will" is an absurdity. The best arguments deal solely with what we know of the way minds work and their connection to what we know of the brain and biological life in general.”
Reading the above it is not clear that you think some mental states have a non physical basis, so do you. For my part I can't see why 'free will' cannot have a physical basis, I see nothing other than that and the information within such a process.
> If you are going to deny that, then please explain to me how it is that reading this is producing thoughts in your head?
I've no idea. I suspect it's a fairly complex process, as yet unknown. I might add, the physical processes of say this CPU is well known. What it is capable of doing is not.
> Even the most hardcore dualist has to acknowledge the connection between mind and brain.
I see no connection – they are one and the same- is my best guess.
> Second, you seem to be stuck on this point that a deterministic world is like a factory that produces the same things over and over.
It's the idea of Newton, and the determinism of Laplace.
> The world is so, so far away from this that I'm unclear how you came to that conclusion.
Which is my point. The world does not seem to run on mechanical determinism.
> Let's remove life from the question. Is the world of minerals, rocks, chemicals, etc. deterministic?
I doubt it.
> If it is, voila, a deterministic world that produces nothing identical.
Which why I doubt it. Like a die, throwing is get you 1,2,3,4,5,6 – never 7.
> Science is unsurprised.
What does that mean. When Rutherford split the atom he was surprised, gob smacked in fact.
> There is of course quantum indeterminacy, but this is not well understood and even then, would just be randomness.
I'm guessing your not a scientist. Or am I, but I think QM is very well understood. As for randomness, again “just”, that's not the case.
> I certainly hope this is not what you are looking to in order to avoid determinism.
I'm not avoiding it. I just would like proof.
“That the sun will rise to-morrow, is an hypothesis; and that means that we do not know whether it will rise.”
> If this world is not deterministic, please give me the mechanism outside of cause and effect that influences it.
I can't, or can I refute Hume's famous analysis of 'cause and effect' being a psychological phenomena. Or Nietzsche's? That the actual reasoning is always from the effect to the cause. Or that some, like Julian Barbour think time, events, are illusions, in which case how can an effect follow a cause. Or problems in SR with simultaneity...?
> I'll respond to the free will argument you posted. It is quite poor in my opinion.
OK, but as a 'flag' it was made by two very smart guys.
> The scientist, or Laplace's demon, or whoever is in the position to know all deterministic factors possible, would also know the effect their telling would have upon the person making the choice.
Yes, that's part of the killer effect. Maybe you don't get it, the machine, or demon goes into a endless self reference, unless it keeps the prediction secret. But that exposes another fault, found in Tristram Shandy.
My knowledge now T1, say is K1. I then predict T2, which changes my knowledge at T1, to knowing K1 and K2, but then my knowledge is K3, knowing K1 and K2... etc. An infinite regression occurs.
> This is simply another deterministic factor. The knowledge that a person has about what is being predicted, or what is being deliberated in their own mind, is itself a causal factor.
Whatever, the predictor can't predict. They can lie, but that isn't a prediction. They say soup, I choose salad.
> If they are causal -
They are- the argument is clever, it accepts the idea, it's a form of reducto absurdism. The demon, machine falls into an endless loop of self causation.
> a process with a conclusion defined by its beginning.
Sure, and it can then never get going, it ends at the beginning in this case in a salad/soup
loop. Imagine a picture of you in your room, I give it to you, you see in the picture a picture of you in the room, and the picture... ad infinitum. You cannot see the picture of you in the room looking at the picture as the picture extends to infinity.
> If not causal, then we must introduce randomness
No need. The idea has been refuted.
> this too is of course problematic, because randomness, even more than causality, removes the agent's freedom.
How can it remove it more?
> So which class does "their knowledge" (that of the choice-maker) fall into? Is it causal? Then the choice is not free. Is it random? Then also, not free.
Do you know the mechanism for intelligence? Are you intelligent? My answer is No, and yes to some extent.
Intelligence is useful though, so is free, non deterministic – will.
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