Viewing a single comment thread. View all comments

gian_mav t1_j331p6u wrote

Ethics are subjective. What each of us see as a duty is an arbitrary preference. Morality satisfies the worldview of its beholder.

>If the utility coach would maximize a persons utility, without harming others, would you force that person to accept the utility coach’s offer?

Well at that point the coach is inherently not maximising for personal utility but for collective utility instead, so the question really becomes "do you think it is moral to drastically limit people's freedom if you were guaranteed to achieve the greatest amount of human fulfilment" to which I would say yes. This isn't the original question asked though.

Also I would like to point out that this would be moral only in a hypothetical, because in reality there are no guarantees and the risk would be too big for comfort to me. I wouldn't want to trust a single human with that kind of power, no matter how noble their intentions.

I have to say though, this was a pretty interesting and thought provoking discussion. Have a good one man.

1

contractualist OP t1_j34i9xu wrote

My substack argues that objective morality does exist (its wrong to torture babies for fun for example, regardless of one's own opinion).

The last section of asks whether you would force others to accept the utility coach. I even state: "My question is whether you would force other people to sign-up for the lifeplan." I'm not interested in one's personal choice, but how far this personal choice should be imposed onto others.

If satisfaction is all you care about, then people would be obligated to force others to accept the utility coach's offer. However, I argue that people should be free to make their own decisions, regardless of the amount of welfare on the table. And this personal freedom is valuable beyond personal welfare. Its something to be respected for its own sake, and its fundamental to ethics.

1

gian_mav t1_j360io3 wrote

>My substack argues that objective morality does exist (its wrong to torture babies for fun for example, regardless of one's own opinion).

It is immoral only if you value human life and consider causing suffering to humans immoral. Imagine an intelligent alien that holds that only aliens of its species have inherent value and everything else has value insofar as it effects the lives of other aliens. How could you convince him that his morality is "wrong"?

>The last section of asks whether you would force others to accept the utility coach. I even state: "My question is whether you would force other people to sign-up for the lifeplan." I'm not interested in one's personal choice, but how far this personal choice should be imposed onto others. If satisfaction is all you care about, then people would be obligated to force others to accept the utility coach's offer. However, I argue that people should be free to make their own decisions, regardless of the amount of welfare on the table. And this personal freedom is valuable beyond personal welfare. Its something to be respected for its own sake, and its fundamental to ethics.

The one you presented and the one I would be ok with are fundamentally different. The questions "would you force someone to maximise their personal happiness" and "would you force someone to increase the happiness of humans collectively" are incomparable. I think the second is moral, but in no way is it the same coach as the one you presented.

1

contractualist OP t1_j36wx5m wrote

Yes, I agree, there is an is-ought distinction. I'm not a moral naturalist. I discuss the values necessary to create morality here. Morality is those principles that cannot be reasonably rejected in a hypothetical bargain behind a veil of ignorance. You have to value human freedom and reason to be motivated to obey that agreement, but morality exists in that sense whether or not someone has the requisite values to be moral.

>The questions "would you force someone to maximise their personal happiness" and "would you force someone to increase the happiness of humans collectively" are incomparable.

If you are a utilitarian, and welfare is your only standard of ethics, then there is no difference. Both questions only weigh an increase in welfare against coercion. I would argue that coercion in both questions is unjustified, but is there a principled distinction that you have between the two questions where they should be differentiated?

1