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contractualist OP t1_j34h8zw wrote

>So if you ask whether a utilitarian should hire the coach for themselves or others, the answer is probably no to both because doing so probably doesn't result in higher utility for society.

Although it would. Whether for yourself or someone else or society as a whole, the utility coach would increase utility.

And it wouldn't be forced on anyone because peoples free choices are to be respected. Paternalism is justified to a very limited extent, but not for all possible decisions.

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rvkevin t1_j3b3h19 wrote

>Although it would. Whether for yourself or someone else or society as a whole, the utility coach would increase utility.

With this stipulated, the decision is a no-brainer; it should be forced on everyone.

>And it wouldn't be forced on anyone because peoples free choices are to be respected.

Based on what justification? Typically we respect people’s free choices because they know their preferences better than we do, but that doesn’t apply in this hypothetical. Even if you say that freedom is a good in itself has its own utility, we have already considered that utility when taking away their free will (in that the loss of that utility is overcome by the gain in utility by having the utility coach). You basically have to treat freedom as having infinite value, but as you start out saying: “No value is ever so sacred that it can never be exchanged for another value.” What is special about freedom that makes it override all other welfare considerations?

When a moral system places freedom on a pedestal above all other values, you get moral issues relating to criminals. Should we respect a criminals free choice to harm and not restrict their freedom? Either freedom is sacrosanct and can’t be traded with other values and we should let criminals run free or freedom is something that can be exchanged with other welfare considerations and allows us to trade it for the higher utility that the utility coach gives them.

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contractualist OP t1_j3dg9tj wrote

It shouldn't be forced because people would reasonably reject giving up their freedom of conscious for welfare (principles that can't be reasonably rejected are ethical principles). Because of that, no one has the right to coerce someone else's conscious.

People would agree to principles that would allow for criminal law (as well as a welfare state and a duty to rescue). However, they wouldn't allow their freedom of conscious to be controlled by another. Whether to accept the utility coach's lifeplan is their own decision. This isn't to say that freedom has infinite value, but its not subject to the will of another based on ethical principles.

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rvkevin t1_j3fwubj wrote

> It shouldn't be forced because people would reasonably reject giving up their freedom of conscious for welfare (principles that can't be reasonably rejected are ethical principles).

It's stipulated in the hypothetical that following the utility coach would increase the utility of anyone using him, so all reasonable people would give up their freedom because that's their actual preference. If you say that they prefer their freedom more than being forced to used a utility coach, you're violating an assumption of the hypothetical.

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contractualist OP t1_j3ipvbd wrote

No, the hypothetical hasn't changed. If people prefer the utility coach, then they have the right to choose for themselves. But because their freedom of conscience wouldn't be given up in the social contract, it would be immoral to take this freedom away. The argument is that people shouldn't be forced to be happy.

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rvkevin t1_j3j12ev wrote

> It shouldn't be forced because people would reasonably reject giving up their freedom of conscious for welfare

According to the hypothetical, the bolded part is false. According to the hypothetical, every time you offer it to a reasonable person, that person would choose welfare over freedom of conscious. That's what it means for the utility coach to increase their utility, it means that the person prefers the utility coach over freedom of conscious.

>But because their freedom of conscience wouldn't be given up in the social contract, it would be immoral to take this freedom away.

When you say "No value is ever so sacred that it can never be exchanged for another value," that also applies to valuing any sort of social contract. Why would anyone care about the social contract in the hypothetical since it comes with a severe cost to society?

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contractualist OP t1_j3k33kc wrote

Because people wouldn’t want to be forced to be happy. That’s reasonable.

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rvkevin t1_j3l1a23 wrote

If people wouldn't want to be forced to be happy, then it's not the case that forcing the utility coach on people would raise their utility since utility is a direct measure of that individual's wants. However, the hypothetical assumed that forcing the utility coach on people would increase their utility, so your reasoning directly contradicts an assumption of the hypothetical.

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contractualist OP t1_j3ox7u6 wrote

I don't make the statement. I ask the question and if people have the intuition that forcing someone to be happy is wrong, I explain that intuition via the social contract. It doesn't violate the assumption given that what is right isn't solely determined by reference to utility, which is the point of the hypothetical.

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