Mission-Editor-4297 t1_j38ls98 wrote
Reply to comment by NaimKabir in Occam’s Deepest Cut: Occam's Razor isn't a guide towards the truth—it *defines* the truth by NaimKabir
Hmmm, we use the razor to eliminate false ideas quickly. It doesnt actually assist in selection so much as it narrows down criteria that we might otherwise spend time verifying. Like all ideas, this has advantages and disadvantages. The Razor is not always true, some things are naturally complex and oversimplification can cause problems.
Truth has to do with alignment, specifically being aligned with actuality: what is actually there, and not just an idea. The complexity of that alignment isnt really a factor in the truth, but it is certainly a matter of how we relate the truth.
NaimKabir OP t1_j395krh wrote
That's kind of getting at my thesis: in science, nothing is ever really there. All we have is the ability to falsify statements given some basic statements we make given sensory information.
There are a vast number of statements we can make that would be unfalsified by sense statements: what we call true are the theories and models that have highest potential for falsification. Because of some set theory assumptions I make in the article, the models with the highest potential for falsification are the simplest ones! (Out of a set of as-yet unfalsified theories)
Mission-Editor-4297 t1_j3ac3j4 wrote
I disagree entirely about the base premise here. Science is all about discovering what is actually there, by eliminating the flaws and biases inherent with our position as conscious observers. The entire premise assume that something IS there that awaits discovery. Newton didn't invent gravity, he just discovered an equation that governed the way it works, and created the name.
NaimKabir OP t1_j3adb2h wrote
You can disagree with the premise, but this is the philosophy that underlies most of scientific method today.
Science is a series of propositions that happen to be useful. Gravity is a name: we can model in different ways. In one case it's an ever-present force emanating from a mass, in other cases it's a geodesic in spacetime. These are models to put our observations into simple elegant pictures.
Reality is composed only of instances of observations: not theories (and so, not forces, laws, particles, etc.). Theories are just a net we throw over observations to give them a gestalt overall picture: but it's not real, the same way constellations aren't real. It's a picture connecting dots.
NaimKabir OP t1_j397cqe wrote
You mention verification — verification of empirical statements actually isn't possible! Because of problems with induction explored by Hume, Popper, etc where induction on empirical statements uses circular logic.
This is why science deals only with falsification!
Mission-Editor-4297 t1_j3a7808 wrote
If the statements are empirical, (based in fact, fact being credible data, data being information gained by direct observation) and scientific (based on logic which can be experimented on repeatedly with predictable outcome) then it absolutely may be verified. The best context for this depends on your intention.
Science deals with the act of falsifying, however it also accepts things which have not, or are not easily falsified, as building blocks.
We know Einsteins theory of time dilation based on speed to be true, because we tried GPS without it and it failed drastically within seconds. Once we plugged in the equation, we got GPS.
NaimKabir OP t1_j3a95k2 wrote
Verification of general principles needs us to go through for every instance of an event and check that it's true! The idea is that any theory we've got is only assumed generalizable until falsified, it can't be *true* for every domain for all time.
Hume explored it like this: Say we observe A causing B. It happens repeatedly, even when we kick off A ourselves. Is this enough to say A is always followed by B? We might say: yes, because past evidence has pointed at A->B. But why do we think past evidence means the trend will continue? We'd have to say: because past evidence has pointed at continuing trends in the past. But this argument is circular, so it can't work.
A sillier version of this argument: Descartes' evil demon. Let's say an Evil Demon has just been deceiving us with evidence at every turn, and in actuality they can stop at any time and reveal our generalizations to be poor matches for a non-Demon world. We can't be sure theories are true always (we can't do induction based on empirical fact)—we can only stick with a theory until it's falsified.
HamiltonBrae t1_j3cdftf wrote
I think these arguments apply just as well for falsification. You can't be sure that a theory that has been falsified will stay falsified in the future and won't be re-validated.
NaimKabir OP t1_j3cdv23 wrote
Thankfully just being falsified once at any point in space and time is enough to say a theory isn't generally correct for all space and time, so you can throw it out.
This asymmetry in how easy it is to prove a counterexample vs how easy it is to universally verify is why we stick with falsification as the main avenue for scientific progress.
HamiltonBrae t1_j3cenu9 wrote
No, because you don't know if there was some mistake or something which means that the finding you got at that point in space and time will never be repeated or something like that. Just like how you occasionally get these big physics experiments which get some statistically significant result that for some reason dsiappears and what they thought they found didn't really turn out to be anything. This applies just as well to falsifying as verifying.
NaimKabir OP t1_j3cfpo7 wrote
Ah yeah, in which case you recant that falsification. But as soon as you get one you're confident in, it's kinda falsified for good.
Whereas if you try verifying — you'll never know, since you can't test every instance in space in time.
HamiltonBrae t1_j3cjct0 wrote
>But as soon as you get one you're confident in, it's kinda falsified for good.
But then how do you know you can be confident. This brings in the same circular issues you criticised induction as having... because it is induction.
NaimKabir OP t1_j3cmvma wrote
Not quite, since it doesn't need to generalize, one counter example is enough. You need to be confident in just one counterexample.
In the verification scheme, you can't ever be confident because you could never test all examples ever.
In one case (falsification) confidence is at least possible, and in the other, it isn't—which makes one of them strictly better
HamiltonBrae t1_j3ctdx5 wrote
It does need to generalize because if this single counter example was flawed then it completely invalidates the whole thing. You need to be sure that this single counter example is actually valid and that if you repeated it ad infinitum you would get the same result again and again and again which you can't be sure of. There maybe an irrelevant reason why thos counter example occurred. I think there is a very well known example that I can't remember specifically which is how the orbit of some planet in the solar system actually "falsified" Newtonian mechanics, however what was not taken into account was another body affecting the orbit of that planet which skewed the result, so it appeared to falsify it when it didn't. Now surely for every event of falsification, to be one hundred percent sure you are falsifying what you think you are, you need to rule out every single one of these alternative explanations.
i think ultimately, you have to verify that your falsification is valid.
NaimKabir OP t1_j3d3znk wrote
Falsification is just when some other statement incompatible with a theory is "accepted". If you choose not to accept it again then the falsification doesn't occur. A falsification is also a single instance you are confident in. One experiment! If you do another experiment it's not a re-litigation of the previous falsification at time 1, it's actually just another falsification at time 2. You might choose not to accept Experiment 1s results for some reason, but Experiment 2 could still stand. You just need one instance you accept to falsify a theory.
To verify a theory you need to prove infinite cases
HamiltonBrae t1_j3egndi wrote
>If you choose not to accept it again then the falsification doesn't occur.
Yes, which is the same problem that induction and verification has. You can infer and verify something then later find out that you can no longer accept it. It applies just as much to falsification as verification.
>One experiment! If you do another experiment it's not a re-litigation of the previous falsification at time 1, it's actually just another falsification at time 2
Well if you are talking about the same type of phenomenon explored several times, I don't see how it is different from the classic example in induction about the sun not rising the next day. In the induction example, sun rises on day 1 but not day 2, in the falsification example instance 1 might be the orbit of some planet and instance 2 might be the discovery that the orbit is affected by some other body. in neither example do verification or falsification are capable of permanently cementing the status of the theories. the finding of the sun not rising on day 2 might even be reversed if it rises on all the days after that and you find some good explanation of why it did not rise on that particular day. my example with the planet orbits depicts a single incidence of newtownan mechanics being falsified which can conceivably be reversed, or was actually reversed depending on how correct my example was.
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