But what if objective reality, for what that actually means and entails to us, doesn't exist in truth? Yet I'd suggest it does in function.

I feel like because of our use of language and inherent ideas, it goes both ways. I could not agree more in the sense that I have profusely expressed that objective reality exists many many times. I still stand by those statements; but, I think I may be using the same words in two different ways.

Some kind of objective reality must exist. Clearly. Yet it is our description that functions. We don't feel we've found the answers, or have the facts, positive statements that express more than nothing, simply by knowing objective reality exists. This, by itself, is useless. True. Yet it means very little until we form a description of that reality. That description is what we then say is truth.

Yet none of our descriptions of it are provably true. More than that. What I'm suggesting is that we can never prove the descriptions. Our descriptions aren't true by this nature. What is logically true is only that there is something. Not what it is; yet, we can still know the function of our descriptions quite well.

When we think about the recursion, aren't any of our descriptions that we seek to call truth only sensible if we place them within the psychological constructs of our minds? Would our ideas mean something to anything else other than ourselves? Would something else conscious that has no use, no emotional attachment or curiosity towards, a specific construct, be able to understand what our truth means when that specific construct is pivotal to our truth? And yet a truth, objective reality, wants to say we should have agreement, in that it is the truth.

Perhaps we can say truth exists in different ways. Bare logic gives us one, which is what yields that objective reality exists. Maybe occams gives us another form of truth, one that is useful when the other form of truth isn't?

It isn't true that x description is an undeniable universally understood (beyond just humans) objectively accurate description. It is true that all we can know is that x description yields y result/functionality. It is true that yielding our description to that functionality provides the same kind of direction we seek from our concept of truth, the same sense as if it were objectively accurate in some universal way.