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bac5665 t1_j5pkl5h wrote

Reply to comment by token-black-dude in On Whether “Personhood” is a Normative or Descriptive Concept by ADefiniteDescription

Because those cognitive abilities are what determine ethical duties owed to that elephant. Being human is meaningless. If you go back down your family tree, parent to child to parent to child, back 5 million years, you'll have an unbroken chain, where each person on that chain is the same as the thousands on either side of it in that chain. But the end would not count as a human. It would be an australopithecine or similar animal.

The point is that species are artificial labels that have no moral weight. It must be emotional and intellectual capacity that creates moral weight. (Or divine command theory, but fortunately we have no reason to believe in that hellish possibility). To base morality off of arbitrary species labels is simply not intellectually supportable.

And because these traits are not fixed, but rather on a sliding scale, it stands to reason that personhood is on a scale as well. Just like how it's a crime to torture a dog but not to torture a flea. That distinction isn't due to some Platonic nonsense about how Dogs are imbued by the universe with rights. It's based on the individual traits of dogs, generally, compared to fleas, generally. If you found a flea that appeared somehow to have the mind of a dog, it's obvious to me that it would be due the same moral treatment that a dog is due.

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Skarr87 t1_j5puzk7 wrote

I believe it can be dangerous to base treatment of an organism on its cognitive ability alone. Say if I had greater cognitive ability than another human to the extent that the difference between me and that human was greater than the difference of that human and a flea then what justification could be given for me to not treat them as they would treat a flea? I believe my treatment of other organisms should be determined by that organism’s capacity to suffer from whatever action I am taking against it and whether that action is necessary. It’s intelligence or emotional depth shouldn’t matter ethically in my opinion. It is my belief that because humans have a tendency to treat other people and animals that are more similar to them better we also tend to frame that justification through a similar lens which is the incorrect justification.

I agree with 99% of what you said. It’s just at the last part my justification would be if the flea is capable of experiencing suffering equal to the dog is what would give me moral considerations for its treatment.

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UncleGizmo t1_j5pwjn8 wrote

You have just outlined the conundrum that many philosophies and religions try to justify or explain. A buddhist may say harming a flea and a dog are equal because we are all connected, whereas some Christian faiths delineate between humans and “lesser animals”.

It’s also why it’s not so simple to define “personhood”, as the post indicates.

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TarantinoFan23 t1_j5q5r26 wrote

What is the conundrum? Don't kill stuff. Feed everything. Farm a ton of food. Easy.

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Plutonic-Planet-42 t1_j5qrpqj wrote

So easy!

Let bacteria proliferate, don’t vaccinate, leave the tumours, and stop cleaning and eradicating 99% of all germs!

You’re being speciesist if you don’t guarantee omicron more hosts!

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RandomNumsandLetters t1_j5r35gu wrote

Don't kill stuff? Farming kills lots of tiny animals in the ground, why is it OK?

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TarantinoFan23 t1_j5r625c wrote

Its only partly okay,for now. If you appreciate their sacrifice, don't treat them poorly, and strive to create a better world without the need to subsist on other beings.

Edit: The people we eat for food today, will hopefully see they were an essential part of making the world a better place for whatever family they have left(that we didn't eat).

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swampshark19 t1_j5qitze wrote

If there was a person who does not experience any form of pain, meaning they do not suffer, by your conditions it would be justifiable to kill them.

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JonBonFucki t1_j5t2fh0 wrote

don't forget the fact that pain and suffering as we understand them cannot continue past death so technically anyone suffering in pain can have their life improved by killing them.

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token-black-dude t1_j5q5vvj wrote

> I believe my treatment of other organisms should be determined by that organism’s capacity to suffer from whatever action I am taking against it and whether that action is necessary.

I don't think this a reasonable or practical perspective. I care more about one of my kids scraping his knee, than the death of a starving child on the other side of the world, and even if they do not admit it when asked, so does everybody else, who do nothing while our society perpetuates a situation where we let starving children die. We as a society are certainly not treating people or animals according to their capacity for suffering.

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tjscobbie t1_j5sth8z wrote

You care more because evolution has saddled you with a half-baked, if any, morality. The whole reason we do philosophy and have these discussions is to transcend what we arbitrarily feel.

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Peacedude95 t1_j5suz43 wrote

This really highlights the problem with a utilitarian approach to morality. It is not practically possible to even measure the suffering of every person influenced by a single choice. We tend to restrict the individuals we consider when making a moral choic3 to make it manageable

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MouseBean t1_j5q05x0 wrote

>Because those cognitive abilities are what determine ethical duties owed to that elephant...It must be emotional and intellectual capacity that creates moral weight.

No they don't. Ethics has nothing to do with cognitive ability. Moral value is a property of systems, not individuals, and the ethical significance of individuals comes from their role in maintaining this systemic value. Ethical significance has to do with relationships, not experiences. And all living things have these relationships, every living thing has ancestors, every living thing reproduces, every living thing eats, and every living thing is eaten.

Humans or other animals are not any more significant in this regard than other organisms.

There are plenty of other alternatives to suffering-based morality that are not divine command theory.

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AhmedF t1_j5q1r1g wrote

> Ethics has nothing to do with cognitive ability

I don't fully disagree with you, but it is related - eg vegans who eat bivalves because their lack of a nervous system means they don't feel pain.

We do make distinction in how "advanced" an organism is.

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Idrialite t1_j5qld82 wrote

>they don't feel pain.

This is why, not their lack of cognitive ability.

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bac5665 t1_j5rj6n8 wrote

Pain is a cognitive ability. One of many.

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AhmedF t1_j5qo616 wrote

People who think gotchas are some form of intelligence are exhausting.

Fine - it's not pain. Are you saying any creature with any kind of cognitive ability is equivalent to you? Are ants equal to pets equal to dolphins equal to humans?

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XiphosAletheria t1_j5qmbu6 wrote

> To base morality off of arbitrary species labels is simply not intellectually supportable.

Why not? It makes more sense than pretending we base them on mental capacity, when, say, an adult crow can be significantly smarter than a month old human. We have moral obligations to humans because we are human, and because other humans can reciprocate. Other animals are not human, and cannot reciprocate, so we owe them nothing.

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token-black-dude t1_j5q4ue4 wrote

I think it is fruitful and meaningful to take a descriptive approach to ethics. From a descriptive perspective, ethics is largely about reciprocity. people feel a high degree of ethical obligation towards those closest to them, less obligation towards strangers they perceive as "in-group" and none or very little towards strangers from various out-groups. This is why people frequently to donate a kidney to a family member but ignore starving migrants. People naturally also have a justified expectation, that the obligation they themselves feel towards their loved ones, is matched by an ethical right to support the other way.

The descriptive approach to ethics is a necessary starting point for discussions about ethics, as there is no indication that people can be convinced to act based on any of the more theoretical approaches to ethics (deontology, utilitarianism, etc.).

It is hard to see how to get from mutual commitment to animal rights. In the descriptive approach, it is not difficult to explain why the senile and brain-damaged have rights, but that is impossible if cognitive abilities is taken to be the foundation of rights: I risk becoming senile and brain-damaged myself, and in that situation I wouldt still want help; I am consequently obliged to render the same assistance. On the other hand, it is difficult to see how the same contract-like relationship can arise in the relationship with an elephant. Animals can have protection to the extent that they are someone's property, they cannot enter into an ethical relationship with humans because such relationships are always based on solidarity. Pets may be an exception, but not because they have "rights", pets are also "part of the family" and given priority above human members of out-groups.

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