Viewing a single comment thread. View all comments

Terminus0 t1_iwrak8n wrote

Reply to comment by 21_MushroomCupcakes in When does an individual's death occur if the biological brain is gradually replaced by synthetic neurons? by NefariousNaz

My totally uninformed opinion, I am an engineer not a neuroscientist/philosopher, believes that as long as continuity is maintained between the totally biological brain and the synthetic rebuild, there will be the same person looking out from the inside.

A copy is not you, because you are still you so that must be someone else.

When you slowly update yourself bit by bit I don't believe there is any point in the process you can declare you as not you. This has always been my answer to the ship of Theseus problem. That the one who maintained continuity with the 'original' is the 'original'.

17

cwallen t1_iwrwt9p wrote

My nitpick with this view is that I don't see a problem seeing both versions as having continuity.

If you had nano fabricator technology, such that you could create a perfect replica of a person, to the point that you can't tell which one is the copy, they are not the same person as soon as they start having different experiences, but they both still have continuity to the person they used to be.

You are not the same person you were ten years ago, you are slightly not the same person you were yesterday. If you copy yourself, both used to be the same person, but are now two different people. Who the original is doesn't matter.

6

Forstmannsen t1_iws0pqb wrote

Yep. Actually though, it would depend on your mindset if it matters or not... but the funny thing is, if you are very attached to the idea of thinking yourself as the original, and not a mere copy, you can bet your ass that the "copy" thinks the exact same thing. Knives out, I say whoever bleeds out last is the original.

Also, this whole continuity argument is a cop-out, IMO. I fail to subjectively (which is the only way that matters) experience continuity every night, and somehow, I live with that.

3

-ZeroRelevance- t1_iwsagw0 wrote

I think there also needs to be spatial continuity, on top of the associative continuity. If you use such a nano-fabricator technology, you’re putting someone in a place that they never were, thus breaking continuity and meaning they are not the same person. On the other hand, if you just replace all the cells in your brain with artificial ones, there is still both associative and spatial continuity, so the end result is still you.

2

SufficientPie t1_iws03qa wrote

> believes that as long as continuity is maintained between the totally biological brain and the synthetic rebuild, there will be the same person looking out from the inside.

So when you fall asleep at night, you die, and are replaced by an imposter the next day with the same memories?

If not, how about people who undergo deep hypothermic circulatory arrest, in which heart and brain activity completely cease?

I don't believe continuity of consciousness is required for continuity of personhood.

2