If practical reason is an expression of what a person cares about, then they should contribute to society if they care about other people in society. A person may also benefit from contributing to society by improving their own social reputation.

I am a moral nihilist (error theorist) and this is what I think remains of practical reason if morality does not exist.

I consider myself an anti-natalist but also an amoralist. I do not use any moral argument to defend my anti-natalist position, but instead put forward what I care about and what this entails. In this way, I care most about strangers whose suffering is so extreme, prolonged and awful that their lives might be considered fates worse than death; subjectively so, from both their own and my own point of view. I still care about other people, almost universally, but the top of my priorities are people (and animals) in extreme suffering whose existences I would rather see prevented.

I do not know if this is a unique psychological quirk I have, or if other people can be convinced of the same, but I really cannot stand the thought of even a single individual leading a life of extreme suffering and mostly tearful existence; each life of predominant suffering can be considered a universe of horrors on its own. But consider the scale of suffering on Earth: this planet is estimated to be able to sustain life for a maximum of another billion years. This undeniably means at least billions, but realistically trillions, of humans and animals who will need to endure horrifying lives, even according to most standards. Even if most individuals lead happy lives, these billions or trillions of predominantly miserable lives are what I would like to prevent at their very root.

That said, I value the lives of myself, my friends and family higher than mere strangers. But if I was completely selfless and had no friends and family, I would want the erasure of all life on this planet out of simple altruism. The reason I can consider myself an anti-natalist despite being partially selfish, as well as not willing to sacrifice my friends and family, is that the lifeless world I want would likely take centuries to achieve. And even then, a small retinue of humanity would likely need to continue existing, only to prevent the undeniable horrors of Darwinian evolution to kick-start once again.

Moral abolitionism is a position that seeks to minimize moral discourse in one's life, which I would recommend based on your goal.

>[...] those who think of our reasons as ultimately connected to our contingent values and concerns should be especially attracted to the potential rewards of moving beyond moral discourse. For that discourse is not conducted in terms of what we care about or value. Rather, it is conducted in the language of rights, duties, obligations, requirements, impermissibility, and the like. Whether one is bound by various duties and such is not thought to depend on one’s contingent values, and therefore such discussion not only does not encourage, but positively discourages, investigation into what it is that we actually care about —how much, in what ways, and with what priority rankings.

(Article, Breakdown of Moral Judgment by Eric Campbell)

Thanks for the clarification :)

>What I said was: perhaps having a bad life is better than never living at all.

I am not the person you are responding to, but I think value judgments like this are entirely subjective. In this sense, OP can judge that a life is not worth living within her perspective, and you can judge that a life is worth living within your own. The person whose life is miserable can also judge whether his/her life is worth living or not. All of you can be correct in this manner.

It is important to me that people are also able to weave this subjectivism into their discourse. To recognize other people's values and desires as valid expressions, and not shut them down as unreasonable and wrong.

As before, this approach requires recognizing subjectivism with regard to reasons and values. I am rather extreme as I would be considered amoral to some (which is my own preference), and a moral relativist to others. My objective is to remove any unnecessary middlemen/intermediaries (e.g. moral obligations and experiences of external values) to expressing our cares and concerns.