Not sure, it's an extremely fuzzy term/concept which originates from various ancient Indian philosophies & religion, it may possess different definitions when utilised in different schools of thought. In general though, as hinted by the name it's simply the rejection/denial of duality.

I fully understand it, I used to actively partake in it & I've had various 'non dual' experiences. Since looking deeper into philosophy my opinions have changed though.

Ok, I'm not sure this conversation is going anywhere. I've continually argued it isn't an illusion but you don't seem to agree. We'll leave it at that.

>Again, you cant have an experience without an experiencer, an observer without the observed, a tango without two. The self is real in this.

Right, this is typically what non - dualists try to claim is an illusion, but as argued above this seems false, in reality what is described is pre-reflective self-consciousness, not some self illusion.

This might be relevant, Jay Garfield published a book quite a while ago which largely argued we intuitively see ourselves as separate. See Evan Thompson's reponse below -

https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/losing-ourselves-learning-to-live-without-a-self/

Ok, I still don't exactly see how the self is an illusion. Are you saying the self appears as something separate but in actuality it's not, thus the illusion? I've got quite a bit of experience debating non dualists & generally quite a lot of thoughts regarding these kinds of topics etc.

Firstly, I don't see how the self is experienced as an illusion (a claim non dualists like to make). What's really happening is a kind of pre-reflective self-consciousness, which is simply indicating the fact that consciousness is reflexive -- that is consciousness is at the same time consciousness of consciousness. Moreover, it's so even if it is not discursively or reflectively noted in thoughts "I am conscious". See the quote below -

"To be self-aware is not to capture a pure self or self-object that exists separately from the stream of experience, rather it is to be conscious of one’s experience in its intrinsic first-person mode of givenness. When Hume, in a famous passage in A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), declares that he cannot find a self when he searches his experiences, but finds only particular perceptions or feelings, it could be argued that he overlooks something in his analysis, namely the specific givenness of his own experiences. "

They also like to say there is no self to be found within experience, but I also find this problematic. Why should anyone (who is not terribly confused and who isn't pre-committed to Humean framework of analysis) expect the self to be "part" of experience? What if I believed the self to be the transcendental subject that grounds experience and bind togethers the 'bundles of impressions' diachronically and synchronically for the unity of consciousness or something along this line? It's a reasonable speculation (although we shouldn't buy this idea immediately without critical evaluation of what exactly are its implication), and yet simply 'not finding self in experience' would have no implication for someone who believes the self to be such. In fact that would be precisely what this position would predict -- that you will not find a 'self' in experience.

Particularly, even if I believed that I am a separate 'self' behind the experiences as something that has experiences -- how does not finding any 'self' in experience prove anything? If I am indeed a 'separate' experiencer, precisely because of that, I would expect to not find 'myself' IN experiences.

If anything finding a 'self' IN experience (whatever that would even mean) would probably be a better argument 'against' the existence of a 'separate' self.

Once you even begin to look for a 'self' in experience as if it's even a candidate of something to be found in experience, you would already be starting from a question-begging framework against someone who would, even semi-coherently, believe in any 'separate self' (whatever that even means).

>It is an illusion, you see your “self” as separate from your experience.

No I don't, I see 'myself' as that upon which has the experiences, i.e the organism/human being as a whole.

Right, I thought so, so you're saying ultimately there is 'one self' that everyone is, I'm familiar with these kinds of frameworks. I was just trying to argue against the idea the self is experienced as an illusion, which is typically what non dualists like to claim.

>There is a self, but its not a separate self, an experiencer, but not separate from the experience.

I'm confused, are you saying there is a self or there isn't a self?

>By “I” i dont mean the human being, i mean the experiencer behind all experience, to which no labels (except for the purposes of this conversation (“I”)) can be attributed to.

What is this experiencer behind all experiences exactly? It sounds like you're describing some sort of self?

>And if nothing is separate, then nothing exists, bc in order to have “some-thing” you have to have something else to reference it.

Depends what you mean by separate, but I'm not sure how you've jumped to the conclusion that 'nothing exists,' what do you mean by this exactly?

>This is known as non-dualism. And is why there is a buddhist belief in “no-self” or nothing separate.

Two very separate schools of thought. Anyway, while Buddhists seem to deny a self, Vedantins (advaita vedantins) and others, argue there precisely is a self -- a substratum witness consciousness which grounds change in the first place. Both can be non-dual experiences because the experience is not separate from the witness consciousness. Advanced meditators tend to disagree on these topics, you can come away from such experiences with conclusions that there is a self, much like you can come away with no - self conclusions.

>My question is why do they have methods, if there is no “I” that can really do anything. If my will is the universes will as a whole.

This is a question regarding free will. Most modern day philosophers seem to be compatibilists, the belief that free will is compatible with determinism (which is what I presume you mean by the 'will of the universe.)' In terms of there being no 'I' that can do anything, it's unclear what you're saying. I am a human being who has certain kinds of capacities - rationality, decision making, bodily movement etc, I can clearly do 'things.' But I suppose you're concerned with this potentially being some kind of an illusion, wherein whilst I may think I am acting freely in reality it's the 'will of the universe.' For counter arguments to all our actions being the 'will of the universe' look into compatibilism -

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/

>And the idea of “me” is an illusion that the prenatal “I” attaches to over time

How have you come to that conclusion? It doesn't seem entirely clear the self is experienced as an illusion.

>What can “i” do, if there is no “i”.

Are you trying to deny your own existence here? All the pronoun 'I' refers to is the human being that you are, so unless you're denying you're a human being I'm not sure what the problem is.