Could you please elaborate on how the argument “holds no water” other than stating that there are some who might disagree with it? I would appreciate it if you addressed the premises it’s build upon rather than broadly rejecting them.

Regarding vagueness of the words “good” and “bad”, you might have a point here, but I’d rather we got to the underlying virtue ethics after addressing more general problems one might have with those premises. As for the argument itself, however, I think even an approach as simplistic as negative utilitarianism (which I myself am not overly fond of, but I digress) would suffice to demonstrate the validity of my dichotomy in relation to the morality of having children.

Ah, but procreating is inherently immoral. I wanted to discuss one of my favourite arguments in favour of antinatalism, but the person defending natalism deleted their comments shortly before I had a chance to respond. Guess I’ll just leave my reply here.

For starters: you cannot possibly prevent suffering in anyone’s life, really. You can only attempt at reducing it. No matter how much love, affection and protection you provide for your child in an attempt to ensure they live their best life, there will be always a possibility of them getting kidnapped, raped, murdered, otherwise violently harmed, or inevitably dying of either chronic illness or senescence if they somehow avoid all of the above. Therefore, you are to blame for imposing the capacity to suffer on your child (that would otherwise not exist and accordingly not suffer).

Now, bringing someone into existence generates both good and bad experiences, suffering and pleasure, whereas not doing so generates neither suffering nor pleasure. We both agree that the absence of suffering is good. The happiness they experience throughout life is also good; however, a lack thereof is only a negative factor for the already existing, because only they can have the negative experience of deprivation. Therefore, a lack of pleasure for the unborn child is not bad in a moral sense.

To simplify and, hopefully, systematise this for the experiencing individual:

1. The presence of pain (suffering) is bad.
2. The presence of pleasure (happiness) is good.
3. The absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone.
4. The absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation.

And an additional dichotomy that necessarily follows from these conclusions, if I may:

1. There is no moral obligation to produce a child even if we could be sure that it will be very happy throughout its life.
2. There is a moral obligation not to produce a child if it can be foreseen that it will be unhappy.

We can clearly see that even with the grossly unrealistic assumption that the amount of happiness in one’s life quantitatively outweighs the amount of suffering, the ethical choice is weighed in favor of non-procreation.

Forcing existence upon someone is inherently egotistical.

My advice would rather be that if you want children and think you can manage parenting incredibly well, you should adopt a child instead of procreating. That way you actually reduce suffering instead of creating it in the first place (and forcing the burden of human consciousness upon the individual, little things like that).

Antinatalism gang!